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Summary
A demographic balance in desirable occupations is socially important. Compared
to white males, women and people of colour tend to have lower labour market out-
comes and to be under-represented in top job positions. Despite the increasing par-
ticipation of people of colour and females in higher education, few become faculty
members in universities. The inclusion of previously excluded groups in academia
is particularly important for developing countries that experienced large social trans-
formations and have less mature knowledge systems. Even if gender and racial un-
balances have been extensively investigated, many studies overlook the fundamental
characteristics of the process of entry into academia. In particular, this dissertation
examines how individual and systemic mechanisms relate with supervision, collabo-
ration, and mutual evaluation when they first manifest in an academic career.
Mentorships and supervision are known to affect the students’ future careers de-
velopment and involve one of the first academic tie for a student. Therefore, the
second chapter examines the formation of student-advisor relationship and whether
race and gender homophily plays a role in the tertiary education. The chapter uses
student enrolment data of bachelor, master, and Ph.D. students and their advisors and
measures the relative magnitudes of induced and choice homophily race- (gender-)
based homophily. Further, the chapter examines where choice homophily originates,
estimating homophilous preferences in the interacting populations of black and white
(male and female) students and advisors.
The results of chapter 2 highlight that the process of racial and gender inclusion
is still in a transition phase. Indeed, both race-based and gender-based homophily
play a crucial role in tie formation. In particular, the university system itself induces
half of the observed homophily levels while half arises from individual choices. The
latter mostly originates in the population of white/male students and black/female
advisors. Further, the chapter highlights the potential tension between social transfor-
mation and effective inclusion. Even where homophilous preferences are unchanged
v
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at the individual level, a demographic change in the composition of the population can
mechanically increase the aggregate homophily in the system and, in turn, slow down
the inclusion.
The third chapter looks at the training phase, analysing the first co-authorship link
of students — the one with their doctoral advisors. Doctoral training is critical today
because job market committees often use candidate publications during the Ph.D. as
a screening criterion. Starting from these premises, chapter three studies whether ho-
mophily and advisor characteristics influence students’ productivity during their doc-
torates. In particular, the chapter asks whether the (racial and/or gender) composition
of student-advisor matter for publication productivity of Ph.D. students and whether
the relationship varies for different student productivity-profiles.
The chapter finds that females working with a female advisor are as productive as
male students working with a male advisor. While in contrast, when female students
work with a male, they are less productive compared to male-male student-advisor
couples. Interestingly, the gender difference is u-shaped over student productivity and
cross-racial ties display almost no gender difference in productivity. Indeed, looking
the sub-samples of white-white and black-black, couples gender differences in average
productivity across the groups (and pairs) are driven by differences in the upper tail of
the productivity distribution.
Chapters four and five go further to investigate the transition from the Ph.D. to the
first academic job using data from South Africa and Mexico. In particular, the chapters
study the link between university prestige stratification and research performance in
the short, medium, and long-run. The chapters highlight predictable hiring patterns
from one university to another that follow an underlying prestige hierarchy. Moreover,
in both systems, internal hiring of Ph.D. graduates is positively related to academic
performance. This underlines a positive role of inertia that might prevent talents and
knowledge exchanges among universities.
This dissertation examines process of entry into the workplace looking at indi-
vidual and systemic mechanisms. Globally, this work underlines how homophily,
Matthew effects, and prestige stratification are strong mechanisms in the workplace.
These mechanisms can inhibit social transformations at the aggregate level and at the
same time be beneficial for individual performance. This ambiguity might explain
why transformations are often unevenly distributed in the job hierarchy, fields, and
universities. This book highlights the need for continuous policy intervention and
multiple targets to achieve sustainable social transformations in the workplace.
“I have dedicated my life to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against
white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the
ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony
with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for, and to see realized.
But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.”
— Nelson Mandela
Speech at his trial in Pretoria, 20 April 1964, which he quoted on his release in Cape
Town, 11 February 1990
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Excluded groups are everywhere in the world. Compared to white males, women
and minority groups tend to have lower labour market outcomes, have their jobs con-
centrated in specific occupations and are under-represented in top job positions. Ex-
amining 84 countries, the recent report ILO-UN Women (2019) finds that half of the
female population is excluded or marginalised from the labour market, having a labour
force participation rate 43 percentage points lower than males.1 Besides significant
regional differences, the situation is problematic also for rich countries where labour
markets statistics vary for demographic groups. The recent social tension in the U.S.
and the growing activism of Black Lives Matters testify an unsustainable situation.
The 2018 report of the U.S. Economic Policy Institute finds that African American
workers have an unemployment rate of 7.2 percent, which is the highest compared
to other demographic groups.2. Moreover, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
records a distressing trend, where, between the year 2000 and 2016, the participation
of African Americans to the labour force declines from 65.8 percent to 61.6 percent.
In addition, the McKinsey report “Women in the workplace” (2019) who covers 590
companies and more than 22 million employees, highlights that “Women and peo-
ple of colour remain under-represented at every level in corporate America, despite
earning more college degrees than white men for thirty years and counting”.
This waste of talents and human capital causes incalculable societal, cultural,
knowledge, and economic losses in our societies. How many ideas have been wasted?
How much advice has been unheeded? Which investment decisions would have been
1See https://ilostat.ilo.org/having-kids-sets-back-womens-labour-force-partic
ipation-more-so-than-getting-married/; last access August 2020
2See https://www.epi.org/publication/state-race-unemployment-2018q1/ Janelle
Jones’s report Economic Indicators, commissioned by the Economic Policy Institute in 2018
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taken from a more demographically balanced firm board? How would industrial poli-
cies have evolved if more blacks and females were in the decision rooms? Reversing
the problem, one can try to quantify the contribution that inclusion has brought to GDP
per capita and economic growth. Hsieh et al. (2013) estimate that the decreasing bar-
riers for blacks and women observed in the U.S. between 1960 and 2010 explain 24%
of growth in GDP per capita and 6% of economic growth. But besides any attempt
to quantify gains and losses, history offers many quasi-natural experiments where in-
clusion was accelerated by exogenous conditions. During WWI and WWII, women
massively entered the U.S. and the European labour markets (Hart, 2009; Bellou and
Cardia, 2016; Gay, 2019; Boehnke and Gay, 2020). Their involvement contributed
to the sustained period of growth and innovation post WWII. In this respect, looking
at U.S. data Goldin and Olivetti (2013) find that WWII provoked an increase of the
fraction of woman workers especially among the highly educated women that were
previously excluded by social norms. Similar examples are also found in developing
contexts. For example, in Rwanda, after the genocide of 1994 (that killed many of the
men), women rebuilt the country. Since then, the country is increasing its per capita
GDP at extraordinary rates, and many argue that this is mostly driven by the commit-
ment of the Rwandan government to achieve gender equality (Abbott and Malunda,
2016).3 However, the work of Abbott and Malunda (2016) also examines recent shad-
ows. They highlight that the effort towards women’s empowerment significantly de-
creased after 2003 and it is not uniformly distributed in the country across job-ranks
and geographical areas.
Lights and shadows of those examples underline that achieving a balanced repre-
sentation of the population is socially and economically important. In recent decades
many countries have seen improvements in the participation of female and people
of colour in many occupations. Indeed, women and blacks made large investments
in their higher education (Saleh et al., 2017; Allen, 2018; Blalock and Sharpe, 2012;
Gemici and Wiswall, 2014), and those investments in human capital changed the com-
position of the student body at universities in many countries. Today, women and peo-
ple of colour are represented as students in art, history, education, geography, chem-
istry, agronomy, biology, and medicine (Moore et al., 2018; Bergeron and Gordon,
2017; Weeden et al., 2017; Rossello et al., 2020). Nevertheless, bottlenecks remain
in engineering, physics, mathematics, computer science, and economics where they
are enrolled in lower numbers; even though, also there, their participation has grown




wkL3s1tV4d-cpEyEMt6tdbtmZEs5RB4fmLGcj-e4o8ivV_htfnf03B5lfn3jMasYzj2gO; Last access July 2020.
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Weeden et al., 2017). Besides these significant changes and the increasing demand
for skilled labour (Blair and Deming, 2020) women and people of colour have lower
returns from their education (Saleh et al., 2017; Allen, 2018) and are less likely to find
a job that matches their skills (Somers et al., 2019; Hunt, 2016).
This situation is particularly problematic in top positions in knowledge-intensive
occupations, where females and blacks are severely under-represented. Among 500
corporate boards seats more than 66% are still held by white men;4 and more striking,
among the Fortune 500 CEOs 93% are males5. In 2019, only 29 out of 195 countries
have a woman serving as heads of state or government.6 The European Parliament
(elected in 2019) has 41% of women and is the most gender-balanced ever elected.7
However, many argue that with Brexit ethnic minorities will be even less represented
in the EU Parliament.8 22% of the European population is black, but only 3 of the 751
EU parliamentarians are black.9 Similar issues are problematic also at universities.
In 2016, less than 24% of European full professors were females.10 Also the type of
professor contracts and stipend varies with gender and race. In 2016, in the US, only
27% of full-time professors are female and 4% are black.11
The previous examples highlight that the main issue remains a lack of transfor-
mation at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge-intensive occupations.12 Given the
increasing number of qualified women and people of colour, the lack of social trans-
formation in top positions is, in many cases, hard to explain without considering net-
work mechanisms. Network mechanisms are essential to successful entry into many
knowledge-intensive occupations. To a very great extent, the fundamental process by
which transformation happens is the entry one, following by subsequent promotions.
In those jobs, fundamental tasks of the entry process are training and supervision, col-
laboration and mutual evaluation. Those tasks imply that the work is often organised




5See Barnard et al. (2016)
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_elected_and_appointed_female_heads_o
f_state_and_government; last access July 2020
7Available at https://europarl.europa.eu/election-results-2019/en/mep-gender-bal
ance/2019-2024/; access March 2019
8https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-bame-eu-parliament-mem
bers-ethnic-minority-a9315036.html; last access July 2020
9In 2014 elections https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/29/eu-is-too-white-
brexit-likely-to-make-it-worse; access March 2019
10see https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-in-academia/; last access July 2020
11https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=61; access March 2019
12The phenomenon is often defined as the glass ceiling effect (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2019).
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stances, social networks not only emerge, but they are fundamental in characterising
the profession in its entry (and promotion) mechanism.
When social networks emerge, socio-economic theory highlights that mechanisms
such as homophily, Matthew effects and prestige stratification influence how a system
works and resources are allocated. However, the mentioned social network mech-
anisms have largely been theorised in developed contexts. In addition, most of the
available empirical results focus on the U.S. or European countries. The lack of em-
pirical evidence in “less developed” settings would not be problematic except that
systemic mechanisms may differ in contexts where resources are scarcer or allocated
differently. Emerging economies have less mature, smaller and expanding knowledge
sectors and, contextually, they are often characterised by different social norms. In
similar situations, the distribution of resources and norms may interact with network
mechanisms in the workplace. The interaction of thereof could potentially amplify the
extent of network mechanisms in the entry process. However, the specific context of
developing knowledge systems may also attenuate those mechanisms. For example,
on the one hand, a social norm that blindly attributes “wisdom” to senior members
could reinforce Matthew effects – a young member of the organisation will employ
more time to gain independence from a senior one. In contrast, on the other hand, this
social norm and the strength of Matthew effects could be counterbalanced by the ex-
pansion and dynamism of knowledge-intensive sectors often experienced by emerging
economies. When a knowledge sector is growing, experienced professionals are often
scarce and it might be easier to have social transformation because organisations will
have incentives to hire younger agents. Where the letters are both more likely to have
higher levels of education and to belong to previously excluded groups. Therefore, the
study of systemic mechanisms in contexts where knowledge-intensive workplaces are
emerging may offer new insights about their functioning and motivates the empirical
investigation outside North America or Europe.
Given those considerations, this thesis investigates the entry process in the work-
place and discusses its relation with social transformations. The ultimate objective is
to uncover the mechanisms of the entry process and whether they can inhibit/foster so-
cial transformations. In other words, what are the processes that affect the differential
entry rate of under-represented groups13 (e.g. female, people of colour) into desirable
13Related to under-represented groups today is popular in the U.S. the definition of Under-Represented
Minorities (URM). The term refers to African American, Hispanic, Native American and Mixed Race.
However, the term is hardly applicable outside the U.S. context. In many countries, the groups which
are under-represented in the workplace are the majority in the general population. For example, In South
Africa, 90% of the general population is black. The black population was segregated during apartheid and
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(competitive and high skilled) occupations? To answer this elusive question, I will
consider the specifics of a competitive and knowledge-intensive profession.
Beyond the extensive body of literature that has investigated similar topics in the
past, the focus of this work is rather specific. I will focus my discussion looking at the
process of entering into academia in South Africa and Mexico. In contrast to most of
the literature, I will consider three specific phases preceding an academic occupation.
Academics have their work organised around three pillars: supervision (or train-
ing), collaboration, and mutual evaluation. Thus, I will explore the social network
mechanisms of homophily, Matthew effects, and prestige stratification where supervi-
sion, collaboration, and mutual evaluation first manifest in the career. In particular, I
will examine three phases of the entry process. The first phase that I will look at is the
student-supervisor relationship in the educational phase. Supervision during the edu-
cational phase influences students’ future development. In this phase, students form
their beliefs about the world and generate perspectives on their future careers. More-
over, the student-supervisor relation may provide role models for students. Specif-
ically, I will look at the role of race and gender homophily in the formation of the
student-advisor relation in the educational phase.
Further, as the second phase, I will study co-authorship during the Ph.D. This
phase is critical since nowadays, obtaining a doctoral degree is a necessary condi-
tion to become a scholar. Moreover, doctoral (publishing) productivity is often an
important criterion for screening Ph.D. job market candidates. In particular, I will
analyse whether homophily and Matthew effects affect students’ productivity during
their doctorates.
Lastly, as the third phase of the entry process, I will consider the transition into
the first academic job where the mutual evaluation of quality between job applicants
and the hiring committees implies an emerging prestige ordering among institutions
14 The transition into the first academic job after the Ph.D. represents the first step
into an academic profession. I will use the mutual quality evaluation to derive the
hierarchical stratification of the universities by prestige and ask how the transition in
this hierarchy affects scholar performance.
The following sections of the chapter elaborate on the general framework of the
thesis.
is still under-represented in top job positions. Similarly, in Mexico, income inequalities are severe. People
of Indigenous descent are 60% of the populations but under-represented in top positions and at higher risk
of poverty. See https://theconversation.com/study-reveals-racial-inequality-in-m
exico-disproving-its-race-blind-rhetoric-87661 I will generally refer to under-represented
groups where the word under-represented refers to the workplace. This allows me to include in the general
discussion broadly all discriminated or disadvantaged groups. The advantage of the term is that is broad and
includes female, people of colour, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, migrants, sexual minorities.
14The job applicant applies after she/he accesses the “quality” of a faculty and the hiring committee
search for the “best” candidate. See chapters 4 and 5.
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1.1 Entering process
The entry process into a profession comprises several phases, such as training,
job searching, creation of collaborations, that culminates with a hiring decision. Af-
ter hiring, often, the entry process is not exhausted and starts a phase of evaluation.
During the phases pre- and post-hiring, the newcomer has to create linkages with co-
workers and builds her/his reputation. I will argue that in knowledge-intensive jobs,
pre- and post-hiring phases are as crucial as hiring decisions. In contrast with most
occupations, supervision (or training), collaboration, and mutual evaluation are three
essential job-tasks that differentiate knowledge-intensive jobs from others.
However, often the empirical research disregards the characteristics of knowledge-
intensive occupations and concentrates in a hiring (or promotion) decision in isolation.
Specifically, past research overlooks the fact that hiring decisions, do not stand in iso-
lation, but are part of a series of phases that compose the entry process into a profes-
sion. Indeed, in any hiring decision, an applicant’s quality and productivity obviously
play an important role, but beyond those two considerations, past research underlines
that to enter into a profession successfully, status and social connections are funda-
mental (Bidwell, 2011; Brink and Benschop, 2014; Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015;
Burris, 2004; Han and Han, 2009). For example, numerous multinational organisa-
tions before job interviews exchange information about job candidates, and exchange
managers and engineers between each-others (Westphal and Zhu, 2019; Edström and
Galbraith, 1977; Han and Han, 2009). Indeed, it must be acknowledged that status
and social connections are part of a social capital which develops in the pre- and post-
hiring phases.
Many top job positions in knowledge-intensive sectors require a training period
(often pre-hiring) which is supervised by a senior member. More generally, the phases
of the entry process into a profession involve not only the job candidate, but also su-
pervisors, co-workers, evaluation committees, and organisational/institutional charac-
teristics. In those phases, status and social connections can potentially bias hiring
decisions. This may happen because often the same set of agents are involved and
called to tutoring, teach, evaluate and decide hiring.
1.1.1 Network (or Systemic) mechanisms of the entry process
The involvement of many agents in the entry process entails that social networks
and their mechanisms naturally emerge. Thus, in order to examine the entry process,
the study of network mechanisms that operate at the individual and aggregate level
is fundamental. Those mechanisms are not only crucial for the understanding of the
6
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entry process in general but, are essential to understand what are the constraints that
under-represented groups face in entering into desirable occupations. In these respect,
sociology identifies homophily, Matthew effect, and prestige stratification as the main
systemic mechanisms creating social inequalities.
Indeed, a network mechanisms as homophily, for example, may favour the ma-
jority group and disadvantage others. Further, it must be acknowledged that most of
network mechanisms operate at different levels of aggregation. Thus, their effects
could be different at the individual, group, and system level. For example, homophily,
as described below, could be beneficial for an individual but at the same time may re-
duce the total number of relevant connections between one group and another creating
some degree of segregation that could negatively impact the aggregate functioning of a
system. With these premises, I will focus on homophily, Matthew effect, and prestige
stratification in the entry process.
Homophily
Homophily (or assortativity) refers to the tendency for agents to connect dispro-
portionally to those similar to themselves. The similarity of characteristics can refer
to exogenous (e.g. gender, ethnicity, age, nationality) or endogenous (e.g. income, so-
cial status, values, norms) factors (Kossinets and Watts, 2009; Pin and Rogers, 2016).
Exogenous characteristics (often) correlate with endogenous ones. The latter compli-
cates the attempt to study the different mechanisms through which homophily arises.
The mechanisms driving homophily originate both at the individual level and the
aggregate level (Smith et al., 2014; Granovetter, 1973; Barnett and Benefield, 2017;
McPherson et al., 2001; Currarini et al., 2009; Podolny, 1994; Jackson, 2005). At
the individual level, it arises when agents are endowed with preferences of forming
connections with those of the same type. At the aggregate level, it arises when the
potential meeting pool of agents is homogeneous along with some characteristic but
not representative of the population; so, even when agents form ties at random (type-
blind), they are more likely to form same-type of ties, irrespective of their preferences.
Both mechanisms of homophily formation influence how ties arise in social networks.
Therefore, irrespective of its source, homophily produces a recognisable structure
in networks: tightly connected communities that appear to be self-organised around
some common characteristics/traits which are observable at the aggregate level. In
other words, homophily creates some degree of segregation in the network across
groups of people with different traits.
7
Chapter 1 Section 1.1
In terms of aggregates, a segregated structure influences the total amount of social
capital of each group. For example, the less represented (or peripheral) group will
have more constraints, as a group, in forming same-type of links, and thus, lower
possibilities to create network effects and a lower social capital. Therefore, homophily
is potentially harmful at the aggregate level because it reduced the number of relevant
connection among different groups.
Studying the individual, a large body of literature underlines that homophily in
an agent’s social network generates social capital which is essential for finding a job
(Granovetter, 1973), hiring a new co-worker (Fernandez et al., 2000), training (Hezlett
and Gibson, 2007), and referrals (Zeltzer, 2019). Therefore for individuals, homophily
can be beneficial. The benefit of homophily can arise in specific contexts. For exam-
ple, newcomers have few connections and often lack of experience. In such a case,
homophily may help an agent to overcome these handicaps. Indeed, empirical re-
sults confirm that newcomers tend to display higher levels of homophily in their local
networks (Mollica et al., 2003; Pillai et al., 2018).
In an entry process, the homophilic tendency of individuals could be a way to
make decisions of association when information is imperfect. Related to this hypoth-
esis, Kossinets and Watts (2009) find that homophily governs new tie formation when
agents enter a new social locus; that is when they have no friends or friends-of-friends
in common with incumbent members of the group they want to enter. This observa-
tion is crucial to any entry process which often involves entering into a new group (or
club) of people and making new connections. Therefore, homophily may represent
a general mechanism to reduce the risk of entering a new “club” commonly used by
agents. Indeed, its presence is documented extensively (Smith et al., 2014) in social
(McPherson et al., 2001; Currarini et al., 2009), economic (Podolny, 1994; Jackson,
2005), and cultural (Barnett and Benefield, 2017) networks. However, such a ubiq-
uitous mechanism implies that under-represented groups may encounter significantly
more entry barriers than others.
The barriers expressed by homophily in tie formation within an organisation can
affect, especially in the entry process, socialisation, the acquisition of information or
skills, and performance of the newcomers.
The reasons people socialise more with those with similar traits can be numerous.
It may simply be because communication is easier, more comfortable, or because indi-
viduals are used to it due to structural constraints. Beyond the motives of homophily,
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its presence affects how people socialised and is relevant in terms of information or
skills acquisition. In terms of skills, a close vis-à-vis relation is often conducive for
acquiring tacit knowledge while anecdotes or small-talk are a useful source of in-
formation. Concerning homophily and performance, some management studies find
a positive association (Frink et al., 2003; Watson, 2012; Gompers and Wang, 2017;
Fang and Huang, 2017; Ertug et al., 2018; Kilduff and Lee, 2020).15 In particular, Er-
tug et al. (2018) find that homophily is positively related to performance, but only for
individuals of low job rank, who are more likely to be newcomers in the organisation.
Thus, homophily could be seen as a mechanism which helps newcomers to overcome
their disadvantage with respect to incumbents in organisations.
Matthew effects
The Matthew effect, cumulative advantage, or rich-get-richer effect refer to the
process where some nodes (agents), which are endowed with more links (resources,
or performance) than others, tend to accumulate more and more, becoming dispropor-
tionally more influential (rich, or productive) than others Zuckerman (1977); Barabási
and Albert (1999). This process is observable when network effects are at work. The
Matthew effect also manifests at the aggregate and individual level.
At the individual level, this process of cumulative advantage generates agents that
act as hubs where their initial success generate later recognition and prestige. So their
statuses are sometimes irrespective of their intrinsic “quality”. Robert Merton, in his
famous paper in Science, wrote with respect to emergent hub scientists:
«[...] Eminent scientists get disproportionally great credit for their con-
tributions to science while relatively unknown scientists tend to get dis-
proportionately little credit for comparable contributions [...] The world
is peculiar in this matter of how it gives credit. It tends to give credit
to already famous people [...] As we examine the experiences reported
by eminent scientists we find that this pattern of recognition, skewed in
favor of the established scientist, appears principally (i) in cases of col-
laborations and (ii) in cases of independent multiple discoveries made by
scientists of distinctly different rank.» — pag. 57 — Merton, Robert K.
"The Matthew effect in science: The reward and communication systems
of science are considered." Science 159.3810 (1968): 56-63.16
15Often results vary depending on the context and the nature of decisions or task that are involved.
16Indeed, Merton’s wife Prof. Harriet Zuckerman conducted the interviews reported in the paper and was
later credited by Merton as the co-author of the paper. However, she was an invisible collaborator and her
work did not receive the same credit (Rossiter, 1993).
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The Matthew effect in the entry process implies that some agents start in an ad-
vantageous position (or are significantly differently equipped at the beginning) than
others. Therefore, the patterns that those agents have in the entry process are differ-
ent with respect to the rest of the population. At the individual level, for example,
agents entering the same job may have different experiences and connections with
co-workers. In this respect, Bidwell (2011) compares individuals who experienced
different entry processes in a financial services company in the US. Those promoted
internally and those hired externally. He finds that those internally promoted have
better performance for the first two years and lower exit rates compared to those hired
externally. A similar finding indicates how the accumulated experience/knowledge of
the workplace generates a Matthew effect that affects performance.
Prestige Stratification
Prestige stratification is the process that hierarchically differentiates groups or or-
ganisations according to the level of respect/consideration they have in a community.
Prestige stratification is problematic when quality is difficult to measure and re-
ward mechanisms are imperfect. In such cases, prestige stratification creates a hi-
erarchy inherited from the past which may confer unmotivated advantages (Burris,
2004). In particular, when prestige stratification is coupled with the Matthew effect
small initial prestige differences can be amplified, massively perpetrating inequalities
irrespective of individual merit.
Concerning the entry process, prestige stratification is linked, in particular, with
hiring mechanisms. This because hiring involves a mutual evaluation of “quality”.
Both the job applicant and the hiring committee evaluate each other’s “quality” to
make their decision. For example, empirical work finds that agents who studied or
worked in a prestigious institutions are perceived as more competent than others who
do not and are in an advantageous position in terms of hiring decisions, and promo-
tions (Araki et al., 2016; Jung and Lee, 2016).
As summarised above, homophily, Matthew effect and prestige stratification may
bias the entry process to the disadvantage of previously excluded groups. The three
mechanisms, thus, may constrain social transformation. In what follow, I will fo-
cus on how homophily, Matthew effect and prestige stratification act in an academic
10
Chapter 1 Section 1.2
workplace.
1.2 Entry in a job in academia
Although data on the entry process in the private sector are often not available
or limited, similar data are available for academia. Academia is a highly competitive
and knowledge-intensive profession where the entry process and social transformation
follows similar mechanisms to other sectors. Indeed, teamwork, individual output,
social connections, and training are determinants of the entry process also in academia.
Academia matters a lot to society and the economy of a country. Universities are
part of the innovation system of a country and they are foremost in knowledge produc-
tion and diffusion. Scholars create and direct new knowledge and scientific paradigms
(Kuhn, 2012). The knowledge created in universities contributes to the development
of new technologies and innovations. The modern knowledge economy highlights
the importance of a country to absorb new technologies. In this, the higher educa-
tion system has a primary role because it is responsible for the culture, education, and
development of future professionals. Therefore, the academic profession has essen-
tial responsibilities to society and biases in the entry process there, might distort the
quality and quantity of the knowledge created.
Luckily, information related to scholars is available in all phases of the entry pro-
cess often also for developing contexts. I will take advantage thereof and focus on
academia in the empirical investigation of this thesis. In this section, I will discuss the
traits of entering academia.
The main phases characterising the entry process in academia are the educational
phase (bachelor, master), the training phase (Ph.D.), and the first academic job (post-
doc, researcher).
The educational phase comprises mainly bachelor and master level.17 University
studies open doors to future careers but at the same time conditions people about
what sorts of careers are relevant for them (Gersick et al., 2000; Wenger, 2010). In
this respect, the master level is particularly formative and crucial for the decision to
apply to doctoral programs. The kinds of relationships people have in university can
be formative in the way they view the world and what they expect as a “natural”
relationship. For Astin and Astin (2000) university classrooms enable students not
only to acquire knowledge and skills but also to develop personal qualities and the
17In some cases, doctoral programs offer courses.
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ability to work collaboratively. This development arises both through formal learning
and from interactions with colleagues, peers and teachers. For many degrees, the
final requirement is a thesis, and this is typically supervised or mentored by a faculty
member, who guides the student not only in her/his dissertation but often about much
wider subjects such as career prospects, future education and so on, as well.
The training phase is the most critical to enter academia. Training in academia
corresponds to doctoral education and is supervised by a professor. Obtaining a Ph.D.
diploma is nowadays necessary to enter academia also in developing countries. More-
over, the doctoral training represents the first step of a career and often the first co-
authorship. During the Ph.D., students acquire the skills needed for the profession. It
is there that they acquire the ability to conduct independent and publishable research,
to work collaboratively, to evaluate each-other’s contributions, and to teach and tu-
tor. The role of social connections or social networks is crucial also in academia,
and particularly so for young scholars. So creating connections is an essential part of
an early career. Like so in many social contacts, the process of forming connections
in academia may be subject to homophily. Additionally, from the student’s point of
view, properties of supervisor and institutions matter a lot since they can serve to en-
hance network effects (e.g. Matthew effect, prestige stratification). For example, a
student can acquire co-authors from her/his supervisor’s network. Moreover, in many
disciplines, also the positioning and the quality of connections within a laboratory
(or department) highly influence “quality”, performance, and future hiring perspec-
tives (Brink and Benschop, 2014; Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015; Ramasco and Morris,
2006; Ma et al., 2020). This may imply that the acquisition of skills and the likeli-
hood of entering academia depend not only on the quality and effort of the student in
isolation but also on how she/he is able to accumulate social capital.
After the doctoral degree, a future scholar enters the job market. The first academic
job is a post-doc or a position as a researcher. The Ph.D. job market comprises job
market candidates and university institutions. From the side of job market candidates,
a "good" affiliation can enhance access to colleagues, collaborations, and resources.
From the side of institutions participating in the Ph.D. job market to hire a promising
researcher can improve their performance as well. Indeed, young researchers will turn
into lecturers and professors that will stay in academia for a long time. However, for
institutions, hiring decisions suffer from imperfect information because young candi-
dates often have thin research records. In such situations, a university hiring commit-
tee will look for signals of quality, one of which is the Ph.D. granting university. In
this way, doctorates from “famous” universities have an advantage in the market.
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The behaviour of the agents involved in the Ph.D. job market, thus, creates a net-
work with predictable hiring flows from a university to another that contains a strat-
ify prestige hierarchy (Clauset et al., 2015; Burris, 2004; Cowan and Rossello, 2018;
Gonzalez-Sauri and Rossello, 2019).
The structure of prestige stratification of the Ph.D. job market may imply profound
inequalities. For example, individuals that for various reasons studied at institutions
which are less “prestigious” (or integrated in hiring networks) are disadvantage in the
job market and will hardly be hired in top-tier universities.
1.2.1 Homophily in tie formation
As described above, homophily is a fundamental mechanism of social interaction.
Concerning its formation, homophily has two sources. One at the individual level and
another at the aggregate level. In the literature the first is called choice homophily
while the second is induced homophily. Choice homophily arises when individuals
are selected into a position for conscious or unconscious preferences or tastes that can
be coupled with imperfect information (see the taste for discrimination (Becker, 1957)
and statistical discrimination hypothesis Phelps (1972)). In contrast, when homophily
that has its source in the aggregate level is independent of individuals and induced by
the surroundings. It arises when the potential meeting pool for agents is homogeneous
along with some characteristics because of network structures, path dependence and
segregation.
In Higher Education, the evidence of induced homophily is observable (mainly)
in the demographic composition across the academic ranks and fields. At high job-
ranks and in prestigious institutions, white males still dominate academic positions.
For example, in 2016, according to the U.S. Department of Education, only 27% of
full-time professors are female, and 4% are black.18. Across fields, a certain degree
of segregation is evident where female and black faculty concentrate in specific dis-
ciplines (e.g. art, history, biology, medicine) and are under-represented in others (e.g.
engineering, physics, computer science, and economics) (Moore et al., 2018; Weeden
et al., 2017). Of course, part of the observed homophily here can be driven by choices
of individuals too.
The answer to a key question to understand demographic imbalances at universi-
ties is therefore elusive: Is there a bias in selection committees, or is the population of
applicants not representative of the population as a whole?19 To answer this question,
18Source NCES https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=61; access March 2019
19UC Berkeley was accused of (anti-female) gender bias in undergraduate admissions in the 1970s, but
on closer examination, it was uncovered that most of the discrepancy in admissions rates for male and
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we need to understand one of the most fundamental systemic mechanism of social
interaction: homophily. And in particular to understand the relative magnitude, in
producing these imbalances, of homophily that arises at the individual and aggregate
level. In other words how much of the homophily is induced and how much is of
choices?
At both levels, empirical research has found evidence of homophily in academia.
De Paola et al. (2015) studies the effect of homophily at the aggregate level. They find,
controlling for various individual characteristics including “quality”, that women are
less likely to apply to Italian Scientific Qualification competition in fields where fe-
males are under-represented, or in other words, where the level of induced homophily
is high. Looking homophily at the individual level, Bagues et al. (2017) find, ex-
amining promotions to associate and full professor in Spain, that when there is a
woman on a committee, the men on that committee become homophilous, and thus,
less favourable towards female candidates.
Beyond committee decisions, scientific productivity can also be affected by ho-
mophily. Indeed, publications are often necessary for promotion and precondition for
research funds. In this respect, Helmer et al. (2017) find homophily to be present
in the peer-review process, finding that editors (male and female) are more likely to
publish papers from colleagues of their same gender. Thus, since women are under-
represented in many editorial boards, homophily may significantly reduce the number
of papers published by female authors.
Homophily in higher education seems to be widespread within the different pro-
cesses in which an academic is involved, such as credit from teamwork (Sarsons et al.,
2015), promotion (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2010), publishing (Pezzoni et al., 2016;
Helmer et al., 2017; Rossello et al., 2020), and grant applications (Van Der Lee and
Ellemers, 2015). One specific process that may matter a lot, but is as yet very little
studied, is the selection of supervision. The student-supervisor relation is relevant
in terms of education and affects future student career. Indeed, the doctoral advisor
is often the first co-author of a future scholar. I will concentrate, thus, the study of
homophily in the formation of the student-advisor ties.
In more general terms, the education literature finds that, at universities, an effec-
tive student-supervisor relation includes: (1) a focus on achievements and knowledge
acquisition; (2) support, direct assistance, and role modelling; (3) mutual benefit; (4)
female applicants was induced by differences in the departments to which the groups applied. In fact, there
was evidence that choice homophily operated in favour of admitting women (Bickel et al., 1975).
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a personal nature beyond strictly work-related issues; and (5) a professor having ex-
perience, influence, and achievement (Jacobi, 1991; Gersick et al., 2000; Girves et al.,
2005; Crisp and Cruz, 2009). These attributes involve social relations that are sub-
ject to homophily. Furthermore, when these attributes are present in a positive sense
they can reduce attrition rates, and are found to be crucial, in particular, for under-
represented and minority groups in early career stages (Girves et al., 2005; Terrell and
Hassell, 1994). Indeed, role models are crucial, and mentors of the same race/gender
of the students are often more effective (Bettinger and Long, 2005; Lockwood, 2006).
Thus, the student-supervisor relation, mainly for its relevance for under-represented
groups, is crucial for social transformations. Effective supervision may help formerly
excluded groups to enter organisations where they are under-represented and could be
a channel for inclusion. However, student-supervisor is also a social relation where
homophily can affect tie formation. Homophily in the formation of student-supervisor
ties, because many traits (number of co-authors, productivity, rank, awards, sub-field)
often correlate with gender and race, can influence the social capital of future aca-
demics. Besides, the presence of homophily in tie formation can make the entry pro-
cess of under-represented groups harder because it limits their interaction with the
former majority groups.
1.2.2 Doctoral productivity
Connections are a source of social capital. But it is clear that the type and quality
of connections and the characteristics of the agents involved matters for the nature and
strength of social capital. Especially at early stages of a career, in forming connec-
tions homophily and the Matthew effect can play a role. Homophilous connections
have been observed to be important for students’ role models (Breda et al., 2018;
Bettinger and Long, 2005; Lockwood, 2006). In addition, homophily can influence
individual performance. For this, homophily can be relevant for doctoral productivity.
The literature on education underlines that role models are important for students per-
formance and that race and gender play a role (Girves et al., 2005; Terrell and Hassell,
1994; Main, 2014; Bettinger and Long, 2005; Lockwood, 2006; Aguinis et al., 2018;
Breda et al., 2018; Rossello et al., 2020).
This literature finds that on average same-race/-gender supervision are more effec-
tive than cross-race/-gender. Main (2014) studies gender homophily using data from
the U.S. Graduate Education Survey. In her sample of 7834 Ph.D.s in Social Sciences
and Humanities from cohorts in 1982-1993 she finds that female students are more
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likely to choose a female advisor and when they do so they are more likely to finish
the Ph.D. and to complete it in a shorter period. In subsequent work, Pezzoni et al.
(2016) study student-advisor gender couples differences in doctoral publication pro-
ductivity. They examine 6 Ph.D. cohorts (2004-2009) from the California Institute of
Technology and find no gender difference in productivity between same-gender cou-
ples. However, looking at cross-gender couples, they find that women working with
male advisors publish 8.5% less than male-male couples.
Experiments, also, highlight a positive effect of same-gender role models. For
example, in a recent intervention in France Breda et al. (2018) randomly assign high
school classes to a lesson with a female scientist. They find that a female scientist role
model increase by 38% the share of female students subsequently enrolled in selective
science programs.
Training and research output are crucial to enter academia and, as documented in
previous research, they are influenced by homophily. Indeed, a strong positive associ-
ation between homophily and performance may imply that lack of social transforma-
tions at the top of the hierarchy inhibits transformations at the bottom. For example,
the scarcity of black (female) full professors that can supervise Ph.D. students can
have a negative impact on the average productivity of black (female) students. A sim-
ilar mechanism, will thus decrease the likelihood that black (female) students enter
academia and become future scholars, creating a vicious cycle.
Disparities across academic ranks has been studied in past research showing that
female (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2010; Mairesse and Pezzoni, 2015) and black (Fang
et al., 2000) faculty are promoted at lower rates than white males. Looking at ethnic
minorities (Fang et al., 2000) find this evidence for US medical scholars (N=50145).
While, focusing on gender, Mairesse and Pezzoni (2015) analyse 1813 French physic
faculties and find that a 40 years old female scholar with an average productivity
(and quality) has 16.3% lower chances of being promoted than an equivalent male
colleague. This may imply that Ph.D. graduates from under-represented groups gain
scientific “independence” after a longer time compared to white male. Moreover, an
high academic rank is important for founding, status, prestige and to attract students
and collaborators. Thus, a similar promotion bias may reduce the chance for blacks
and females of enhancing Matthew effects in productivity also later in their careers.
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1.2.3 First job
Following the educational and training phase, a future scholar enters the academic
job market. The first academic job is fundamental to enter academia successfully. The
“quality” and size of the university of the first hire, the interaction with colleagues,
facilities, students can enhance or inhibit the Matthew effect and so promotion and
future career perspectives.
In order to navigate the academic job market, agents need to understand its dy-
namics. However, for newcomers, the academic job market is often cryptic. Past
research underlines that many Ph.D.s do not understand the dynamics of the academic
job market (Fox and Stephan, 2001; Akerlind, 2009; Felisberti and Sear, 2014; Hayter
and Parker, 2019). And, many doctoral students leave academia when they realize
the difficulties associated with entering it (Hayter and Parker, 2019; Stephan and Ma,
2005; Golde, 2005). The latter is potentially more problematic to previously excluded
groups that for the mechanism of homophily (there are few professors “like” them)
may lack mentorship.
The specific characteristics of the academic job market are a small turnover, hiring
constraints, and prestige stratification of institutions. In relation to the size of the job
market, Hayter and Parker (2019) underline that less than the 15% of post-docs in the
U.S. will find employment as tenure-track faculty. Universities have hiring constraints
which relate with the number of students and courses, number of retired professors,
private and public investments, and sizes. These characteristics are included in formal
university rankings that aim at evaluating the prestige of institutions.
Beyond the way in which university prestige is measured, it creates a structured
and stratified university system. In this respect, the sociological literature underlines
that predictable hiring flows between universities emerge. These flows follow a hi-
erarchical and stratified hiring network where university prestige plays an important
role (Webster et al., 1991; Burris, 2004; Jung and Lee, 2016). University prestige
is the reputation that an institution has in a community of practice and is crucial in
the transition in the first academic job. Scholars at the beginning of their careers can
give few signals of their quality as researchers. For example, they have few records
of publications and co-authors, and their specific contribution is often not observable.
For doctoral graduates, the absence of signals of “quality”, makes the prestige of the
university granting Ph.D. a signal for it. Thus, a prestigious Ph.D. increases the likeli-
hood of being hired in a “good” first-job institution and this confers an advantage that
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can enhance Matthew effects and future productivity (Mai et al., 2015; Burris, 2004).
1.3 Social Transformations and the Entry Process
Social transformations are changes in the shared understanding of social norms in
a society followed by a change in behaviour. Such a change is often lengthy because
social norms are resilient. What constitutes their resilience is that norms come to
existence because different groups share beliefs, and beliefs coordinate, codify, and
sediment over time. In a similar manner, change is often a gradual phenomenon. In
fact, the more common social transformations verify when little changes accumulating
and stratifying over centuries. In this way, change gradually transforms a society.
However, there are contexts or eras, where social, political, and economic conditions
accelerate those changes.
Often, the labour market is one of the places where social transformations first
become evident. This because often excluded groups are a source of new employ-
ees. Social transformations generate two observable outcomes: a change in the demo-
graphic composition, and a change in the structure of group interactions (Smith et al.,
2014). Within a workplace, the social transformations change the pull of young job
applicants which then affect the entry process and the composition of organisations.
In other words, social transformations and the entry process are interlinked by the suc-
cession of job-cohorts, generations, hirings, and retirements. This turnover makes the
relation between the new and the old generation of job applicants and senior members
essential to effective social transformation. The interaction of the demographic groups
in a population, the level of homophily, their hierarchy and the relation between the
old and the new generation are particularly relevant in the entry process of newcom-
ers. The entry process changes the demographic composition of a workplace and is an
essential step for social transformations.
1.3.1 Mechanisms that foster or hinder social transformations
Often social transformations concentrate in specific organisations, fields or tasks,
and job-ranks. This concentration has to do with the relation between social trans-
formations and systemic mechanisms of the entry process. Indeed, homophily in tie
formation, Matthew effects in productivity, and prestige stratification of institutions
can hinder or foster social transformation.
The first mechanism that play a role in social transformation is homophily in tie
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formation. In this respect, a broad empirical evidence finds that newcomers in or-
ganisations tend to form homophilous relations (Bramoullé et al., 2012) and these are
often associated with higher outcomes (Frink et al., 2003; Watson, 2012; Gompers and
Wang, 2017; Fang and Huang, 2017; Ertug et al., 2018; Kilduff and Lee, 2020) (See
section 1.1.1). Thus, under these conditions, homophily can affects transformation in
two ways. One the one hand, homophily can hinder social transformation for rela-
tive group sizes and segregation. In term of sizes, a group that is under-represented
in an organisation has lower chances to meet agents of the same group and to form
homophilous ties. While in terms of segregation, often diversity is concentrated in
the job hierarchy and top positions remain often dominated by white males. Thus,
sizes and segregation imply a disadvantage for members of under-represented groups
because they have a lower scope to generate social capital (as a group) by exploit-
ing the mechanism of homophily. On the other hand, looking at the individual level
homophily can foster social transformation thanks to the role model effect. When
a certain number of agents from under-represented groups are present in an organi-
sation, they may act as role models attracting and encouraging the entry process of
newcomers from under-represented groups.
The second mechanism relevant for transformations are Matthew effects in pro-
ductivity. They imply a process of path dependence where the initial level of resources
highly influence future productivity. So, a lack of resources or social capital in early
stages of a career might impede (or undermine) future outcomes. If homophily in
tie formation is at work, it could inhibit the productivity of newcomers of under-
represented groups because they lack role-models and supervision. Alternatively, if
newcomers of the former majority groups are less likely to form ties with young mem-
bers of under-represented groups this may inhibit the Matthew effect in the careers of
the latter ones. In a similar case, Matthew effect in the entry phase and the lower ex-
tents of it for under-represented groups will inhibit social transformations. In contrast,
under-represented groups may be specialised in specific fields, niches, or tasks. Spe-
cialisation could generate a cumulative advantage and enhances a Matthew effect that
positively affects their productivity in those areas. In this case, forming homophilous
relations coupled with Matthew effects may foster social transformations. However,
this may be limited depending on the size, reputation, and impact of those tasks or
topics of specialisations.
The third mechanism that may influence social transformation is the stratification
of prestige. The reputation and impact of an institution emerge from the consideration
it has among peers in a period. The mutual evaluation among members of a com-
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munity generates a stratification of prestige. Related to social transformations, often
prestigious institutions are found to have low levels of diversity. In many countries,
under-represented groups often do not access quality education in prestigious schools.
Given the importance that a prestigious degree has in signalling “quality” in the job
market, groups that for various reasons are under-represented in those prestigious in-
stitutions encounter an additional barrier. Thus, the stratification of institutional pres-
tige may constitute a mechanism who prevent social transformation.
1.4 The Context
This dissertation studies the entry process in a knowledge-intensive sector in two
developing contexts: South Africa and Mexico. In contexts such as these, knowledge-
intensive jobs are evolving fast and are relatively recent. The knowledge sectors in
middle income countries have several properties that differentiate them from those in
advanced economies. For example, knowledge-intensive occupations, while growing,
and considerer "the future" still make a relatively small part of employment. Conse-
quently, training for those occupations is often relatively recent: doctoral programmes
became systematic only in the last two decades.
In general, the entry process in the workplace is understudied in developing con-
text because of lack of data. However, the focus of a developing context could un-
cover more clearly the systemic mechanisms of an entry process because networks
are smaller and less integrated internationally. Similar characteristics make the study
of entry mechanisms easier, and less demanding in terms of data. For example, one
can think of the country as a relatively closed system. In the context of academia, it is a
good approximation to assume that only domestic universities participate to the Ph.D.
job market.20 Thus, this work treats the South African, and the Mexican academia as
separated to the rest of the world. In addition, middle income and developing coun-
tries are characterised by smaller knowledge systems where resources are often more
scarce and concentrated. Concentration of resources makes flows from one university
to another more predictable and network mechanisms stronger.
1.4.1 South Africa
South Africa is an example of a country undergoing rapid social transformations
where the social, political, and economic conditions have accelerated changes. Apartheid
20If a university attracts international students it is likely to be the same that attracts the most also nation-
ally.
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legally divided all walks of life on ethnic and racial lines, for more than eight decades.21
The situation escalated in the late 80s, the national and international political pressure
of that time accelerated the change of the society. The turmoil culminated in 1991
with the abolishment of apartheid. With the elections of 1994, formally all institutions
became democratic and the integration process started.
Since the new elections of 1994, the country is de-segregating and transforming
from a society legally divided on racial lines to a more integrated one. However, the
transformation process is not complete, and in many places there remains a consid-
erable gap between the current situation and aspirations. Higher education is still
for only a few, and the upper secondary school is represents one of the bottlenecks.
Unicef reports an attendance rate of upper secondary school in 2019 of 70% with a
completion rate of 48.22
On the top of that, the higher education sector has its struggles. During apartheid,
the university system was segregated and essentially a two-tier system. Black, Indian,
and coloured institutions were specialised in technical education and teaching, signif-
icantly underfunded, and not in the condition to do any meaningful research (Herman,
2017). The system has begun a process of integration, but still social transformations
are unevenly distributed and they present contradictions and bottlenecks.
The main contradiction remains the heritage of a two-tier system in many geo-
graphical and research areas. For example, besides the significant transformation of
the student body where the percentage of black students has increased from 20% to
61% in 20 years (Rossello and Cowan, 2019);23 higher education in many areas of
the country remains the privilege of only a few. The university system is relatively
small. In a population of almost 60 million people there are 24 public universities and
around 4000 full-time professors.24 Furthermore, limiting access to higher education,
the costs play a significant role. The average annual tuition fee is high, between 30000
and 64000 ZAR (approximately 1500-3200 Euro) in a country where gdp per capita
21I refer here to the “Natives Land Act”of 1913, that limited land property to 7% for the black population.
The act represents the first discriminative law. Formally, the term of apartheid was politically used for the
first time in 1916 and was implemented in 1948.
22See unicef tables at https://data.unicef.org/topic/education/secondary-education/;
last access September 2020.
23Formally, in South Africa there are four “racial” groups: black, white, Indian and coloured. The word
“black” is sometimes used to refer to the aggregate of black, Indian and coloured. We use this meaning
throughout this text.
24The datum refers to statistics of the year 2012 available at https://africacheck.org/reports/
how-many-professors-are-there-in-sa/; last access March 2020
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(PPP) is around 232000 ZAR. (12000 EUR)25 In addition, many Ph.D. programs are
not funded (especially in the Social Sciences and the Humanities) and the production
of Ph.D.s and research is concentrated in few institutions (Cowan and Rossello, 2018).
The latter contributes to the persistence of demographic imbalances in the profesori-
ate. In 2014, black scholars constituted 44% of the total and remained concentrated in
some fields and universities (Rossello and Cowan, 2019).
On the other hand, bottlenecks arise in the commitment of South African academia
to reach an international role and position in terms of research output and impact.
This concentrates resources in formerly white universities in specific subjects. In
those universities and subjects, the enrolment of black (South Africans) and females
is low, creating scarcity of supply of potential future professors of under-represented
groups. The university system of the country plays a crucial role in Southern Africa
and attracts many international students also from other African countries(Confraria
and Godinho, 2015). Moreover, the South African university system has competitive
advantages and specialisation in many fields where it is producing frontier research
(e.g. astronomy, biology, anthropology, medicine, geology, agronomy). But prioritis-
ing certain parts of the system does not permit the development of an African based
Social Sciences and Humanities and Base-Science. Investing in those underfunded
sectors may constitute an important engine for employment, innovation, and devel-
opment in the country. Unbalances are clear looking at percentages of graduates by
fields. Overall in 2012 the country 20% of students graduated in STEM subjects 26
Unbalances and inequalities in the South African university system provoked two
large student protests in 2015 demanding racial transformations and equal access and
opportunities.27 28 These protests represent a puzzle for higher education policy
where many argue that exist a trade-off between inclusion and quality (based on inter-
national standards).
1.4.2 Mexico
Mexico is a vast country with a population of more than 128 million people. In
contrast to South Africa, racial and cultural integration was promoted since the begin-
ning of the 20th century. However the country is plagued by income inequalities and
unequal opportunities that interest a large part of the Mexican population.
25Available at https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/293800/university-fees-201
9-how-much-it-costs-to-study-in-south-africa/; last access April 2020
26See https://www.businessinsider.com/most-technological-countries-lag-behind-
in-science-2015-12?IR=T; last access June 2020
27For details see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodes_Must_Fall. Last access March 2020
28For details see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FeesMustFall. Last access March 2020
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Indeed, access to quality education is considered problematic in Mexico today.
While literacy is quite high, and over 90% of children attend primary school, only 62%
of them go to secondary school and only a quarter of them pass to higher education.29
A reason behind the unequal access to education is often the lack of infrastructures
throughout the rural schools.
In Mexico, there are 1250 institutions of Higher Education, including public uni-
versities, technological institutes, technological universities, private institutions, teacher
training colleges, and other public institutions. Among those, universities are 213.
However, 50% of the research and 58% of the students concentrates in only 45 pub-
lic universities which are mostly located near Mexico City and in other large cities.30
Concerning the distribution of academic fields, priority has been allocated to applied
STEM subjects. In 2012, Mexico was the 8th country in the world for the percent-
age of graduates in STEM subjects where 25% of students graduated in those sub-
jects (the U.S. has 16%, and the Netherlands has 15%)31 The latter could contribute
to the persistence of inequalities and the marginalization of rural communities. In-
deed, according to Oyarzún et al. (2017), the Indigenous population in Mexico faces
not only exclusion from higher education for the low levels of access linked to ge-
ographical and income inequalities. Their additional exclusion connects to the little
acknowledgement of the distinctive cultural traditions of those communities within
the university curricula (Franco and McCowan, 2020).
In both contexts, common goals refer to the expansion and consolidation of their
fast growing of knowledge sectors in order to acquire a solid international position and
partnership. These goals are accompanied with numerous challenges in addressing the
high social inequalities that characterised both countries. In this, the higher education
system in both countries may play an important role in mediating goals and challenges.
1.5 Knowledge Gap
The study of constraints that under-represented groups face in the labour market
has been extensively studied in many social sciences, like sociology, economics, and
psychology. However, few study how those constraints relate to network mechanisms
29See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Mexico#Quality_of_education_i
n_Mexico; last access June 2020
30See https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/984/Mexico-HIGHER-EDUCATION.
html; last access June 2020.
31See https://www.businessinsider.com/most-technological-countries-lag-behind-
in-science-2015-12?IR=T; last access June 2020
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and social transformations in the entry process. Indeed Smith et al. (2014), with the
broad focus of the U.S. society, links the network mechanism of homophily and social
transformations using the U.S. General Social Surveys 1985-2004. They also under-
line, with the following sentence, how little has been done in the understanding of
those phenomena:
“Given homophily’s central importance, it is surprising that we have so
little knowledge of whether this fundamental social fact has changed over
time. [...] Most of the information we have about changes over significant
periods of time in the network structure of our society come from either
the exclusive, close ties of marriage (Kalmijn 1998) or the much weaker
ties of co-employment (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993), co-residence (Massey
and Denton 1993), or co-matriculation (Shrum, Cheek, and Hunter 1988).”
– pag. 433-4 – Smith, Jeffrey A., Miller McPherson, and Lynn Smith-
Lovin. Social distance in the United States: Sex, race, religion, age, and
education homophily among confidants, 1985 to 2004. American Socio-
logical Review 79.3 (2014): 432-456.
Social networks and their mechanisms represent the fabric of our society. Each
of us is involved in many networks at the same time. In this respect, any entry pro-
cess (in clubs, organisations, or workplaces) involves the interactions of the different
networks in which we are involved. For example, the likelihood that a friend be-
comes a co-worker (or vice-versa) depends on how (and according to which traits) the
friendship network and the co-worker network overlap. Moreover, if the friendship
network forms according to racial homophily, this will imply that under-represented
groups will be less likely to get into that workplace by exploiting information from
their friendship networks. However, the study of these sorts of mechanisms requires
a large amount of data. For this, the lack of longitudinal and representative data of
the entry process represents a gap in the study of social network mechanisms. Indeed,
there are many hypotheses and models on how network mechanisms work but little
empirical evidence 32. Indeed, network mechanisms are complex and ambiguous. For
example, homophily, Matthew effects, and prestige stratification have both aggregate
and individual effects. In section 1.3.1 I described some possible aggregate and indi-
vidual effects that may foster or inhibit the entry process of under-represented groups.
This ambiguity of the effect of network mechanisms implies that little is known on
how they relate with social transformations.
32See Jackson (2010) for examples on network models
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Social transformations change the demographic composition of a workplace and
how groups interact. In the workplace, the social transformation process over time
first changes the pool of candidates. After, thanks to the entry process and subse-
quent hirings, social transformations filtrate and the demographic composition of an
organisation changes. However, a demographic balance into desirable (knowledge-
intensive and competitive) occupations is particularly problematic in developing con-
texts. There, this type of occupation is still relatively scarce and often accessible only
to a privileged minority. An additional problem is the lack of possibility to monitor
social transformations as they tend to take place over a relatively long time. Many
developing countries do not have longitudinal data that would allow one to track the
changes either as they take place or in retrospect. In such contexts, a place to look at
network mechanisms in the entry process is academia. First, academia is a knowledge-
intensive workplace where scholars collaborate, know, train, and evaluate each-other.
Second, data on academics are available also in developing countries (at least in princi-
ple). However, most of the research on how academics interact is focussed on Europe
and North America and often concentrates in one organisation or field. In contrast
with much of the literature, this dissertation studies the entry process of South African
and Mexican future scholars. Moreover, using register data from their public agen-
cies that evaluate research, I cover a representative sample of future scholars in both
countries.
The study of transformation processes in developing contexts allows observing
university systems in transition into a mature phase. Constraints in the entry process
of under-represented groups arise both at the individual and aggregate level. During
a transition phase of social transformation, those constraints may work differently. A
less mature knowledge system, for example, will have less international collaboration
and it will depend more on local linkages. Thus a focus in developing context is
crucial to understand social transformations but often neglected in the literature.
The additional gap that this dissertation intends to cover is the distance between
the literature that focus on homophily, Matthew effects and prestige stratification at
the individual level and the one that studies them at the aggregate level. On the one
hand, the economic literature emphasises the individual mechanisms of the entry pro-
cess as individual performance, mobility, and role models, and homophily of choice
(that often call racial-/gender-bias or preferences). On the other hand, the sociologi-
cal literature focuses on aggregate (or systemic) mechanisms like group relations, the
level of homophily induced by an organisation, the relations between institutions, and
prestige stratification. Starting with these promises, this thesis connects the two liter-
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atures. To connect the two, is not easy and requires together different methodologies
and perspectives. For this, I developed new techniques that I describe in the following
section.
1.6 Methods
Network mechanisms have individual and aggregate effects that possibly affect the
entry process of individuals. Given their complexity, in each chapter, I employ and
develop a methodology suited to study both.
Chapter 2 develops a new methodology which separates choice homophily from
that induced by the system. The method solves causal issues creating a null model of
random and unbiased tie formation that controls for network structures, supervision
capacity, and small sample bias. Further, I design a model with interacting populations
and use it to estimate homophilous preferences using aggregate department-level data
of student, supervisor, and tie composition. The methodology is promising for moni-
toring aggregate and group level homophily in the entry process. Further, the method
can also be used with sparse register data.
Chapter 3 uses an econometric technique. In particular, I employ a panel data
analysis with a quantile regression approach. This to investigate the link between
student-advisor same- and cross-gender (and race) couples and productivity. In this
chapter, I investigate the relation between homophily and productivity in the dif-
ferent student productivity-profiles. This accounts for the possibility that homophi-
ly/heterophily (same-/cross-gender -race ties) works differently for (hub) scholars
with extraordinary levels of productivity who experience Matthew effects.
Chapter 4 develops a new technique to study prestige stratification of institutions.
Based on hiring networks, the algorithm ranks universities according to their repu-
tation among academics. Further, I develop a new quasi-experiment method to test
the effect of movements in the prestige hierarchy on research quality. The method is
based on exact matching and compares the performance of matched pairs of scholars
with the same training (or job) but different prestige transitions.
Chapter 5 modifies the ranking algorithm to rank university prestige. The modi-
fied version of the algorithm takes into account that universities may recruit in a cycli-
cal manner. In this way, the university ranking is dynamic over time and accounts for
changes in investment flows, modes, news. Then, I apply the matching methodology
used in Chapter 4.
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1.7 Thesis outline
This thesis investigates the entry process in academia focusing on network mech-
anisms that may constraint under-represented groups.
As mentioned above, the entry process changes the demographic composition of
a workplace and is a precondition and the main channel to social transformations.
In general, the entry process follows aggregate mechanisms at the system level and
mechanisms at the individual level.
Systemic mechanisms influencing the entry process are the interaction of the de-
mographic groups in a population, the level of homophily, hierarchy and links between
institutions, and the relation between the old and the new generation.
At the individual level, important determinants of the entry process are individual
output, social connections, training, characteristics of the student-advisor relation, and
mobility.
Chapter 2 analyses the systemic mechanisms governing student-supervision re-
lations. In particular, the chapter studies homophily along racial and gender lines in
the formation of student-advisor relations. In this chapter, first, I ask what the rela-
tive magnitude of induced and choice homophily in the system is. And further, where
choice homophily originates in the interacting populations of black and white (male
and female) student and advisors.
Chapter 3 studies the individual mechanisms of student-advisor relations, asking
whether homophily enhances student productivity or not. More specifically, it exam-
ines whether student-advisor gender and race couples matter for publication produc-
tivity of Ph.D. students and whether it changes depending on the student productivity-
profile.
Chapter 4 investigates systemic and individual mechanisms together. In partic-
ular, the chapter studies the link between mobility and hiring channels in the Ph.D.
job market with institutional prestige and research quality in the short, medium, and
long-run.
Chapter 5 expands findings of Chapter 4 looking at prestige mobility and perfor-
mance in a larger university system.
Chapter 6 synthesises the key results of the thesis, highlights the elements of the
larger significance of the study and lays the foundation for future research and gives
general policy recommendations.
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This chapter investigates homophily1 along racial and gender lines in the forma-
tion of student-supervisor tie. In the period of analysis (1973-2014) South African
Academia was interested by profound social transformations and reforms of the higher
education system. Profound social transformations potentially can change how demo-
graphic groups relate one other in terms of homophily. Thus, to study the relation
between the two in the first part of the chapter I decompose observed homophily in
its choice and induced components; and in the second part, I study where choice ho-
mophily originates in the interacting populations of students and advisors.
In the first part, I develop a new method to separate choice homophily from ho-
mophily induced by the system. The new technique uses two levels of aggregation of
the data, system and department level. It creates for each level a null model of random
and unbiased tie formation using repeated permutations. In this way it is possible to
0This chapter is based on Rossello and Cowan (2019), UNU-MERIT working paper series. I would
like to thank the comments and suggestions of participants of the 2nd Workshop in Economics of Science
and Innovation at BETA in Strasbourg; participants at EAEPE 2019 in Warsaw; participants at the seminar
at Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan; participants at the seminar at the BE-Lab at Harvard
University. As well as those of Dr. Emanuele Colonnelli, Dr. Daniele Giachini, Prof. Alan Kirman,
Dr. Mindel van de Laar, and Tatenda Zinyemba. Financial support was provided through the Institut
Universitaire de France.
1The use of the word homophily in this chapter should not be confounded with the concepts of sexism
and racism. Of course, there are some degrees of overlapping as agents that are sexist and racist will display
an homophilistic tendency in their behavior. However, sexism and racism is just the tip of the iceberg as
also progressive and anti-discrimination agents are often found to display homophilistic tendencies.
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control for small sample bias, supervisor capacity, and other confounding embedded
in the network. The findings highlight that racial and gender homophily interest the
formation of student-supervisor relations. The decomposition of homophily in its two
components shows that roughly half of the homophily observed is induced by the com-
position of the departments and displays little changes over time. Overall, comparing
choice homophily along racial and gender lines their magnitudes are similar.
In the second part, I investigate the origin of homophily of choice in the demo-
graphic groups of students and professors. To do that, I develop a model with in-
teracting student and supervisor populations. Where in each of the two populations
dichotomous types represent race or gender. With the use of aggregate department
level data of student, supervisor, and tie composition, I estimate homophilous prefer-
ences using the model. This new methodology offers a promising way to monitor, in
the presence of sparse register data, social transformations within organizations. The
results underline a high tendency to form same-type of tie among white (male) stu-
dents and black (female) professors. Further, the model underlines that under some
circumstances homophily can mechanically rise. During a transition phase of inte-
gration the changes in the relative sizes in the sub-populations can cause a mechanical
increase of homophily, without changes in the behaviour of association among groups.
2.1 Introduction
“Homophily” refers to the tendency for like to be associated with like, and is
often manifest when a particular social milieu is dominated by one group. Today we
observe many contexts in which the presence of homophily is taken to be problematic:
66% of Fortune 500 corporate board seats are still held by white men;2 and 93%
of Fortune 500 CEOs are male3; only 37% of the European Parliament (elected in
2014) is composed by women;4 of the 751 EU parliamentarians, 3 are black, whereas
22% of the European population is black.5 Similarly, in universities, women held
40.6% of academic positions in the 28 EU-countries in 2013, but few institutions have
female heads (20%).6 In 2016, in the USA, 27% of full-time professors are female




3See Barnard et al. (2016)
4Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/gender-balan
ce.html; access March 2019
5Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/29/eu-is-too-white-brex
it-likely-to-make-it-worse; access March 2019
6https://www.catalyst.org/research; access March 2019
7https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=61; access March 2019
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ways, the most troubling. The first order effect (absence of women and people of
color) is troubling enough in its own right. But there is a strong second order effect:
education is a place where students learn skills and knowledge, but also where their
perceptions about the world’s structure are formed. An important role of schools, and
universities, in particular, has been the formation of “citizens”, so the social structures
and group compositions to which students are exposed (including the presence or
absence of homophily) can be instrumental in the nature of the citizens the education
system produces. One specific relationship in which homophily might be troubling
is in student-supervisor relations. Moreover, this relationship is acknowledged to be
very important for future career trajectories, so biases there are likely to perpetuate the
situation described above.
It is this issue, homophily in student-supervisor relationships, that I address in this
chapter. Recent discussions of homophily in general identify two types: choice ho-
mophily, originating in deliberate choices of actors, and induced homophily, where the
association of like with like in smaller groups is driven by the composition of the larger
population from which those groups are drawn and network structures. Dis-entangling
these two sources is important, as addressing homophily will demand different poli-
cies depending on its origin as chosen or induced, but it has been a challenge. One
contribution of this chapter is to present a method for identifying the relative mag-
nitudes of these two sources of homophily. Further, it develops a simple model that
permits to identify the sub-groups of the population wherein homophily originates or
is strongest. My empirical setting is the university system in South Africa.
Concerning social homophily, South Africa is an extreme case. Apartheid formal-
ized homophily in the legal structure, ensuring that people were strictly segregated
along ethnic or racial lines. This applied in all walks of life, including education,
and the segregation in the education system may have had the deepest and most long-
lasting effects. Between 1994, when apartheid ended, and 2000, social transformation
to reduce homophily in universities was pursued by encouraging geographic mobility
and promoting the enrollment of black and female students in former white universi-
ties. Between 2002 and 2004, a systemic change merged many university departments
and created new institutions to foster diversity in the faculty composition (Herman,
2017). Reforms notwithstanding, the legacy of apartheid is still present. In the for-
merly white (and historically most prestigious) universities, in 2016 less then 20% of
faculty with Ph.D.s was black, whereas blacks comprise 90% of the South African
population.8 Homophily remains an issue in higher education in South Africa.
8Annual Report of the Department of Higher Education (2016), “Statistics on post-school education and training in South Africa”, see http://www.ssaci.org.
za/images/Statistics-on-Post-School-Education-and-Training-in-South-Africa-2016.pdf; and Breetzke and Hedding (2018).
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2.2 Homophily and social transformations
Homophily is an empirical regularity of our social (McPherson et al., 2001; Cur-
rarini et al., 2009), economic (Podolny, 1994; Jackson, 2005), and cultural (Barnett
and Benefield, 2017) lives. Homophily is the agents’ tendency to connect to those
similar to themselves. In the literature similarity is conceived along many dimensions
which can be divided into exogenous (like gender) or endogenous (like social status
and norms). I focus on two exogenous characteristics; race and gender.
Homophily operates also in the labor market. In any workplace imperfect informa-
tion plagues both sides of a hiring decision, and to reduce it agents rely on social net-
works. Recruiters have incentives to use their networks because they will perceive as
reliable the advice coming from people they trust (i.e. their acquaintances) (Schmutte,
2016). Job seekers are likely to receive relevant information about job vacancies from
their acquaintances. However, social networks tend to exhibit homophily along socio-
economic dimensions. Thus, hiring decisions are often biased along the dimensions
displaying homophily in social networks and they are likely to be resilient, reproduc-
ing the group structure of the organization itself (Barnard et al., 2016; Schmutte, 2016;
Montgomery, 1991; Granovetter, 1973; Sherif, 2015).
Past segregation also affects the inertia within the workplace. Segregation adds
additional constraints to agents’ interactions and it reduces the number of linkages
between demographic groups. As mentioned above, homophily can arise from choice
or can be induced, but because the social space of each individual is endogenous, to
disentangle the two empirically is not easy. On the one hand, the composition of the
social space of an individual influences her/his choices for association; on the other
hand, it emerges from her/his past choices for association. But further, individual
choices do not stand in isolation, they are embedded in a society with certain norms,
structures, and culture. In other words, individuals’ choices are also influenced by
choices made by other individuals across generations. Indeed, path dependence and
stratification makes any observed behavior (of individuals or groups) a combination
of induced and choice homophily (Sharmeen et al., 2014; Kossinets and Watts, 2009).
The formal definitions of choice and induced homophily evades this problem.
Kossinets and Watts (2009) define induced homophily and consider choice homophily
as a residual: the level of homophily that is unexplained by induced homophily. Ac-
cording to this definition, induced homophily is the probability of forming same-type
of ties given availability of agents of same type in the potential pool (sometimes de-
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fined as the risk set) (McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987; Kossinets and Watts, 2009)
if ties are formed randomly.
This forms the basis of the strategy I use for disentangling choice from induced
homophily. To my knowledge, only Kossinets and Watts (2009) study empirically in-
duced and choice homophily. They study the network of e-mail messages of a US uni-
versity for one academic year. Differently, their methodology focuses on estimating
the impact of similarity and social proximity on the probability that two agents form a
new tie. They find that similarity governs tie formation only when agents are not close
in the social space. This result suggests that both induced and choice homophily play
a role in tie formation. By contrast, I look at choice and induced homophily at two
levels of aggregation in an attempt to disentangle the two empirically.
Besides the overall level of homophily, different parts of the population may have
different frequency or strength of homophilous preferences (Pin and Rogers, 2016).
Indeed, each group evolves differently and has different incentives in response to so-
cial transformations. In more general terms social transformations change the de-
mographic composition of a system and the structure of agents’ interactions. The
way in which different population groups interact with each other is crucial to effec-
tive and stable social transformations (Smith et al., 2014). When a new generation
of individuals enters a system, for example, it changes its demographic composition.
Newcomers usually have fewer connections because they have been in the system for
a shorter amount of time and they are on average younger. Past research finds that
newcomers tend to have higher homophily levels (Mollica et al., 2003; Bramoullé
et al., 2012) In addition, the workplace usually has a job hierarchy. In such a context,
homophily/heterophily can be functional to the strategic behavior of the agents. In
a such system, agents of the formerly dominant group are more likely to be on top
of the hierarchy and each newcomer will have incentives to link with them. When
this strategic behavior holds it translates into high homophily levels for newcomers of
the formerly dominant group and heterophily for newcomers of the under-represented
group (Mollica et al., 2003; Main, 2014; McPherson et al., 2001; Ibarra, 1992, 1997).
In the psychological and sociological literature, conflict and contact theory of-
fer a framework which links demographic changes and homophilous behavior of the
groups. In particular, a change in the demographic composition of a group changes
the probability of cross-type interaction and thus preferences for association (Alderfer
and Smith, 1982; Zebrowitz et al., 2008; Hewstone and Swart, 2011; Zhou et al., 2018;
Barnard et al., 2016; Jost et al., 2004).
For contact theory, when the quantity and quality of interactions with members
of the other group increase, homophilous preferences for same-type ties decrease. In
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other words, a lack of contact with members of another group is the primary cause
of homophilous decisions based on group identity (Allport et al., 1954; Pettigrew
and Tropp, 2006; Hewstone and Swart, 2011; McKeown and Dixon, 2017; Stainback,
2008; Zhou et al., 2018). When the number of relevant cross-group contacts increases
group identity and group homophily decreases and people will base their choices on
individual characteristics rather than on group identity (Hewstone and Swart, 2011).
By contrast, for conflict theory the tension among groups of different sizes and
“status” shapes group identity. This because the “in charge” group wants to maintain
relevant positions or access to resources (Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif, 1966; Levine and
Campbell, 1972; Brief et al., 2005). A demographic change will increase the tension
among groups resulting in a hardening of attitudes and stronger homophilistic choices
based on group identity.
Both theories examine important aspects of group behavior underlining the link
between homophily and social transformations and its role in a system at the aggregate
level.
2.2.1 Homophily in Higher Education and Research
The evidence of homophily in Higher Education is observable (mainly) in the
demographic composition across the academic ranks and fields. At high ranks, white
males still dominate academic positions.9 For example, in 2016, according to the US.
Department of Education, only 27% of full-time professors are female, and 4% are
black.10 Across fields, a certain degree of segregation is evident where female and
black faculty concentrate in specific disciplines (e.g. art, history, biology, medicine)
and are under-represented in others (e.g. engineering, physics, computer science, and
economics) (Moore et al., 2018; Weeden et al., 2017; Mullen and Baker, 2008).
A key question, to understand these imbalances, remains unresolved: is there a
bias in selection committees, or is the population of applicants not representative of
the population as a whole?11 A way to answer this question is to understand the
relative magnitude of choice and induced homophily in producing these imbalances.
The empirical literature often concentrates on choice homophily. In particular,
among the vast literature documenting the lower success rates, and biases against
9Here academic rank refers to either as institutional prestige or as rank in the career.
10Source NCES https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=61; access March 2019
11UC Berkeley was accused of (anti-female) gender bias in undergraduate admissions in the 1970s, but
on closer examination, it was uncovered that most of the discrepancy in admissions rates for male and
female applicants was induced by differences in the departments to which the groups applied. In fact there
was evidence that choice homophily operated in favor of admitting women (Bickel et al., 1975).
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women in various types of academic evaluation, several papers look explicitly at
whether this bias may be driven by choice homophily among the evaluators. Re-
sults suggest that these processes are quite complex and context-specific. Bagues and
Esteve-Volart (2010) find heterophilous effects in national hiring committees in the
Spanish judiciary, implying that female candidates are less likely to succeed when the
evaluation committee contains several women. They suggest this is because women on
the committee over-estimate the quality of male applicants. On the other hand, what
they observe is compatible with the opposite hypothesis, a homophilous effect. That
is, the presence of women in committees may affect the voting behavior of the male
colleagues such that male members increasingly favor male candidates. The latter is
what Bagues et al. (2017) find in an extensive study of promotions to associate and
full professor in Spain. They find that female committee members have gender-blind
preferences, but when there is a woman on a committee, the men on that committee
become less favorable towards female candidates. A second paper confirms a similar
mechanism, with a slightly different data-set: Bagues et al. (2014) find that the suc-
cess rate of a female candidate decreases by 2 percentage points for each additional
female in the committee.
Additional evidence of choice homophily is in terms of research funding. Male ap-
plicants are more successful in grant applications (Van Der Lee and Ellemers, 2015),
and since often adjudication committees have a male majority, this may indicate ho-
mophilous preferences there also. One recent explanation for the observation that
male scientists are more successful in grant applications than are females has to do
with language use (Kolev et al., 2019). Controlling for many “obvious” correlates,
the authors find that a gender-gap remains in success in grant proposals submitted
to the Gates Foundation (2008-17). However, when in addition, they controlled for
the type of vocabulary used in the proposal, the gap was no longer statistically sig-
nificant. Specifically, males tend to use more vague terms, while female use a more
field-specific language.
Beyond committee decisions, scientific productivity can also be affected by ho-
mophily. Indeed, publications are often necessary for promotion and precondition for
research funds. In this respect, Helmer et al. (2017) find homophily to be relevant
in the peer-review process, finding that editors (male and female) have same-gender
preferences.
There are no empirical studies which directly access the impact of induced ho-
mophily on the individuals. However, while biases (choice homophily) in evaluations
may exist, the observed outcomes may also be induced. De Paola et al. (2015) find
controlling for various individual characteristics including “quality”, women are less
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likely to enter the Italian Scientific Qualification competition in fields where perceived
discrimination against women is high. They also find that women are less likely to ap-
ply for promotion in fields in which females were under-represented, in other words,
in fields with high levels of induced homophily.
The processes that form any observed homophily in higher education and research
are numerous and complex. Further, they seem to be widespread within the different
processes in which an academic is involved, such as tenure, promotion, publishing,
and grant applications. One specific process that may matter a lot, but is as yet very
little studied, is the selection of supervision. The student-supervisor relation is rele-
vant in terms of education but can also have enormous affects on a student’s future
career.
In more general terms, the education literature finds that, at universities, an effec-
tive student-supervisor relation includes: (1) a focus on achievements and knowledge
acquisition; (2) support, direct assistance, and role modeling; (3) mutual benefit; (4) a
personal nature beyond strictly work-related issues; and (5) a professor having expe-
rience, influence, and achievement (Jacobi, 1991; Gersick et al., 2000; Girves et al.,
2005; Crisp and Cruz, 2009). These components are particularly important (especially
in early-stages) for under-represented and minority groups (Girves et al., 2005; Terrell
and Hassell, 1994) and when these attributes are present in a positive sense can reduce
their attrition rate (Terrell and Hassell, 1994). Role models are crucial, and mentors
of the same race/gender of the students are often more effective (Bettinger and Long,
2005; Lockwood, 2006; Breda et al., 2018; Gaule and Piacentini, 2018; Rossello et al.,
2020).
Thus, the student-supervisor relation, mainly for its relevance for under-represented
groups, is a potential channel of social transformations if, for example, members of
under-represented groups succeed in finding “good” supervisors who can further in-
spire their careers. At the same time, though, the formation of the student-supervisor
tie is yet another place where homophily may be strongly present. I turn now to the
analysis of homophily in student-supervisor relations in higher education in South
Africa.
2.3 Data
The data originate with the South African National Research Foundation (NRF).12
The NRF has a “rating system” in which scholars apply to have their research eval-
12NRF (www.nrf.ac.za) is a state agency whose mission is to promote research and to develop national
research capacity.
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uated. In the application, each researcher has to submit her/his complete curriculum
vitae, details on publications, work history, student supervision, plus individual char-
acteristics such as race, age and gender. Almost all researchers in the country with a
research oriented career are part of the NRF this because there are strong individual
and institutional incentives.13
Overall, the South African university system is relatively small, having only 4034
tenured associate and full professors in 2012.14
The data include 78081 student-supervisor relationships (with 7432 total super-
visors). They represent thesis supervision of bachelor (“Honours” in South Africa)
(19%), master (56%) and Ph.D. (25%) students where Science Technology Engineer-
ing and Mathematics (STEM) represents 73% of the total supervisions and Social
Sciences and Humanities (SSH) the remaining 27%.15 The data contain information
of students and professors gender, race, student level of education, year, university (39
institutions), and broad scientific field (18 categories).
The analysis aggregate data in five time-periods: 1973-1995 (3%), 1996-2000
(9%), 2001-2005 (22%), 2006-2010 (39%) and 2011-2014 (27%).16 This chapter
studies student-supervisor ties, looking at race and gender. Supervision relations be-
tween agents of same-types are: white-white (WW) and black-black (BB) for race,
and male-male (MM) and female-female (FF) for gender. Ties between agents of
cross-types are: black-white when a black student has a white supervisor (BW) or
13The NRF covers overall 30% of the South African Academics, those globally account for more than
90% of the peer-reviewed research output. The STEM fields have been part of the NRF rating system longer
than have SSH fields, and in these fields, coverage is almost complete and in line with the statistics provided
by the South African Council of Higher Education (CHE https://www.che.ac.za). Those disparities
have to do to the fact that a large part of the South African higher education in SSH is concentrated in
education only. Unfortunately, there are no national statistics on the composition of this part of the system,
and the data are likely to do not represent that part of the system. Nevertheless, I should remark that
transformations are more advanced in those areas where female and people of color were historically more
involved.
14Data provided by the Department of Higher Education (DHE). Available at https://africacheck.
org/reports/how-many-professors-are-there-in-sa/; access 2019
15Given how data are collated, if there is an incompleteness in the records, it will be at the lower levels.
This is not particularly troublesome as Honours supervision involves the least student-supervisor contact.
Comparing the sample composition with National statistics I can conclude that the sample is representative





16The aggregation in 5 time-periods is done for two reasons. First, to reduce possible issues of sample
biases, since NRF rating applications are sometimes not submitted yearly by individuals. The latter relates
to historical reasons. The first period 1973-1995 represents the apartheid era. In that period the system was
(almost) completely segregated. The second 1996-2000 is after the end of apartheid but before the reform of
the university system. In that period, there was the political commitment to reduce the apartheid heritage.
In the years 2001-2015 was announced and implemented a major reform of the university system. The
reform created new institutions and merged some old institutions, so I isolate that period. The last period
2011-2014 is the post-reform period.
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white-black for the reverse (WB), and similarly for gender: female-male (FM) or
male-female (MF).
2.4 Preliminaries
In what follows, I will make repeated use of two things: a null model of tie-
formation; and a particular network statistic. So before I start the analysis, I detail
them here.
The population is made of students indicated with S and supervisors (teachers)
called T . When the S and T are used with subscripts, indicating the dichotomous
types b and w (or f and m for gender), they represent the relative proportions of types.
For example, Sw indicates the proportion of students who are white, and so on for Sb,
Tw, and Tb.
2.4.1 Null Model
The null model describes the random assignment of student-supervisor ties in
which a student and a supervisor are drawn randomly and independently from their






For example, Pr(ww) is equal to the proportion of white students multiplied by
the proportion of white supervisors (SwTw). The four probabilities represent the ran-
dom mixing which is the probability of observing a certain tie-type given population
availability and type-blind tie formation.
Null model with permutations
To account for the small sample bias and other confounding embedded in the net-
work, I create a “corrected” null model using permutations. The null model with
permutations is the result of tie-types given by repeated permutations of the existing
ties. So the probability of observing any of the four tie-types is given by permutations
results, as follows
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Where J is the number of permutations, j is a realization of the permutation, and
perm j indicates a random assignment of students to supervisors. The permutation
preserves the degree sequence of supervision. In other words, it retains the number of
supervisions that each professor performs at the individual level and randomly assigns
the students.
2.4.2 Homophily and Assortativity
To measure homophily I use the assortativity coefficient (Newman, 2003). It is
a standard measure used to characterize this aspect of social networks (Johny et al.,











i indicates the types (w and b); eii are the proportions of same-type of ties (WW and
BB in this case) and ai and bi are the proportions of each type in the population a and
b (S and T in this case). Here:
Ass.=
(BB+WW )− (SbTb +SwTw)
1− (SbTb +SwTw)
. (2.4)
Where BB and WW are same-type ties proportions, Sb is the fraction of black stu-
dents, Tb is the fraction of black professors, and Sw and Tw are, respectively, those of
white students and professors. Intuitively, the assortativity coefficient measures the
gap between observed same-types ties and those predicted by the null model (eq.2.1).
To reduce the issue of small sample bias and to control for various confounding fac-
tors embedded in the network structure I use in section 2.8 a modified version of the
assortativity coefficient. I replace the expected value with the permuted values as de-
scribed above. This gives a frequency distribution for the assortativity measure rather
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than a point observation.
With those preliminaries in place, I turn now to the analysis.
2.5 Student-Supervisor ties
Table 2.1: Student supervision composition. Where w indicates white, b black, m male, f female, S represents students,
and T supervisors. Ass. is an abbreviation for assortativity. Expected values of random mixing (eq. 2.1) are in
parenthesis. Columns 1 and 2 should be treated carefully as both have few observations. Column 1 represents
the apartheid era and column 2 is before the reform of the university system.
1973-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2014
Populations
Sw 0.80 0.58 0.49 0.43 0.39
Sb 0.20 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.61
Tw 0.90 0.80 0.71 0.61 0.56
Tb 0.10 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.44
Supervisions
WW 0.79 (0.72) 0.56 (0.46) 0.44 (0.35) 0.37 (0.26) 0.33 (0.22)
WB 0.01 (0.08) 0.02 (0.12) 0.05 (0.14) 0.06 (0.17) 0.06 (0.17)
BW 0.15 (0.18) 0.28 (0.34) 0.31 (0.36) 0.29 (0.35) 0.28 (0.34)
BB 0.05 (0.02) 0.13 (0.08) 0.20 (0.15) 0.28 (0.22) 0.33 (0.27)
Ass.b/w 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.34
Populations
Sm 0.65 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.48
S f 0.35 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.52
Tm 0.74 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.56
Tf 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.44
Supervisions
MM 0.56 (0.48) 0.40 (0.34) 0.37(0.31) 0.33 (0.27) 0.32 (0.27)
MF 0.08 (0.17) 0.11 (0.17) 0.14 (0.19) 0.15 (0.21) 0.15 (0.21)
FM 0.24 (0.26) 0.28 (0.33) 0.27 (0.31) 0.26 (0.30) 0.26 (0.29)
FF 0.11 (0.09) 0.21 (0.16) 0.23 (0.19) 0.25 (0.22) 0.27 (0.23)
Ass.m/ f 0.23 0.21 0.2 0.16 0.18
The stack plot of tie-type composition over time underlines the social transforma-
tion of the university system (fig. 2.1). In particular, it shows the growth of cross-type
ties and the growth of black (female) participation. In more details, descriptive statis-
tics on populations, supervisions, and the network assortativity coefficient are in Table
2.1. The table underlines the transition of the system: from a system dominated by
white males to one showing more diversity. The presence of black (female) students
increases from Sb = 20% (S f = 35%) in 1973-94 to Sb = 61% (S f = 52%) in 2011-14.
A similar, though less striking transformation occurs in the composition of the faculty:
the percentage of black (female) professors (Tb and Tf ) increases from 10% (26%) to
44% (44%) over the same periods.
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Figure 2.1: Stack plot of Student-Supervisor relations 1973-2014. Ties are labels ordered as student, supervisor. Racial
ties WW, WB, BW, BB (2.1a) and Gender ties MM, MF, FM, FF (2.1b). For 5 time periods: 1973-1995;
1996-2000; 2001-2005; 2006-2010; and 2011-2014
(a) Racial ties
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(b) Gender ties
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The compositional changes of the students and the supervisors provoked an in-
crease in cross-type of relationships, evident in the second parts of each panel. In the
period of apartheid, 1973-1995 white professors have 94% of the total supervisions,
and supervisors are 80% male. In the last period of the sample, 2011-2014, by con-
trast, white and male professors supervise respectively 61% and 58% of the students.
Same racial supervision ties (WW and BB) represent the 84% of the total in 1973-
1995, they fall to 66% in 2011-2014. Similarly, same-gender supervisions (MM and
FF) fall from 67% in 1973-1995 to 59% in 2011-2014. In each cell, the parenthesis in-
dicates the proportion of supervisions of that type expected under the null model (eq.
2.1). Thus, besides the increase of cross-type of ties over time, ties of white (male)
students with black (female) supervisors are relatively rare even today.
Newman’s assortativity coefficient in the final row of each panel shows positive
values for race and gender assortativity. A positive coefficient indicates a tendency
(at the aggregate level at least) for agents to connect with those of same-type. This
provides prima facie evidence of homophily.
Race assortativity decreases before the university reform (2001-2005) but, after, it
increases again. Instead, gender assortativity appears more stable.
2.5.1 Future Academics
In the data I identify students who continue their career as (research-active) schol-
ars in a South African university. The NRF database is an extensive database with
many tables containing different information of all individuals who applied to NRF
between 1970 to 2014. In this chapter, I identify future academics with the following
procedure. I use the data of student-advisor records described before and I matched
them with university employment records. First, I started from the database contain-
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Table 2.2: Student supervision composition subsample of Future Academics. Where w for white, b for black, m for male,
f for female, S for students, and T for professors. Ass. is abbreviation for assortativity. Expected values
of random mixing are in parenthesis. To note: column 1 and 2 should be treated carefully, both have few
observations. Column 1 represents the apartheid era and column 2 is before the reform of the university system.
1973-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2014
Populations
Sw 0.79 0.61 0.50 0.46 0.40
Sb 0.21 0.39 0.50 0.54 0.60
Tw 0.93 0.87 0.75 0.64 0.58
Tb 0.07 0.13 0.25 0.36 0.42
Supervisions
WW 0.78 (0.73) 0.60 (0.53) 0.46 (0.38) 0.40 (0.29) 0.35 (0.23)
WB 0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.08) 0.03 (0.13) 0.06 (0.17) 0.05 (0.17)
BW 0.17 (0.20) 0.29 (0.34) 0.33 (0.38) 0.26 (0.35) 0.24 (0.35)
BB 0.04 (0.01) 0.09 (0.05) 0.17 (0.13) 0.27 (0.19) 0.36 (0.25)
Ass.w/b 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.44
Populations
Sm 0.67 0.51 0.51 0.46 0.40
S f 0.33 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.60
Tm 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.61 0.58
Tf 0.21 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.42
Supervisions
MM 0.60 (0.53) 0.40 (0.37) 0.37 (0.34) 0.33 (0.28) 0.29 (0.23)
MF 0.07 (0.14) 0.11 (0.14) 0.14 (0.17) 0.12 (0.18) 0.11 (0.17)
FM 0.23 (0.26) 0.32 (0.36) 0.30 (0.33) 0.30 (0.33) 0.29 (0.35)
FF 0.10 (0.07) 0.17 (0.13) 0.19 (0.16) 0.24 (0.21) 0.30 (0.25)
Ass.m/ f 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.21
ing employment records. Here for each individual is presented the career progression,
including graduation year, broad scientific field, and university of employment. First, I
disambiguated all names and surnames, and I attached a unique user id to all uniquely
identified agents. Then I matched Students records with records on the employment
database matching records by name, surname, university, scientific field and degree
year. I manually checked a random sample of 100 individuals to access the quality of
the matching searching on-line information of these individuals. The students identi-
fied in this way are the future academics that after graduation applies to NRF between
1970 to 2014. This procedure has one limitation: the observation period after grad-
uation is not fixed for all agents. However, the students in the last period 2011-2014
are about 27% of the total and NRF gives strong incentives also for young scholars
to apply to be rated. Future academics are an interesting sub-group, as their super-
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Figure 2.2: Student-Supervisor network for Future Academics 1973-2014. The side of the nodes are proportional to node
degree. The colour of the nodes represents ethnic groups black are black, blue are coloured, orange are Indians






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































visors may have identified them as promising students. They constitute 13% of the
sample of students. I consider the future academics sample important to understand
the entry process of researchers into the system. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics
for this sub-population of students. The population composition and supervisions of
the sub-sample are in line with the overall population, though social transformation
appears slightly lower along racial lines. In figure 2.2 I show for the sample of fu-
ture academics the network of student-supervisor relations where the colours of the
nodes represent ethnic groups and the size of nodes their number of connection (node
degree). The figure shows to some extent the degrees of segregation in the system.
Indeed, in the giant connected component in the middle the more central agents with
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a higher number of connections are mostly whites (grey nodes). All around, in a more
peripheral position are visible clusters of black (black, blue, orange) students and ad-
visors.
2.6 Methodology
A system has various layers of organizations or (sub-)units; for this, the key to
isolating choice homophily in a system is to use different levels of aggregation. The
university system is a collection of the faculties, each one organized into departments.
In principle universities and departments interact with each other, but supervision hap-
pens (mostly) within a department. Indeed, institutional constraints govern student-
supervisor tie formation, and each university department has the duty and the incentive
to provide internal supervision for their students. In other words, the department is the
risk set, the meeting pool of the agents likely to form ties together. University depart-
ments represent the constraints to agents interaction which create induced homophily
within the system.17 These organizational “limits” to interaction express norms, spe-
cialization and the division of labor. For example, lab equipment available in few uni-
versities could limit supervision and affects the formation of student-advisor relation.
This chapter includes that in the broad definition of institutional constraints. Indeed,
equipment, funding, and facilities are part of the institutional arrangement of a uni-
versity system. This type of constraints produces induced homophily in the university
system. I control for induced homophily isolating choice homophily using the depart-
ment level (randomization) permutation. The randomization at university department
level controls for all type of institutional constraints (e.g. department demographic
composition, professor popularity, funding, norms, lab equipment, facilities).18
Thus, to remove most of the induced homophily, I restrict attention to the students
and supervisors within a single department — any student within a department can
17In some cases, there are demonstration effects at play. This happens when students choose a certain
department because there is a specific demographic composition. In this situation, I argue that what it may
appear as “choice homophily” of students is instead induced by the system. Let’s consider this thought
experiment. In a hypothetical system where all groups are fairly represented in all (sub-)units or ranks,
that will not happen. A student will enter the system and chose her/his major and only then, after knowing
professors in her/his department will make a choice for association. In that case, after the opportunity
provided by the system to be exposed to diversity, I can really consider her/his choice as “free” and not
induced. In this line of reasoning, I consider this sorting effect into disciplines or department as induced by
the system.
18A caution remark should be considered here. Within one university department, not all have equal
access to the scientific equipment in the laboratory. A star scholar might access equipment more than
his co-workers. Related to this issue, I made an implicit assumption in my methodology that is: a star
scholar attracts more students then a colleague (i.e. she/he displays preferential attachment in supervision).
However, this might be a limitation that could be overcome with the use of collaboration data. Part of it is
accounted in Chapter 3 advisor past average productivity is added as a control. An additional limitation is
in the way I am forced to define university departments.
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take any faculty within that department as a supervisor.19
The first part of the chapter empirically investigates homophily in its two com-
ponents choice and induced. I use a permutation technique repeated at the system
and the department level of aggregation. I use the pair university name and broad
scientific field, to identify university departments.20 The permutation results give the
null model of random type-blind ties. Then, using permutation results, I compute ho-
mophily levels in the two cases. The measure of homophily is a modified version of
the assortativity coefficient (see section 2.4) and examines at the gap between the null
model with permutations and observed ties (eq. 2.5 below).
Homophily measured at the system level comprises both choice and induced. The
one measured at the department level eliminates (much of) the homophily induced by
the system and represents choice homophily.
The second part of the paper, section 2.9 below, I investigate where choice ho-
mophily originates. I use department-level data to measure the strength of homophilous
preferences in the populations of students and professors. In particular, I develop a
model to estimate homophilous preference in the four (sub-)groups: black and white
students and black and white professors.
In section 2.10, I further discuss the model showing how measures of homophily
can be prone to misleading interpretations in the presence of social transformations.
2.7 Permutation Test
I perform a permutation test creating 95% confidence intervals of the null model
with permutations (see section 2.4 eq. 2.2) at the aggregate level, and then at the de-
partment level. This to test whether observed tie-types are more (less) likely than a
model of random type-blind tie formation would predict. If there is no homophily in
student-supervisor tie formation, the observed tie-types should lie within the confi-
dence intervals of the permutation test.
The permutation test at the aggregate system level is constructed as follows. For
each period, it permutes the students 100 times and randomly assigns students to “su-
pervision slots”. In other words, it retains the students and professors actual popula-
tion, and the total of supervisions each supervisor performs (keeping fixed the super-
visor’s degree sequence) and randomizes the students.21 From this set of 100 permu-
19It must be noticed that for example, a physics departments might include both theoretical and experi-
mental physicists. An experimenter would not supervise a student doing a theoretical thesis. So there will
remain some induced homophily for which I cannot correct. This is particularly true given the way I am
forced to operationalize “department”, as I discuss below.
20The full list of university names and fields are in the Appendix A.2.
21The procedure preserves the degree sequence of student supervision, randomizing the demographic
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tations I compute averages and 95% confidence intervals of tie-types, and I compare
them with observed ones.
At the system level, part of the gap between observed tie-types and the permu-
tation test is due to the implicit assumption of the permutation, which is that each
professor can supervise anyone: a physicist in Cape Town can supervise a student of
law in Limpopo. In the university system there are many constraints (e.g. geographic,
disciplinary) which prevent the formation of such relation, this makes part of the ob-
served divergence induced. This is what I refer to as the homophily induced by the
system.
I remove induced homophily repeating the permutation test at the department
level. I use the same procedure, but I restrict the permutation to run within the uni-
versity department. Due to data limitation, my proxy of a university department is the
couple university name and scientific field. In particular, there are 39 South African
institutions and 18 scientific fields. 22 23
I run the permutation tests at the system and the department level for the whole
sample and the following sub-samples of the population: identified students who enter
academia (Future Academics), STEM, SSH, top institutions24, and Ph.D. students (the
last two are in Appendix A.1)
2.7.1 Permutation Test results
Figure 2.3 shows the results of the permutation test at the system and the depart-
ment level for different sub-samples of the data. The left column of panels treats the
entire country as one integrated system, imposing no constraints on who can super-
vise whom (system level permutations - without institutional constraints). The right
column of panels constrains supervisions to take place within one “department” (de-
partment level permutations - with institutional constraints).
Results for different (sub-)samples are consistent.25
Figure 2.3 underlines that student-supervisor ties display racial (gender) homophily
(results for gender are in figure 4 in Appendix E). In particular, observed proportions
of tie-types (solid lines) are outside the 95% confidence interval of the permutation
test (dashed lines). In other words, same(cross)-type of ties are more (less) likely than
composition of the ties. It controls for preferential attachment and other confounding factors, like the
willingness of supervisors to accept students, budget constraints, and faculty practices and norms.
22Institutions and fields are listed in the Appendix A.2
23The proxy for university departments is probably too broad to get precisely the right level of dis-
aggregation. This is a limitation of the data.
24Top institutions are: Cape Town, Pretoria, KwaZuluNatal, Stellenbosch, Rhodes, Witwatersrand, and
Western Cape University.
25As a robustness check, I performed the analysis the permutation in each year and then aggregating into
the five periods and the results are consistent.
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a process of random type-blind tie formation would imply.
The results comparison of the permutation tests at the system and department level
(figures 2.3 and 4 from the right column to the left) shows that the gap between ob-
served tie-type and the null model is lower when institutional constraints (department
level permutation) are taken into account. Though it remains statistically significant,
this highlights the presence of a large amount of induced homophily. In the follow-
ing section, I measure more directly the relative magnitude of induced and choice
homophily.
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Figure 2.3: Permutation tests for student supervisor data 1973-2014. The permutation is done keeping fixed the number
of ties per supervisor and permuting the students. Permutation without constraint (left) and with institutional
constraints (right). The Permutation is repeated 100 times for each of time period. The results of the permuta-
tion are plotted using dashed lines with two standard deviations on either side of the mean shown in the same
color. Solid lines in each plot show the proportions observed in the data. Tie-type labels (BB, BW, WW, WB)
are read as student-supervisor.
(a) All
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Chapter 2 Section 2.8
2.8 Choice and Induced homophily
In this section, I use the system and department level permutation to separate
choice homophily from that induced by the system.
I measure homophily modifying Newman’s assortativity coefficient (in eq. 2.4)
as follows. The Newman coefficient considers the gap between the proportions of
same-type ties observed and expected values of random mixing in the population; in
contrast, I compare observed same-type of ties with the distribution of permutation
results. The measure becomes
Ass j =
(BBobs +WWobs)− (Bperm j B+Wperm jW )
1− (Bperm j B+Wperm jW )
. (2.5)
j is a realization of the 100 permutations.26 BB and WW are proportions of the
same-type tie, and obs and perm mean observed and permutation results. I present
homophily computed in this way using box-plots.
26Bperm j B indicates that students are randomly assigned to supervisors, maintaining the degree sequence
for supervisors.
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Figure 2.4: Induced and Choice Homophily comparison looking racial ties in student supervisor relations 1973-2014. I
compare results of assortativity of different sub-samples: All vs. Future Academics (a), STEM vs. SSH
(b). Each panel contains 4 series; In Fig.(a): aggregated (upper series) versus department level (lower series)
crossed with total sample (white background) versus future academics (grey background). And similarly for
Fig. (b). Upper series are system-level permutations, including both induced and choice homophily; lower
series are department-level permutations, excluding much of the induced homophily. Each box plot represents
100 permutations and associated assortativity calculation, as described in section 2.4.2, and equation 2.4.
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In each column and period figure 2.4 shows assortativity at the system level in
the upper boxes and assortativity at the department level in lower boxes. In the
lower boxes the institutional constraints are included, I have constrained supervisions
to take place within a department, which approximates a situation of zero induced
homophily—in principle any professor can supervise any student. The lower boxes
thus approximate choice homophily and the difference between upper and lower boxes
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is an estimate of induced homophily.
Figures 2.4(a) and 2.4(b) show choice and induced racial homophily. Figures
2.4(a) compares the whole sample (grey background) with future academics (white
background). While Figures 2.4(b) compares STEM (grey background) with SSH
(white background). Both figures underline that at the system level homophily (upper
boxes) is roughly double that at the department level (lower boxes). Thus a large part
of overall observed homophily is induced by department composition. Further, choice
homophily (lower boxes) exhibits a slightly increasing trend. A similar trend could be
partially an artefact of social transformations taking place in the system. I explore this
further in section 2.10.
The Comparison between the whole sample and the sub-sample of future aca-
demics shows additional insights. The results underline that future academics experi-
ence larger institutional constraints and so higher induced homophily. In particular, af-
ter 2001-2005, the assortativity measured for future academics in figure 2.4(a) (white
background - upper boxes) exhibits higher levels compared with the whole sample
(grey background — upper boxes) while by contrast, choice homophily (lower boxes)
has similar levels. Such a result could be compatible with demonstration effects along
racial lines in (sub-)disciplines. The latter creates a correlation between sub-field and
racial composition of the academics in it. Demonstration effects work in the following
way: when students choose an academic discipline, they ask whether “people like me”
prosper in that discipline. Demonstration effects and absence of role models are often
an explanation for the under-representation of women in STEM subjects (Steele and
Ambady, 2006; Bian et al., 2017; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Cheryan et al., 2017).
Another important indication is given comparing STEM and SSH fields. The com-
parison in figure 2.4(b) globally finds similar levels of homophily, but different com-
position. In STEM (grey background) induced homophily appears stronger. Indeed
the distance between total homophily and choice homophily is larger in STEM than
in SSH. If a demonstration effect is at work, this suggests it is stronger in STEM than
in SSH.27
In the Appendix E figure 6 shows the analogous results for gender. In general
homophily along gender lines tends to be lower than homophily along racial lines.
However, estimates and time-trends of choice homophily are very similar for race and
gender.28
27This is consistent with the large empirical evidence in the education literature underlining the impor-
tance of same race (gender) role models. Additionally, there are also evidences that parents educational
attainments largely correlates with the educational outcomes of children. Those children may have lower
needs of role models because they have it within their family.
28The low numbers of black females in the sample make unfeasible to look at the intersection between
race and gender. Black scholars and students with a research-active career are mostly male. Indeed, statis-
tics from the South African DHE on professorship and students enrolments underline that most of the racial
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Globally, the results show that the composition of the departments induces race-
based and gender-based homophily largely. In other words, university and field con-
straints to interaction generate haft of the homophily observed in the system. Further,
homophily, have a different composition in STEM and SSH. This suggests an unequal
distribution of social transformation in the South African university system. This is
consistent with the observation in Herman (2017) who suggest a knowledge divide
created by apartheid and still present. The university reform of 2002-2004 in South
Africa partially accounts for that. The reform reduced the number of universities from
36 to 23 and operated with mergers to redistribute resources and to remove the racial
inequalities inherited from apartheid (Herman, 2017).
2.9 Where does choice homophily originate?
In the previous sections, I measured choice homophily in the aggregate. This as-
sumes that in the population all have the same degree of homophilous preferences.
Given the history of the country, this might not be the case. The new methodology
in this section presents a way for distinguishing homophily levels among the different
groups. First, I create a model of type-blind tie formation which inserts for each sub-
population of students and supervisors a specific level of homophilous preferences.
Second, I estimate for each sub-population the proportion of agents with homophilous
preferences at the department level.29 Lastly, I discuss the need for caution interpre-
tation of the assortativity coefficient in a transition phase of social transformations.30
Intuitively, the model includes in each sub-population a certain fraction of agents
with strictly homophilous preferences (that form only same-type ties) and the remain-
ing is completely “color-blind” (form ties at random).31 Four are the sub-population
groups: white and black (male and female) professors and black and white (male and
female) students. I apply the model at the department level, thus eliminating induced
homophily.
inclusion happens with the introduction of black males. Although, the intersection between race and gen-
der is crucial. I address it in a smaller sample which concentrates on Ph.D. STEM graduates were the
sample is more complete (Rossello et al., 2020). Not surprisingly, I find a high correlation between race
homophily and gender homophily. Interestingly, the results show that cross-racial couples attenuate the
gender productivity gap.
29In Appendix A.3, I use a simple econometric model as a robustness check.
30Homophily values are likely to be heterogeneous across universities and departments. In principle,
that is present in the model I present. However the data are not strong enough to include that aspect in the
estimates, so I assume that university-level effects are not present.
31The model could as well be explicated in terms of “tendencies” for (non-)homophilous tie formation at
the individual level. The analysis would be identical.
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2.9.1 A Model of homophilous preferences of the different groups
In this section, I describe the model of random tie formation of student-supervision.
I use it to estimate the homophilous preferences in the four population groups. In par-
ticular, Both students and professors are of two types w or b.
Students and professors form supervision ties according to a two-stage process that
I model as a probability tree. First, I draw a student and then the professor. Students-
supervisor ties are formed by drawing one member randomly with replacement from
each population.
In many disciplines (particularly at the bachelor and master level) is the student
who approaches the professor asking for supervision.32 This mechanism is mimicked
by the proposed pairing of students and supervisors, where the student is drowned
first.
The possible outcomes are the probabilities of observing same- and cross-types of
tie. When all agents are type-blind, according to equations 2.1, only relative sizes of
groups matter, in this model, though, I add homophilous preferences.
The model has a simplifying assumption. Each sub-population has a specific level
of homophilous preferences. Formally this level represents the frequency of agents in
each group with strictly homophilous preferences. I assume that strictly homophilous
individuals form ties only with those of same-type and refuse cross-type of ties 33
In each sub-populations, there are agents with homophilous preferences who form
only same-type of ties and type-blind agents who link at random in their potential
pool. According to the model, the probability of WW ties is the sum of the probability
that a homophilous w student (Swhsw) is extracted plus the probability that a type-
blind w student links at random with a w professor ((Sw(1−hsw) Tw1−htbT b )). The other























hsw and hsb are respectively proportions of agents with homophilous preferences in
32In some disciplines for Ph.D.s in particular professors do approach students. In the analysis, Only 27
% of the data are Ph.D. supervisions.
33Skvoretz (2013) highlights the importance of including attraction to similar and repulsion from dissim-
ilar in a model of group behavior in terms of homophily. The model includes both mechanisms.
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Figure 2.5: Race Homophily of the different groups 1973-2014. The estimation is done minimizing the average relative
entropy of tie-types between observed and predicted from equations 2.6. I use data at the department level
with 10000 samples with replacement of department observations. Black dashed lines are averages. Faculties










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the population of white and black students. htw and htb are those of white and black
supervisors.
I use equation 2.6 to estimate the different hs of 4 sub-populations at the depart-
ment level each period.
2.9.2 Choice Homophily of different groups
In this section, I estimate the hs of the model in the previous section. For a vector
of h= (hsw,htw,hsb,htb) the model 2.6 predicts the composition of type-ties for a given
department population composition.
For the estimation I use department level data for each time period of sub-population
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proportions and tie-types.34 Fully black or white departments and those with less than
10 supervisions per period are removed. In particular, I include departments which
satisfy 0.1 < Tw,Tb,Sw,Sb < 0.9 and have more than 10 supervision in a time period.
I use the predictions of equation 2.6 to estimate the four hs
I apply a bootstrap technique for the estimation (Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). I
generate 10000 bootstrap samples U ′ = {u′1, ...,u′10000}, for each period. Every u′k ∈U ′
has size M(t) and it is drawn from the set of university departments.35 I estimate h =
(hsw,htw,hsb,htb), for each bootstrap sample u′k, by minimizing the average relative






p(i| j)log p(i| j)
q(i| j)
. (2.7)
Where I = {ww,wb,bw,bb}, J = {departments in the bootstrap sample u′k}, p are the
empirical probabilities and q are the model predictions.
The procedure minimizes the average loss of information between observed pro-
portions of tie-types and those predicted by the model in equation 2.6 at the depart-
ment level. Each time it obtains an estimate of the fraction of agents with strictly
homophilous preferences in the 4 sub-populations. I report the bootstrap distributions
for the estimates. 36
Figure 2.5 shows the estimation of the racial homophilous preferences (see figure
8 in Appendix E for gender). The results highlight that white (male) students have
the highest estimated homophilous preferences. Among professors are black (female)
which display the higher levels. In contrast, in the sample of future academic stu-
dents, black professors have lower homophilous preferences than white professors,
especially in the most recent period, 2011-2014.
It must be noticed that while black (female) professors display homophilous pref-
erences, black (female) students do not. Thus, since it is often the student who asks
a professor to supervise her/his work, black (female) professors may face additional
induced homophily that I do not capture. Under this hypothesis, the students drive tie
formation, and by this mechanism, they may transmit homophily.37 Moreover, when I
34I account for various confounding embedded in the network (like preferential attachment, supervision
capacity, etc.) repeating the estimation using the proportion of each sub-population of students and super-
visors computed from supervision ties instead from actual individuals. This to include the fact that some
professors may attract more students than others. The results are consistent.
35M(t) is the number of departments observed in the data in period t.
36For the minimization I used the limited memory algorithm for bound constrained optimization as in
Byrd et al. (1995), under the optim R function. This because the hs are probabilities thus are bounded
between 0 and 1.
37This is likely to be the case in bachelor and master students, but probably less so in PhDs. I check
it repeating the analysis in the sub-samples of only PhD students. Those results show little differences
compared to estimates in the whole sample. Suggesting that this hypothesis is probably negligible in the
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concentrate on future academics, limits to supervision experienced by black (female)
professors could be stronger since, there, white professors have high homophilous
preferences.
2.10 A simple model with changing populations and
unchanging homophily
Results in section 2.8 show that choice homophily is increasing over time. Given
the South African context, this would be somewhat distressing if true. I point out
in this section that this can be partially a composition effect of changes in the sup-
population. I illustrate this effect below.
In a simple model with Sw = Tw and the same fixed level of homophilous prefer-
ences hsw = hsb = htw = htb = 0.3 in all sub-populations. I start with a population of
500 white students and 500 white supervisors; they are all of the same type meaning
that initially Sw = Tw = 1. Progressively I introduce in such population the other de-
mographic type. Sb and Tb which was zero at the beginning starts to rise.38 I present
the results as a function of the number of blacks, (Nb), in the system.39 I make super-
vision assignments using the model in section 2.9.1 and then calculate proportions of
tie-types and assortativity mixing.
I show the behavior of the model under the described conditions of unchanged
tastes-for-similarity over time in figure 2.6. Figure 2.6(a) shows on the x-axis the
number of blacks in the population and on the y-axis the proportion of tie-types. It
relates to figure 2.3. The figure underlines that in the system, as the number of blacks
(Nb) increases the distances between “observed” tie-types and the null model of type-
blind formation (eq. 2.1) initially rises.
Figure 2.6(b) relates to figure 2.4 and shows the Newman assortativity coefficient
as a function of the number of blacks in the population. It shows that assortativity
makes a steep rise, before it falls slowly.
This section highlights that under some circumstances, assortativity could me-
chanically rise even when the level of homophilous preferences stays constant. The
condition for this rise is when same-type preferences are strong and largely unex-
pressed because of groups imbalances. Thus when a system is at the beginning of a
process of social transformations which change its demographic composition under-
sample. However, I consider this a possible limitation that might be context specific and it needs further
research and data.
38For simplicity students and professors are added with equal sizes, yet the main result here is consistent
with a case with different rates of sub-population growth.
39Nb is equal to the number of black students plus black supervisors where both have equal size.
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Figure 2.6: Model predictions as a function of number of black in the population with a starting population of 1000 white.
The model is with one population (Sw=Tw) and h=0.3 for all groups. Solid lines for model with h=0.3 and
dashed lines for model h=0.
(a) Tie types
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lining preferences will become apparent thanks to size changes of group interaction.
Therefore, I want to remark here that the increasing tendency of homophily found in
section 2.8 could be partially artificially due to the increasing number of black who
entered the system. It suggests that social transformations in South Africa academia
may still be in the transition phase. These findings suggest an additional complication
in the study of homophily in a context of social transformations. In such a context,
standard measures are open to misleading interpretations. Paradoxically, on the one
hand, apparent changes in preferences might, in fact, be due to changes in the relative
sizes of the demographic composition of a population and the interaction of thereof.
On the other hand, this suggests that a process of inclusion may in the initial phase
creates tensions due to rising levels of choice homophily.40
2.11 Conclusion
Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa is changing and slowly de-
segregating from a society divided on racial lines by the law to a more integrated
society.
Social transformations are ongoing; in many walks of life still exists a considerable
gap between aspirations and the current situation. The demographic composition of
formerly white universities is changing, yet the process in unevenly distributed in the
system. How effectively and quickly transformations proceed depends on how the
relations among students and supervisors evolve across race and gender lines.
I have examined the composition of tie formation in the relations between the
students and their thesis advisors in South African universities. Following the end
40This has a similar implication to those of conflict theory that is described in the review of the literature.
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of apartheid and the formal de-segregation of the universities, the data underlines an
ongoing transformation in its transition phase.
I found evidence of both choice and induced homophily along racial and gender
lines in the formation of student-supervisor ties. My findings have policy implications.
In particular, it should be noticed that homophily can make a transition phase of social
transformations, difficult, and very lengthy. Thus, the results suggest that a policy with
a joint target in reducing induced and choice homophily could accelerate the transition
phase of racial and gender inclusion.
Further, looking at the interaction between the demographic groups, I provide evi-
dence that the racial(gender)-base homophily in the system might originate from white
(male) students. This group might be less capable of understanding the potential gains
that an inclusion policy brings for all and feel threatened.
Moreover, strong homophily in white (male) students could retain the transition
phase of social transformations by hindering the creation of cross-type ties. Further,
examining homophily in a context of social transformations, the integration process
shows an additional complication. Paradoxically, I show that during a transition phase
of social transformations homophily can mechanically increase due to changes in the
demographic composition of the sub-populations.
At universities, the promotion and encouragement of cross-type supervision and
mentoring (across departments and universities) could be a channel for social trans-
formations. A slow path of social transformations is a great economic and social loss
of many societies. The chapter underlines that a dual-target on induced and choice
homophily in student supervision may speed up this path. In addition, such a target
offers a more holistic view beyond the focus of only demographic changes and/or
labor market outcomes. Given the potential tensions of a long transition phase mon-
itoring and targeting induced and choice homophily could create a better and more
productive environment for all.
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Doctoral productivity and the
role of gender and race in
supervision
The chapter explores gender differences in productivity of Ph.Ds graduated be-
tween 2000 and 2014 in STEM in an emerging economy with the recent systematic
introduction of doctoral programs, South Africa.1 I study whether student-advisor
gender couple matters for student publication productivity. The chapter explores gen-
der couples in the whole sample and it investigates the joint effect of gender and race
looking at the sub-samples of (1) white-white; (2) black-black; and (3) black-white
student-advisors supervisions. Further it asks whether differences among gender cou-
ples change for high, medium and low student “productivity type”. The results of
this chapter show early career productivity differences: female students on average
produce 11%-22% fewer article than male and this in particular for female students
working with a male advisor and not those working with a female one. Further, the
difference in publication productivity with the male-male student-advisor couple is
u-shaped across student productivity. In particular, female students working with fe-
male advisors with low and high productivity do not differ to male-male couple. When
0This chapter is available also as Rossello et al. (2020) in the UNU-MERIT working paper series.
Financial support was provided through the Institut Universitaire de France. I gratefully acknowledge the
comments and suggestions of participants of the workshop “APEX – Academic Pipeline Development for
Excellence” at CREST-SciSTIP as well as those of Dr. Gloria Bernal, Dr. Arjan Schakel, Prof. Louis
Volante, Prof. Kristof de Witte, and Dr. Tatenda Zimyemba.
1The notion of the systematic introduction of doctoral programs refers to the fact that some South
African professors do not have a Ph.D. in the period of the analysis. This is a feature that differentiate
the South African context to the US and many European countries.
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gender is couple with race the gap interests only the top 10%-20% of the more pro-
ductive students. Interestingly, male students working with female advisor display no
significance difference in productivity compared to male students working with male
advisors. Overall, cross racial supervisions displays less severe gender differences.
The findings underline that gender gap do not interest the whole population and that
female advisors and cross-racial ties might have an important role for students and to
reduce gender and racial inequalities.
3.1 Introduction
The gender gap in publishing is well documented: depending on the context, disci-
pline, geography or era, female scientists are found to produce fewer papers per year
than their male colleagues (Allison and Stewart, 1974; Cole and Zuckerman, 1984;
Fox and Faver, 1985; Mairesse and Pezzoni, 2015; Holman et al., 2018; Lerchen-
mueller and Sorenson, 2018; Mairesse et al., 2019; Pezzoni et al., 2016).
The ultimate sources of this gap remain elusive, though Mairesse and Pezzoni
(2015) have found that when biases in promotion decisions, and the frequency of
“idle periods” are controlled for, women are in fact more productive than men.2 They
admit, though, that their context is specific, and they do not claim to have presented
the universal explanation.
It is common to observe in studies of the gender gap that age plays a role in pub-
lishing productivity and that the gap can change with age (Kelchtermans and Veugel-
ers, 2011). This observation, combined with the well-known Matthew Effect (Merton,
1988) suggest that productivity gaps might originate very early in the career. An im-
portant open issue then is whether publishing productivity gaps are observed early
in the career (David, 1993; Conti and Visentin, 2015b), and if so how to understand
them. The chapter can get at this issue by examining publication of scientists during
the course of their doctorates.
While the study of the gender gap focuses on single scientists, it must be ac-
knowledge that much publishing involves more than the focal author (Wager et al.,
2015; Chuang and Ho, 2014; Larivière, 2012). Not only co-authors, but research as-
sistants, co-workers, technicians, conference participants, and many others contribute
with work, ideas, and suggestions. Of course, when Ph.D. students are considered as
a (co-)author, the thesis supervisor is very likely to provide important input.
2The context of their study is France 1982-2005 and they look at 2811 scholars in Physics in universities
and Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS). A similar study has been done in Mexico and
South Africa, and finds that, after controlling for promotion biases, female are 8% more productive than
male and that there are no differences in terms of publication quality (Rivera León et al., 2017)
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Often the thesis advisor is the first person with whom a student co-authors, but
additionally, supervisors play a key role in introducing students into the profession.
It seems very likely that the properties of the supervisor matter for a student’s early
success (Li et al., 2019). A priori, there are some obvious traits of the supervisor
that will matter: extent of supervision, publishing record, status in the profession,
quality, and so on. But other literature suggests gender (race) might also matter. For
example subtle gender and racial biases can distort the meritocratic evaluation of the
students. An experiment in a sample of 127 biology, chemistry, and physics professors
in the USA, asks academics to evaluate the CV of students for a laboratory manager
position, where gender was randomly assigned to CVs. It finds that both male and
female faculty judge female students as less competent, less likely to be hired than
an identical male student, and also offered her a smaller salary and less mentoring
(Moss-Racusin et al., 2016). Such biases can also reduce a student’s access to relevant
information. A similar randomization experiment finds that black students are less
likely to receive warning information from academic advisors than are white students,
when race is randomly assigned to student academic records (Crosby and Monin,
2007).
Gender (or racial) bias can play a role through both sides of the relationship
(Rossello and Cowan, 2019). From the student side, in education and learning the
gender of the advisor can affect performance and beliefs (Gaule and Piacentini, 2018;
Breda et al., 2018; Rossello and Cowan, 2019). For example, female role models are
often found to be more effective in inspiring female students (Bettinger and Long,
2005; Lockwood, 2006; Aguinis et al., 2018). A recent French experiment among
senior high school students finds a reduction of stereotypes associated with jobs in
science, after students were exposed to a female scientist (Breda et al., 2018). In the
same study, enrolment in a selective science programme increased by 30% among the
higher achieving students. And in particular, the share of female (male) students in
STEM programs were 38% (28%) than that in classes that did not receive the inter-
vention.
Thus, one might expect to see female students performing better with female ad-
visors. In South African academia, after controlling for preferential attachment and
institutional constraints, Rossello and Cowan (2019) find preferences for same gen-
der (race) in student-advisor tie formation in a sample of bachelor, master and PhD
students and advisors based on enrolment data. In particular male (white) students
have high tendency to form same-gender (race) relations, while among professors it is
female (black) faculty who display the higher frequency.
61
Chapter 3 Section 3.1
From the advisor side, the gender of the student can also be relevant. Each Ph.D.
student shares with others a thesis advisor who guides and supervises the research,
provides access to knowledge (tacit in particular), co-authors, resources, and job op-
portunities. Thus, gender biases in this phase can limit the access of the student to
resources and information. Past research has found that supervisors provide more
psychological support to protégés of the same gender (Koberg et al., 1998; Aguinis
et al., 2018); male advisors were more likely to agree to a mentoring meeting with
a male student then with a female student with same characteristics (Milkman et al.,
2015); and less willing to supervise female students (Moss-Racusin et al., 2016).
Exploring the relationship between gender (race) and performance in the student-
supervisor pair is a step towards understand productivity differences among differ-
ent groups within academia. Past research in Science, Technology, Engineering and
Mathematics (STEM) is available only for the US in a first-tier institution (Pezzoni
et al., 2016) or in a single field (Gaule and Piacentini, 2018). Looking 20,000 Ph.D.
graduated between 1999 and 2008 in US chemistry departments, Gaule and Piacentini
(2018) find that same-gender couples tend to be more productive during the Ph.D., and
that female students working with female advisors are more likely to become faculty
members compared with female students working with a male advisor. In contrast,
Pezzoni et al. (2016) study all fields in STEM with data based on 933 Ph.D. gradu-
ates and 204 advisors at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) between 2004
and 2009. In terms of student publication productivity, they find no difference between
the female-female and the male-male couples. However, they find that male students
working with a female advisor perform better than male-male peers, while female stu-
dents working with male supervisors perform worse than male students working with
male advisors.
In this chapter, I study whether Ph.D. students’ early career productivity is affected
by the gender (and/or race) of student and supervisor. In the first analysis I ask simply
whether there is a correlation between students’ publication output and the gender
(race) of the student, and, independently, the gender (race) of the supervisor. In the
second analysis I ask whether there is an observable effect of the student-supervisor
pair. The data are drawn from an emerging economy, namely South Africa, where
resource constraints in the science system generally, and universities in particular, are
much more severe than they are in developed countries. One might expect that in
the presence of resources constraints the “privileged group” will have better access
and therefore higher productivity relative to others. The academic science system in
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South Africa is relatively small — in 2012 there were only 2174 full professors,3 and
the production of Ph.D.s is concentrated in a relatively small number of institutions
(Cowan and Rossello, 2018).4 These features are typical of many developing countries
(Nchinda, 2002; Gonzalez-Sauri and Rossello, 2019).
While concerns with gender in science are common to many countries today, given
the history of apartheid and its on-going legacy, in South Africa there is a second axis
of concern, namely race.5 In South Africa people of colour make up 90% of the
population and apartheid essentially excluded them from academia. Until 1994 there
were “black universities”, but they were severely under-funded and not expected to
do any meaningful research. One of the ongoing efforts of governments since 1994
has been the transformation of the university system to include more of the black
population in the “top” (formerly white) universities. Part of the challenge has been
the academic “pipeline”: whether or not faculties are trying to hire formerly excluded
groups, if there is no supply of them, the system will not transform from a white male
bastion to a more inclusive institution. Given that academic appointments are often
heavily based on performance during graduate studies, understanding gender and race
effects on PhD student publishing becomes something of significant importance in
this context.
Pezzoni et al. (2016) have done a similar analysis using data from the Caltech,
an elite institution in US, and this chapter is modelled on theirs. They found that
compared to the male-male student-advisor couple: female students working with
male advisors publish 8.5% less; and male students working with female advisors
publish 10% more. Their data were constrained to a single, rather specific (in terms of
student and faculty quality, and finances, just to mention two dimensions) institution,
namely Caltech. Mine involves the entire national academic science system, and so
might be considered more representative of national trends and effects. In addition,
the statistical analysis differs from theirs in an important respect.
They study the relation between the student-advisor gender couple and productiv-
ity employing a model of cumulative advantage in science, where future productivity
is explained by past productivity. They use for the estimation OLS panel regressions.
In contrast, I use a quantile regression approach. The advantage of this approach is
that it does not assume that the discrepancies between genders (or races) are constant
throughout the population being studied. It could be, for example, that the average
3These data are available at https://africacheck.org/reports/how-many-professors-are-
there-in-sa/ last access November 2019.
4For a further discussion on the South African system see Rossello and Cowan (2019), and the report
Mouton et al. (2015)
5“Race” is sometimes considered a contentious concept (and word) but in the context of South Africa it
is well understood as central to the construct of the society, so I will employ the word and concept here in
the way it is done in South Africa.
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gender gap is driven by a few outliers in one or other of the groups. More specifically,
differences in gender-specific productivity may change depending on the “productiv-
ity type” (high, medium or low) of the student. These sorts of differential effects
across different population groups effects are more likely to be important where the
output variable is skewed and has a fat tail, as is the case with publications. (Petscher
and Logan, 2014).
Further, the sample is characterised by a close to balance population of students in
terms of gender and race and allows to explore both dimensions. In the gender (race)
analysis to study the gender (race) couple of student and advisors I look at the sub-
samples of white (male) students working with white (male) advisor, black (female)
students working with black (female) advisor and black (female) students working
with white (male) advisors.
To preview in the results:
The regression analysis shows that female students on average produce 11%-22%
fewer articles than males. However, dividing the two student sub-populations by
student-advisor gender, and controlling for race, I find that this average gap is mostly
driven by female students working with male advisors; the gap does not seem to exist
for female students working with female advisors once I consider the joint effect of
gender and race.
For the whole sample, the quantile regression shows that this gender gap might be
non-linear and indeed u-shaped over student productivity. That is, the gender publica-
tion gap is zero among low and high publishers; but in the middle of the publication
distribution female students publish less than males. But decomposing the population
over gender and race, the gap involves only the e most productive students (the top
10%-20% of the publication distribution) and is strongest in black-black supervision6
and not present in the population of black students working with white advisors. Inter-
estingly, male students working with female advisors seem to have roughly the same
productivity as male students working with male advisors.
Similarly, I compare black and white students and I do not find a significance
difference in productivity between the two.
The findings imply first that the gender and race composition of the student-
supervisor couple matters, but that the gender gap does not pertain to the whole
population of scholars. In particular, among the more productive, results suggest a
positive role of female advisors and that female students working with male advisors
is where differences in productivity are largest. The results show that looking only at
aggregated data may produce quite mis-leading conclusions, and therefrom possibly
6I have to remark that in this sub-sample female advisors are few.
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inappropriate or ineffective policy.
3.2 Material
3.2.1 Data
The data originate from the National Research Foundation (NRF) database of
South African Academia.7 The NRF has a system, in which academics at South
African universities apply to be “rated”. This rating has (until recently) financial and
prestige incentives, so most academics in South Africa who pursue a research career
do apply. Overall, rated scholars comprise about 30% of South African scholars who
produce roughly the 90% of the country peer reviewed output. The STEM fields have
been part of the system longer than have SSH fields, and in these fields coverage ap-
pears to be more complete. Consequently I restrict attention to this group, where the
agency has a primary role in funding research. I create a unique dataset using data
supplied in the application process. The raw data include student PhD supervision
from 2000 to 2014, and publications from 1961 to 2014.
From student and supervisor characteristics I am able to match to NRF publication
data. To be confident that publication data are complete, I include in the analysis
only Ph.D. students in STEM who became active scholars in the NRF system. This
constitutes 25% of the total PhD graduates over the period. The final sample represents
Ph.D. students within the enrolment period of 2000-2012 and with a graduation period
up to 2014. In the sample Ph.D. students graduate on average after 3.8 years after
enrolment (with a median of 4 years and a maximum of 12 years). To construct the
panel data I carry forward for each individual student the time from enrolment year up
to two years after graduation obtaining a total of 6049 observations representing 924
Ph.D.s and 549 thesis supervisors.
In the period 2000-2014 the number of Ph.Ds graduated increased rapidly.8 The
sample, in table 5 in the appendix, shows similar trends and has a good representation
in terms of the distribution of Ph.D. graduation over time. However, the last two
periods have lower number of graduates relative to national statistics. This is because
7NRF is a state agency that has as its mission the promotion of research and the development of national
research capacity. https://www.nrf.ac.za/
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Table 3.1: Students and Advisors, by Race and Gender. A professor can supervise more than one student.
Advisor
White Male White Female White Black Male Black Female Black
Stud. White Male 179 53 232 13 4 17
55% 37% 49% 54% 36% 49%
Stud. White Female 149 92 241 11 7 18
45% 63% 51% 46% 64% 51%
Stud. White 328 145 473 24 11 35
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Stud. Black Male 123 45 168 97 17 114
71% 64% 69% 64% 81% 66%
Stud. Black Female 51 25 76 54 4 58
29% 36% 31% 36% 19% 34%
Stud. Black 174 70 244 151 21 172
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
it takes several years after graduation before a faculty member is ready to apply for
rating. So by restricting to students who eventually do apply for rating, I will under-
sample the later years. Distributions of Ph.D.s graduated over disciplines, in table 6
(appendix B.6), are also in line with national statistics.9
Students in the sample are 58% (249 white and 282 black) male and 42% female
(259 white and 134 black). Professors in the final sample are 73% male (298 white
and 104 black) and 27% female (130 white and 17 black).10 Table 3.1 shows the
population composition in terms of student and advisor pairs. The majority of students
are supervised by white male advisors (54%) followed by white female (23%), black
male (19%), and black female advisors (3%).






10The sample demographic composition is close to that of the system in that period. See Rossello and
Cowan (2019) for further discussion.
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Figure 3.1: Heat-map of doctoral average annual productivity for student and advisor gender (racial) combinations. The
color intensity of each entry represents the average annual productivity of each group. Darker (lighter) colors
represent lower (higher) productivity values. Productivity is log(1+ pubt ), where pubt is number of student
publications between year t and t + 2 inclusive, divided by 3. Rows in sub-figure A are advisors gender-race
type while columns are student gender-race type. In sub-figure B rows are student advisor gender couples and
columns are fields.
For the average student, looking at three year moving windows between enrolment
and graduation plus 2 years, the annual average number of publications is close to
one; where white male students have the most (1.58) followed by black males (1.37),
white females (1.21) and black females (0.75). The median values are close to zero
for all groups (See Table 3 in the appendix). Publication data, also referring to a 3
year average, are skewed, and 44% (410 Ph.D.s) of the students do not publish at all
between enrolment years and two years after graduation.11
I define student productivity as log(1+ pubt) were pubt is number of student pub-
11Details on relative publication rates over time are shown in Figure 9 (a)(b) in the appendix.
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lications between year t and t + 2 inclusive divided by 3. Raw differences in student
productivity between different populations and student-supervisor pairs are presented
in figure 3.1 and table 7 in the appendix. Figure 3.1(A) shows that same-type super-
vision (2nd diagonal) correlates with higher average productivity (lighter colours).12
Further, looking at students (by columns) and advisors (by rows) type productivity
displays a large heterogeneity across supervision couples, suggesting a complex joint
effect of gender and race. I explore this further in table 7(e) in the appendix: look-
ing at black students working with white advisors, it is the couple (black) males with
(white) female advisors who publish most. Similarly in the population of female stu-
dents working with male advisors (table 7(f) in the appendix) white (female) students
working with black (male) advisors have the highest average productivity. Interest-
ingly, the female students who stand out in terms of productivity, in the top decile of
the productivity distribution are those who have supervisors of opposite race (Figure
12(d) in the appendix).
Figure 3.1(B) shows average productivity across student-advisor gender and dis-
ciplines. In 5 out of 13 fields the couple female student with female advisor has the
highest average productivity.13 In 2 fields, Mathematics and Medical: clinical, cross
gender ties are those with the highest averages. In the remaining 6 fields the couple
male student with male advisors has the highest average productivity. Overall, the
couple female student with a male advisor have the lowest average productivity for 6
out of 13 fields.14
3.3 Methods
The raw data indicate that female and black Ph.D. students publish less than male
and white students. But these differences could be driven by many things. In the
analysis that follows I control for several factors that are likely to contribute to a
scientists’ publication productivity in order to isolate the effects of gender and race.
The variable of interest is the number of publications produced by a student in a year
during the course of the doctorate. Because this variable has a skewed distribution, I
work with logs: log(1+ pubt). There is always a lag between the date of (completion
of) the research and publication, so I include in the definition of pubt publications of
12White females are an exception: they display higher averages when they work with black male super-
visors, however the group has very few observations.
13The 5 fields are: Technologies and applied sciences, Physical sciences, Medical science: basic, Earth
and marine sciences, Engineering
14In table 8 in the appendix I check whether there are any environmental effects at the level of university
or field in terms of gender and racial likelihood of supervision association. There are not any identifiable
environmental effects in terms of gender in the sample. But there are along racial lines, thus I run the
analysis on separate racial sub-sample of the data.
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which the student was a (co-)author, between years t and t +2 inclusive. I normalize
for annual output by dividing by 3.
In line with Pezzoni et al. (2016) I ask whether doctoral productivity differs with
respect to: (1) student gender; (2) advisor gender; (3) the genders of the student-
advisor pair. I estimate panel OLS regressions with robust clustered standard errors.15
In all regressions I control for discipline, enrolment year, time to graduation,
whether the student had published previously, whether the student has more than one
advisor, and advisor productivity as the log of average publications of the advisor
lagged one year.16
In table 9 in appendix B.7 I control for the joint effects of gender and race explor-
ing the interaction terms. This preliminary analysis shows that the main difference
in productivity is between male and female students: race has no role. Since the end
of apartheid, the progressive introduction of black was not uniform across gender.
Black females are under-represented both among students and professors, particularly
in STEM fields. For this reason, I also run the analysis on different sub-samples of the
data to decompose the possible join effects of gender and race.
For the gender analysis I look at the sub-samples: white students with white advi-
sors; black student with black advisor; and black student with white advisor. Similarly,
given the context of the country, I run a parallel analysis in section 3.4.1 to compare
black and white. Here I look at the sub-samples: male student with male advisor;
female student with female advisor; and female student with male advisor.17
As a further contribution to understanding where the gaps originate I use quantile
regression to examine the effects of the student-supervisor pair, where the quantiles
are defined over productivity. This permits to observe that much of the difference in
average publication between male and female, white and black students is driven by
differences in the right hand tail of the output distribution.
The quantile regression formulation is:
Qτ(Yit |Zi,Xit−1) = ατ + γτ Zi +βτ Xit−1 + εit (3.1)
where Qτ(Yit |Zi,Xit−1) is the τth quantile regression function, Zi are time invariant
15As robustness check I report Poisson panel regressions in appendix B.9 with robust clustered standard
errors. The results are not qualitatively different.
16In appendix B.14 I show results of the OLS panel regressions with the main variables of gender and
race and controlling only for field and enrolment years.
17There are too few white students with black female advisors, and male students with black female
advisors to give reliable results for those groups. Hence there were not included.
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covariates and Xit−1 are time variant lagged controls and εit is the error term.18
The models compare: student’s gender, advisor’s gender and the student-advisor
gender couples. The main independent variables are: the dummy StudFemale equal
to 1 for female students and zero otherwise; the dummy AdvFemale which is 1 for
female advisors; and the dummies for the different student-advisor couples StudFe-
male_AdvFemale, StudFemale_AdvMale, StudMale_AdvFemale where the baseline
category is the pair male students with male advisors. For each model I show re-
sults for the whole population (ALL) and partitioning the data according to student-
supervisor racial composition (WW for white students white advisors; BB for black
students black advisors; BW for black students and white advisors).
18For the estimation I use robust clustered standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity and intra-
cluster correlation as described in Machado et al. (2011)
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Chapter 3 Section 3.4
3.4 Results
Table 3.2 shows the results of OLS estimations of three models. Model 1 compares
female with male students. Results for the whole sample (column 1) show that female
students produce on average 11% fewer papers than male students. Looking at white
students working with white advisors (column 1a) I find that female students produce
on average 12% less than male students. Looking at black students working with black
advisors (column 1b) I find that female students display a larger gap — 22% compared
with male. Finally, among black students with white advisors, (column 1c) there is no
difference between male and female students.19
Using the same structure, model 2 (table 3.2) compares male and female advisors.
I find that female and male advisors have students that are not statistically different in
productivity.20
Model 3 in table 3.2 explores the gender pairs of students and advisors. In this
model the baseline category is the student-supervisor pair male-male. Overall female
students working with male advisors have the largest gap compared with the male-
male couple: they produce on average 14% fewer papers; while it is 12% fewer for
female students working with female advisors. Male students working with female
advisors do not differ in productivity with male-male. Decomposing the joint effect of
gender and race, the gap in productivity between female and male students is mainly
driven by female students working with male advisors in same-race supervisions. In
particular, I find that when student and supervisor are both white, (column 3a) female
students working with male advisors produce 14% fewer papers that a male student
working with male supervisor. Similarly, among black-black supervision pairs (col-
umn 3b) female students working with male advisors produce on average 20% fewer
papers than do males students working with male advisors. Interestingly, the group of
black students working with white advisors (column 3c) display no significant differ-
ence in productivity between gender couples.
19I should underline that in the BW sub-sample, outstanding students (top 10% more productive) are
females and have a median productivity higher than males. However, they comprise less than 25% of their
relative population (Appendix B.5 figure 12).
20It is important not to draw hasty conclusions from this result. It is consistent with a situation in which
male advisors favour male students, thus having productive male and unproductive female students, and
female advisors doing the reverse. This kind of homophilous preferential attention, were it to exist, would
produce the results observed here. This observation should not be read as a conjectural explanation, though,
but rather a caution against quickly interpreting this to mean that advisors are gender-blind.
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Figure 3.2: Quantile Regressions for student annual average doctoral productivity comparing student-advisor gender couples. Productivity is log(1+ pubt ), where
pubt is number of student publications between year t and t +2 inclusive, divided by 3. Each row shows results for a different data sample: All (A, B, C);
only white student-advisor (D, E, F); only black student-advisor (G, H, I); and black student with white advisor (J, K, L). In each sub-figure, the horizontal
axis represents percentiles and the vertical axis shows estimated productivity difference of student-advisor gender couple with the baseline Male-Male
couple. The columns show respectively estimated coefficients for productivity difference for the dummy female-female (green), female-male (violet) and
male-female (brown) student-advisor couple. Quantile regressions are done for each 2.5 percentile using robust clustered standard errors according to
Machado et al. (2011) and estimates for the student-advisor gender are shown with 95% confidence intervals. The solid black line is zero, dashed red
line is the (non-quantile) panel OLS estimation of Models 3 from table 3.2. Additional controls are: discipline, enrolment year, year, time to graduation,
whether the student had published previously, whether the student have more than one advisor, the log of average publications of the advisor lagged one
year. Corresponding regression tables are in Appendix section B.10
(a) All StudFemale_AdvFemale (b) All StudFemale_AdvMale (c) All StudMale_AdvFemale
(d) WW StudFemale_AdvFemale (e) WW StudFemale_AdvMale (f) WW StudMale_AdvFemale
(g) BB StudFemale_AdvFemale (h) BB StudFemale_AdvMale (i) BB StudMale_AdvFemale
(j) BW StudFemale_AdvFemale (k) BW StudFemale_AdvMale (l) BW StudMale_AdvFemale
To go beyond average differences and to accommodate the skewness and fat tails
of the dependent variable, I explore model (3) using quantile regressions with clus-
tered standard errors. In this way I am able to look for the origin of this difference,
and ask whether discrepancy between groups is stronger or weaker for different parts
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of the population, where the population is sorted into quantiles by publication produc-
tivity.
Figure 3.2 presents quantile regression estimates done over 40 groups (each repre-
senting 2.5% percentile of the population) for whole data and sub-samples. It shows
the coefficients of the dummies student-supervisor gender pairs with 95% confidence
intervals where zero represents the male-male supervision baseline. Results for the
whole sample show that productivity differences of female-female and female-male
with the male-male couple is u-shaped over student productivity (fig.3.2(a)(b)(c)). The
u-shaped productivity gap is most pronounced for female students working with fe-
male advisors, who are not statistically different from male-male for low (<70th per-
centiles) and high (>90th percentiles) student productivity type (fig.3.2(a)). Female
students working with male advisors overall display larger gaps with the male-male
couple in line with OLS results (fig.3.2(b)).
Results for data sub-samples look at the joint effect of gender and race. Over-
all I find that the productivity gap (with the baseline male-male couples) increases
with student productivity. The figure shows that female students working with fe-
male (fig.3.2(d)(g)) or male advisors (fig.(3.2(e)(h)(k))) compared to males working
with males occurs mostly after the 75th percentile of the productivity distribution and
tends to grow with publication productivity. In line with OLS results, male students
working with female advisors are not different in productivity compared to male-male
pairs.21
I explore this evidence further in appendix B.10. For the sub-sample of white
students working with white advisors, table 15 shows that differences in productivity
of female students working with female advisors compared to male-male exists only
among the most productive — top 10%, 5%, 1% (90th, 95th, 99th percentiles) of the
students and ranges from a 27% to a 41% difference. I find a more heterogeneous
and pronounced difference (from -20% to -47%) for the female students working with
male advisors. The difference is significant also for the top 20% (80th percentile)
productive students.
I find similar results in the sub-sample of black students working with black advi-
sors (table 16) and with white advisors (table 17).
Results of the quantile regressions run on the entire population underline that the
productivity difference between male and female students is most pronounced for fe-
males working with male advisors and u-shaped, in particular for females working
with a female advisor. However, when student-supervisor gender is coupled with race
the gap with male-male is not u-shaped but rather downward sloping and in fact ex-
21However, this group displays significantly lower productivity than male-male at the 99th percentile for
the sub-sample of white-white and black-black supervisions (see table 15 and 16 in appendix B.10).
74
Chapter 3 Section 3.5
ists only among the top productive (top 10-20%) students especially for same-race
couples. This suggests some composition effect reminiscent of the Simpson paradox.
The Simpson paradox underlines that aggregate figures can show opposite trends to
disaggregate ones. Indeed, one of the well-known instances of the paradox concerns
gender or racial sorting into scientific disciplines and universities (Mullen and Baker,
2008). I test for such environmental effects at the level of university and field in ta-
ble 8 in Appendix B.5, there were not any identifiable effects looking at gender but I
found some along racial lines. This may explain differences in the regression results
for different sub-populations.
3.4.1 Results looking at race
I perform the same analysis comparing black and white students and advisors for
the whole sample and 3 sub-samples of gender couples: male-male (MM), female-
female (FF), female students male advisors (FM). In appendix B.11 and appendix
B.13 I show respectively results for OLS and quantile regression estimation. The
results show no difference in productivity between white and black students for all
sub-samples. This is particularly relevant for policy in South Africa Academia. This
year in South Africa many Ph.D. funding schemes (in social sciences in particular)
are ending and they will be re-discussed.22 Funded Ph.D.s programs are essential
in a country with large inequalities like South Africa. Surveys underline that black
students identify financial constraints as the main reason preventing them from pur-
suing postgraduate education (Mouton et al., 2015). Thus, in the South African con-
text where financial constraints are removed to a great extent (doctoral programs in
STEM are usually funded) (Mouton et al., 2015) the fact that I do not find any differ-
ence between black and white students may underline the importance of such funding
schemes that guarantee access to postgraduate education for all.
3.5 Conclusion
In STEM subjects, in South Africa, I find some evidence of an early career produc-
tivity differences between male and female Ph.D. students: on average male students
are more productive in terms of publishing during their doctoral studies. Disaggregat-
ing the population according to the gender composition of the student-supervisor pair,
I find that this difference is mostly attributable to female students working with male
advisors. Female students with female advisors have publication records very similar
22The NIHSS-SAHUDA funding program for example ends in 2020; available at https://www.nihs
s.ac.za/content/nihss-sahuda-programme. Last access December 2019.
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to male students. Disaggregating further, and looking at the joint effects of gender
and race, I find larger gaps for female students when student and supervisor are of the
same race. Again, female students with male advisors show the lowest productivity.
There are two striking observations about these results however. First is that most of
the gap in average performance is driven by a gap in the right hand tails. That is, in the
“moderately productive” group of students, males and female have very similar num-
bers of publications per year. It is only when I look at the very highly productive (top
20%), that a large male-female gap appears. Second, looking only at aggregated data,
the relationship between the gap and productivity levels is U-shaped: among high and
low productivity students men and women look very similar, but among moderately
productive students the women lag. But this U-shape disappears almost completely
when the student population is disaggregated. Among any sub-population if the gap is
striking, it is only so among the most productive part of the student population. One
very general and important conclusion is that in thinking about the issue of gender or
racial gaps (whether productivity or anything else) it is very important to get the level
of aggregation correct.
The results may suggest that female students with male advisors may receive lower
quality (or quantity) supervision than do male students. There may be other reasons
behind this difference though. The chapter do not attempt to give an ultimate expla-
nation of such observed differences but I consider the following important lines of
future research. The observed differences in early career productivity could be due
to student-supervisor personal relations; access to resources; differences in the career
paths; different nature of the research output in terms of content (for example between
basic or applied research which can translate into differential ‘publishability’).
The personal relations hypothesis is compatible with results in Rossello and Cowan
(2019), which finds a same-gender (same-race) bias in supervision-tie formation, driven
largely by male (white) students and female (black) advisors. Bias in tie formation re-
lates with group behaviour and socialisation in the working environment which may
disadvantage female students working with males (Blackburn et al., 1981; Van den
Brink and Benschop, 2014; Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015). More in general, social
relations are embedded in networks which are found to vary with gender and enhance
or restrict access to resources, information, and collaborations (Jadidi et al., 2018).
Differences in productivity are often explained by differences in career paths in-
duced by motherhood (see Pezzoni et al. (2016)). Past research has found that female
productivity has a negative shock during the first 3 years of a newborn (Mairesse et al.,
2019). In South Africa female fertility rates peak at age 25-29 which corresponds to
doctoral years (Lehohla, 2015). Such a shock may be accommodated differently de-
pending on whether the female student works with a male or with a female supervisor.
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A further explanation, explaining why the female-male couple has the lowest
productivity, can relate with the two-world hypothesis. This hypothesis states that
there exists a gender or racial specialization in specific (sub-)disciplines (Moore et al.,
2018). Thus, cross-gender couples may re-combine different (sub-)fields and knowl-
edge. More in general, the management literature has found that diversity is associated
with novelty and innovation because it is more likely to recombine distant knowledge
and expertise (Rzhetsky et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015; Uzzi et al., 2013; Chen et al.,
2009; Fleming, 2001). In science novelty is often a risk, particularly for a younger
scientist, and may have slower returns (Wang et al., 2017; Boudreau et al., 2016; Ver-
hoeven et al., 2016; Azoulay et al., 2011). Taking risks early in the career may slow
down productivity in the short-run affecting ‘publishability’ of the research. Different
gender composition pairs may differently mitigate the risk.
All these mechanisms may individually and jointly explain the findings and con-
tribute to an early career gender gap in science. Beyond possible causal explanations,
the chapter testifies a gender productivity gap and shows how the promotion of cross-
racial ties could reduce it. Indeed, the chapter underlines the interlinked nature of
gender and racial ties and productivity during the training phase preceding the first
academic job.
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Chapter 4
Emergent structures in faculty
hiring networks, and the effects
of early-career mobility on
academic performance
This chapter examines the transition into the first academic job. In particular, the
chapter is about the South African job market for PhDs. PhD to first job mobility
involves the preferences of both the hiring institution and the candidate. Both want to
make the best choice and here institutional prestige plays a crucial role. A university’s
prestige is an emergent property of hiring interactions, so the chapter uses a network
perspective to measure it. Using this emergent ordering, I compare the subsequent sci-
entific performance of scholars with different changes in the prestige hierarchy. The
chapter asks how movements between universities of different prestige from PhD to
first job correlates with academic performance. I use data of South African scholars
from 1970 to 2012 and I find that those who make large movements in terms of pres-
tige have lower research ratings than those who do not. Further, looking only those
with large prestige movements, those with higher prestige PhDs or first jobs have
higher research ratings throughout their careers.
0This chapter has been published as Cowan and Rossello (2018), in the journal Scientometrics.
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4.1 Introduction
Placement in an academic position directly after completing a PhD is one of the
most stressful events in an academic career. A good first job provides access to good
colleagues, and a good affiliation from which to apply for funding. Anecdotes say that
an academic’s reputation is made in the first 6 years after the PhD, and these anecdotes
are consistent with Robert Merton’s Matthew Effect — early success provides the
springboard for later success in academia (and many other venues). At the same time,
from the side of the institution, a “good hire” constitutes an improvement to the quality
of faculty, and future improvements in reputation. Many resources are spent on both
sides of the PhD job market, as recruiters and recruitees try to do as well as they
possibly can.
But young faculty hiring is a classic problem of asymmetric information (Connelly
et al., 2011). PhDs usually have only a thin record of citations and publications, which
it means that their intrinsic quality is largely unobservable by any hiring committee.
In this type of situation, a committee will look for signals of quality, one of which is
the status of the university granting the PhD (Clauset et al., 2015). Moreover, since
PhD to first job mobility involves the preferences of both the hiring institution and the
candidate (Barnard et al., 2016; Conti and Visentin, 2015a), and both want to make the
“best choice”, hiring decisions are pairwise assessments of quality between the two
agents. The sorting of PhD graduates through the first-job market can be seen to imply
an emergent prestige ordering of universities, encoding the collective assessment of
each others’ quality (Clauset et al., 2015).
This chapter is about the South African job market for PhDs. In particular, I ask
whether PhD-to-first job mobility is correlated with future research performance. It
looks at the South African PhD job market as a system where universities’ prestige
plays a role not only in hiring but may also correlate with individuals’ later academic
performance. In particular I ask how movements between universities of different
prestige from PhD to first job correlates with future academic performance.
In the analysis I first develop a new measure of prestige of the South African
universities, based on the idea that the PhD job market contains information about
how universities judge each other’s graduates, and so, by implication, how they view
each other’s quality. There can be two reasons I might expect to observe a correlation
between first job placement and future academic success: If recruiters are able to
identify talent, even noisily, and academics want to work at “the best” institutions,
then the quality of institutions at which graduates are hired correlates with their own
intrinsic quality. In this way job placement is (perhaps just) a signal of quality, and
so job placement should predict future success. On the other hand, even supposing
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that all graduates are of exactly equal quality, being affiliated with a top institution
should give better access to resources and funds, and perhaps colleagues, which should
provide a career advantage. Starting here I ask whether PhD to first job movements
are in fact correlated with future academic performance.
This analysis is aimed at increasing the understanding of the university system,
looking at social inequalities, and career trajectories. These issues are of particular
interest in the South African context. The country is still struggling to achieve social
transformation post apartheid, especially within the university system (Barnard et al.,
2016). A part of the difficulty of this transformation lies in bottlenecks in the general
university hiring process. There is a large black population of students and faculty in
the system as a whole, but the strongest universities, or those with the strongest re-
search reputations, are the formerly white universities.1 Here blacks are badly under-
represented, both in the student population and especially in the faculty. The challenge
of transforming the racial composition of the faculty of the those universities with the
strongest reputations is to a great extent one of hiring, and in particular of hiring recent
PhD graduates. Studying the processes by which people get into this profession is one
of the first knowledge gaps to cover.
This chapter reveals how the transition from PhD to first job, operating within a
hierarchical system made of interactions among the different institutions, has long-run
effects also on scientific performance. I show that the 5 most prestigious South African
universities produce more than 50% of PhDs in the country and they tend to hire their
own or each other’s graduates. These findings are in line with previous US-based work
which finds that faculty hiring obeys a hierarchical structure based on institutional
prestige, which in turn produces or maintains social inequalities (Burris, 2004; Clauset
et al., 2015). A simple Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of the distributions of prestige
rank-change indicates that under-represented groups (women and blacks) are more
likely to move down in prestige than are white males, when moving from PhD to first
job, which can contribute to a different type of social inequality. The main concern
here, though, is with the relationship between different prestige transitions from PhD
to first job, and academic performance. In this respect I find two results: a positive
role of inertia, and a positive role of prestige. The results on inertia show that scholars
who make large movements in prestige tend to have lower performance than those
who do not. The role of prestige is evident looking at scholars making large prestige
movements: those with more prestigious PhDs or first jobs have higher future career
performance.
1Language regarding racial or ethnic identity can be charged. As the empirical part of this chapter is
about South Africa, I follow the standard terminology accepted there.
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4.2 University prestige and young faculty hiring
To measure university prestige is not easy, in part due to the many definitions
of prestige that are employed. Generally speaking prestige is associated with for-
mal university rankings such as the Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Ranking, or the
Times Higher Education Ranking. But there are many other measures and methods
that scholars have found to rank prestige of departments and universities: subjective
survey based measures; output based measures; labour market based; or some combi-
nation of thereof all exist. During the 1970s and the 80s many works analysed the re-
lationship between subjective reputational rankings based on surveys, and “objective”
rankings based on research outputs and productivity (for example citations, citations
per capita, number of paper published). Hagstrom (1971), for example, uses survey
data of department prestige for hard sciences in the US, looking at the correlations
between prestige and input/output variables of the universities. He finds that prestige
correlates with size, research output, research facilities and opportunities, quality of
faculty background, number of postdoctoral fellows, selectivity of the undergraduate
program, and awards. Webster et al. (1991) present an extensive review of this debate
looking at work published between 1965 and 1982. They collect 28 articles aimed at
ranking Sociology departments in the US, and find both similarities and differences
between reputational rankings and productivity rankings. In particular they underline
the strong correlations between these two measures when the sample is restricted to
the top departments. Additionally they highlight, as in the more recent contribution
of Burris (2004), the persistence over time of department prestige, finding previous
prestige to be the best predictor for current prestige no matter the level of previous
productivity. Webster et al. (1991) conclude that future research on prestige rankings
should incorporate the sociological stratification perspective in order to explain the
link that university status has with job market placement and research performance.
Some formal university rankings try to incorporate prestige using surveys. For exam-
ple, QS world university ranking asks scholars, specialised in a specific field, to rank
universities both in general and according to the discipline of the respondent.
Survey measures try to address the potential bias of productivity measures, as in
fact the presence of few star scholars can boost research output of one department but
not be representative of it as a whole (Barnett et al., 2010). But surveys suffer from a
fundamental problem. It might be possible to have a reliable rank of the top universi-
ties (because everybody in the field knows more or less who they are and their relative
stature) but moving down the ranking, at a certain point survey respondents are not
able to perceive the differences between similar institutions. Part of the issue here
has to do with localization: institutions (and the individuals in them) are much more
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cognizant regarding the institutions with whom they are competing (for students, fac-
ulty, resources), thus it is unlikely that faculty in top-ranked institutions will be able to
differentiate between the 100th and 110th ranked institutions. But the latter two, com-
peting with each other, are much more likely to have knowledge about each others’
strengths and weaknesses. Thus knowledge about relative rankings of universities is
likely to be quite localized within the ranking itself. For this intrinsic characteristic of
how the university system operates, survey based measures are likely to be unreliable,
particularly below the top (or perhaps second) tier institutions.2 The algorithm I use
below to create a university ranking is consistent with this localized knowledge, and
in fact takes advantage of it.
In sociology, institutional stratification in higher education refers to a social pro-
cess that causes a hierarchical differentiation among the universities, with elite and
prestigious schools on one side and lower status ones on the other (Shavit, 2007).
University prestige enhances stratification, as Jung and Lee (2016) summarise, be-
cause it engages and attracts the talented experts and resources, often drawing them
out of lower ranked universities. This causes structural inequalities within the higher
education system. For example Mai et al. (2015) study the hiring network of PhDs in
the field of communication in the US. They find that the hiring patterns follow a strict
hierarchy, in line with the stratification hypothesis. They also find that institutions’
ability to place their PhD graduates in other universities is particularly stratified. This
supports the idea that the hiring network represents a bilateral assessment of qual-
ity among institutions because it signals an acknowledgement of the university that
trained the PhD. More interestingly, it suggests that an examination of hiring patterns
will reveal the consensus prestige ranking. Along the same lines Barnett et al. (2010)
extract centrality measures of the faculty hiring network as a measure of the quality
and prestige of doctoral education in the field of communication. Their logic is simi-
lar, driven by the idea that prestige rankings are emergent, and that PhD placement is
indicative of how universities or departments view each other.
Bair (2003) studies the link between university prestige of American finance PhD
programs and hiring. He finds that top ranked PhD programs in finance preserve
their reputations by hiring each other’s graduates or directly their own graduates. His
findings are also linked to previous work, where this pattern is evident in prestigious
doctoral programs in other fields: law schools, mathematics, physical sciences, social
sciences, chemical, engineering, psychology, and social work (Bair and Boor, 1991;
Bair and Bair, 1998).
Bedeian and Feild (1980) study the stratification hypothesis using US data from 24
2No doubt this explains why almost all rankings provide integer rankings only for a given number of top
places, after which institutions are grouped into rather large groups (100-199; 200-299 and so on).
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top graduate departments of management. They find that the academic placement in
management departments is influenced by doctoral prestige (measured by a subjective
survey-based measure); in particular they find a significant relationship between the
prestige of scholars’ PhDs and the prestige of their current positions. The article
ends with two possible, opposing, explanations: Either merit is irrelevant and hiring
processes rely on prestige only; or the prestige of people’s PhD department is related
to an unobserved variable indicating the scholar’s intrinsic ability.
In this chapter I consider the prestige of a scholar’s PhD institution but look also at
transitions in prestige from PhD to first job, asking whether those transitions are cor-
related with future research performance. The implicit hypothesis here is that move-
ments may indicate perceived quality of the individual that goes beyond using the PhD
institution as a signal of quality.
With respect to the relationship between university prestige and performance, re-
sults in the literature are mixed and available only for North America. The different
results are mainly due to different models, measures of prestige and output, samples
analysed, field considered, and to the time span of academic career included, since
this effect is likely to affect academic output differently as time passes (Miller et al.,
2005). Moreover, there is a clear circular causation: the prestige of a scholar’s PhD
increases the likelihood of a prestigious job, and institutional affiliation may affect
individual research output. Moreover it is well known that prestige of an institution is
highly correlated with its research output. For this reason it is difficult to distinguish
at the individual level whether those with prestigious affiliations are intrinsically more
productive or if they gain cumulative advantages from their affiliation (Merton, 1968).
Williamson and Cable (2003) study the predictors of research productivity of 152
young management faculty who find their first academic jobs after the PhD in the
period 1987-1995. Using a structural equation model, they find effects of supervisor’s
research productivity and department scholarly output (both for origin and placement
departments) on early career performance. But they find no direct effect of the origin
department’s prestige. Prestige does appear to be important as a predictor of first
job placement but there is no direct effect of PhD institution prestige on individual
performance.
The lack of a direct effect of prestige on performance could be related to the cor-
relation between department prestige and scholarly output, both of which are present
in their model. Alternatively, it could simply be attributed to the measure of prestige
they used, the Gourman Report, which has never disclosed its criteria or its methods.
Miller et al. (2005) analyse the predictors of a prestigious job, looking in partic-
ular at prestige of the training institution and individual research output. They use a
sample of 445 Business school graduates between 1977 and 1985, two measures of
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prestige (survey based and the Gourman Report measure), and as research output a
composite index which considers the individual’s journal publications and citations,
discounted by contribution (i.e. single author, first author). Again using a structural
equation model they find that the determinants of prestige of the employing institution
are the prestige of the training department, which operates for many years of the ca-
reer, and research output. In this line of research, the findings of Miller et al. (2005)
are supported by results in other fields: Allison and Long (1987) (physics, chemistry,
mathematics, and biology); Judge et al. (2004) (psychology); Baldi (1995) (sociol-
ogy); Reskin (1977) (chemistry). On the other hand, though, Hurlbert and Rosenfeld
(1992) looking at the field of psychology, find that prestige of later jobs is weakly
affected by publications but not at all by the prestige of the PhD institution; similarly
Long (1978) find for biochemistry no effects at all of either of those two variables.
Interest in the relationship between the university prestige and career outcomes,
including social inequalities and allocation of talent, extends beyond the university
faculty job market. It is well known in non-academic job placement: Jung and Lee
(2016) examine the relationship between university prestige and subsequent wages of
workers in South Korea. They find that university prestige, measured using standard
university rankings, matters for job market outcomes, particularly regarding salary.
Araki et al. (2016) study employee promotion in Japanese manufacturing industries,
finding again a crucial role for the prestige of the universities where workers got their
degrees. To measure prestige they rely on standard university rankings and find that in
the early stage of a worker’s career university prestige is crucial because it corresponds
to the employer’s a priori ideas about the distribution of abilities among workers. So,
among young employees the likelihood of being promoted is higher for those with
prestigious degrees because the employer will decide who to promote according to his
prior. These results in the non-academic markets underline how important are these
studies that try to shed light on the mechanisms driving the academic job market. The
academic job market has of course its specificities, but it shares common elements
with other job markets (especially those for highly specialized occupations).
In this chapter I explore the relationship between university prestige, young fac-
ulty hiring and individual research performance. Past research underlines how young
faculty hiring follows a stratified hierarchy (Clauset et al., 2015; Burris, 2004), and to
connect to this literature I develop a network-based measure of the prestige of South
African universities. In contrast to Clauset et al. (2015), who consider scholars’ cur-
rent affiliation, I build the faculty hiring network looking at the very first job right
after the PhD. If the job market is being used to infer universities’ views of each oth-
ers’ prestige, it is essential to apply that inference where prestige is most relevant.
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That is, when information about the candidates on the job market is least complete.
Years after the PhD, presumably most academics have an established record, and good
information about them is available. So it is the first job that contains the most accu-
rate signal of how universities evaluate each others’ quality. Moreover, Clauset et al.
(2015) focused on 3 fields (computer science, business, and history) and they produced
separated prestige rankings looking 60 top departments for each one. Their period of
analysis is also limited to one year. The goal here is to investigate the entire univer-
sity system of the country focusing at university level on a longer time scale. Again
contrasting Clauset et al. (2015), I consider all universities together as an integrated
system by defining broader fields, and I also take an historical perspective looking the
first job market over more than 3 decades.
After computing the new measure of prestige, I compare the future research per-
formance of scholars with different prestige movements in their PhD to first job tran-
sition. In particular, in order to distinguish between individual performance and possi-
ble cumulative advantages gained from their affiliations, I match people with different
movement in the prestige hierarchy but same gender, ethnic group, PhD obtained year,
and first job (or PhD) institution. So this chapter differentiates from past contributions
giving a ranking of universities coherent with the mobility issue and predicting career
success for different time spans looking not only at mobility but also the individual
movements in the prestige hierarchies. As additional value added of the work, to mea-
sure individual career success I use a non-bibliometric measure based on the informed
evaluation of international experts in the specific scientific field.
The chapter finds that inertia and university prestige are both positively related to
a scholar’s future performance. Related to inertia I find that the scholars who make
large movements in prestige are considered to perform worse than those who do not.
Related to prestige, instead, I find, looking those who experience large movements in
prestige, that those with higher prestige PhD or first job perform better. This chapter
addresses the knowledge gap regarding the relation between the role of university
prestige in young faculty hiring and the subsequent individual performance of the
scholars. This will increase awareness about the functioning of the higher education
system in an emerging country such as South Africa and show whether it displays
similarities with previous, mostly US based, work.
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4.3 Data and variable construction
I use data from the South African National Research Foundation (NRF3) from
1970 to 2012 which contains detailed personal information of the scholars (i.e. gender,
ethnic group, affiliation, career history, scientific field, and NRF rating). I restrict
attention to academics who received their PhDs from 1970 to 2004 (when the major
reform of the university system took place). This also permits to examine medium
and long term effects on career. The main variable is the NRF “rating” for years
1983-2012, which is a measure of individuals’ academic performance. The process
by which the NRF grades researchers is a very rigorous examination of a candidate’s
research output. The NRF solicits half a dozen international referees to evaluate the
CV and published papers of the candidate for rating. This process ends with a rating: a
scientific committee evaluates the content of the referee reports and assigns the rating:
one of 13 ordered categories. Strong institutional incentives imply that almost all
academics with a research-oriented career apply to be rated: NRF data cover the 30
percent of scholars in the country who produce about 90 percent of all South African
peer-reviewed research outputs (Barnard et al., 2012; León et al., 2016).4
The analysis focuses on scholars in the field of Science, Engineering and Technol-
ogy (SET). In the field of Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) language and schools
of thought often put constraints on the PhD to first job transition. These constraints
are particularly relevant and in the past have represented a strong check on academic
mobility in the South African context. In the main text that follows I present only the
results for SET, as the results for SSH are less reliable. However, I include a parallel
presentation of SSH in the appendix C.19.
Separately for each field (SET and SSH) I construct the hiring network among the
different South African institutions, based on scholars who found their first jobs in
a South African university within 5 years of receiving the PhD. I then calculate the
network-based measure of university prestige (prestige ranking) and for each individ-
ual his prestige rank-change from PhD to first job (that is, the difference between the
prestige ranking of the PhD institution and that of the first job instituition). In the
next sections I present the details of the faculty hiring network, prestige ranking, and
prestige rank-change.
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CapeTown 107 4 5 0 2 0 2 19 1 2 1 3 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5
NelsonMandelaMet. 1 33 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Witwatersrand 4 2 83 6 2 1 2 1 8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Pretoria 2 1 1 116 7 3 7 6 1 6 2 0 3 3 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 0
Johannesburg 0 2 2 5 30 4 7 1 0 4 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
FreeState 0 1 0 1 1 55 0 8 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
SouthAfrica 0 1 1 1 0 0 15 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stellenbosch 2 1 2 4 1 6 1 73 3 2 1 0 6 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
KwaZuluNatal 4 0 10 5 0 1 2 4 65 1 2 1 1 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 12 0
NorthWest 0 0 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 52 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
Limpopo 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhodes 2 2 4 3 0 1 0 0 3 1 2 19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WesternCape 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
OfFortHare 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WalterSisulu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Venda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CentralUnivOfTech 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
TshwaneUnivOfTech 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
VaalUnivOfTech 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
MonashSA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DurbanInstituteOfTech 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CapePeninsulaUnivOfTech 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4.1: Adjacency matrix of the hiring network for the years 1970-2004 in SET, rows are PhD institutions and columns
are first job institutions. Each entry represents the number for people with a PhD in university i hired as first
job in university j.
4.3.1 Faculty hiring network
The hiring network is a weighted and directed adjacency matrix M. It has 22
rows and columns that are the 22 South African universities,5 where each entry mi j
represents the number of scholars with a PhD from university i and a subsequent first
job in university j. To illustrate, the adjacency matrix for SET is shown in Table 4.1.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 4.2, with populations subdivided by gender and
race.6
3NRF (www.nrf.ac.za) is a state agency that has as its mission the promotion of research and the
development of national research capacity.
4For more information on the rating system see http://www.nrf.ac.za/rating.
5In 2004 the university system was reformed: some universities were merged and changed names. The
reform does not affect the big universities, excepting University of Johannesburg and KwaZuluNatal, but
does have some effects on the lower ranked ones. I use the post-merger names because the data are more
complete. I discuss this in the Appendix C.15.
6In South Africa there are formally four “racial” groups: black, white, Indian and coloured. The word
“black” is sometimes used to refer to the aggregate of black, Indian and coloured, and this is the meaning I
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Figure 4.1: Hiring networks 1970-2004 SET. The vertices are the South African Universities, plotted at their geographical
coordinates (for the institutions located in the same area I separated manually). Vertex size represents in-
degree, vertex colour out-degree.
Table 4.2 shows a common pattern for females and blacks: their networks are
sparser than those of white males. That is, they have fewer edges and so lower density,
but also higher average path length, and a lower clustering coefficient. To a very great
extent this is explained simply by the relative sizes of the three sub-populations.7
The geographic displays of the networks (Figures 4.1 and 18) show common hir-
ing corridors, where universities with high number of connections in hiring tend to
send their graduates to a high number of different institutions (nodes with high/low
in-degree tend to have high/low out-degree); indeed, the correlation (excluding self-
hiring) between in-degree and out-degree is 0.72 for SET and 0.53 in SSH.8 I observe
apply throughout this text.
7The same patterns, and explanation, are present in SSH (Table 36).
8The exceptions to this strong correlation are for SET: Tshwane University of Technology, University
of Fort Hare, and University of Limpopo that have a high connections in hiring (in-degree) and a low
connections in placement (out-degree); while University of KwaZulu-Natal, and University of Cape Town
instead show a high connections in placement (out-degree) and a low connections hiring (in-degree). See
Table 34. For SSH I find the following exceptions: Walter-Sisulu University, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University, and University of Limpopo with a high hiring connections (in-degree) and a low placement con-
nections (out-degree); and University of Stellenbosch, and University of Cape Town with a high placement
connections (out-degree) and a low hiring connections (in-degree).
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Summary Statistics SET hiring network
All Male Female White Black
Number of Nodes 22 22 22 22 22
Number of Components 1 2 3 1 2
Number of isolated Nodes 0 1 2 0 1
Statistics on the Giant Component
Number of Nodes 22 21 20 22 21
Number of Edges 133 115 57 107 52
Edge Density 0.288 0.274 0.15 0.232 0.124
Average Path Length 1.795 1.764 2.498 1.748 3.087
Diameter 9 6 12 9 15
Global Clustering Coefficient 0.648 0.588 0.511 0.578 0.41
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics SET hiring network for the years 1970-2004. Network statistics are computed without
considering self-loops
that the universities with a high hiring and low placement connections are historically
black universities, while those with an high placement and a low hiring connections
are historical white universities, with the exception of KwaZulu-Natal.9 This sug-
gests that formerly black universities have been using hiring connections as a way to
upgrade their faculty since the end of apartheid.
4.3.2 Prestige ranking
I consider university prestige as a social assessment, emerging from interactions
among institutions. The well-known university rankings (THE, QS, Shanghai) can
proxy prestige, but they remove interaction from the picture and so have question-
able reliability, since prestige is not an individual attribute but it is part of a social
process (Burris, 2004; Clauset et al., 2015). Consequently, following Clauset et al.
(2015), I develop a measure of prestige ranking where institutional status arises from
the patterns observed in the faculty hiring network. The algorithm starts from two
hypotheses:
1. Universities want to improve the quality of their research and teaching. A corol-
lary is that they want to hire from universities that are “better” then themselves;
2. Scholars want to be hired by the best universities.
9The University of KwaZulu-Natal was formed in 2004 by the merger of the University of Natal (white)
and the University of Durban-Westville (Indian).
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Were the desires expressed in these two hypothesis to be perfectly satisfied, and if the
PhD institution is a reliable indicator of graduate “quality”, it would be possible to
order universities (the rows and column of the adjacency matrix M) so people only
move down the ordering, implying that the adjacency matrix would have only zeros
below the diagonal. Since actual hiring often departs from this “ideal” I search for an
ordering that most closely approximates “zero weight below the diagonal”. To do this
I apply to the adjacency matrix M an algorithm inspired by Vries (1998) and Clauset
et al. (2015). The algorithm starts with a random ordering of rows (columns always
having the same ordering as rows) of the matrix o0 and I compute the score so of this
order, where:






The algorithm tries to improve the score of the current order o0 using local search.
Each iteration swaps two randomly selected nodes (both row and column). If the swap
does not decrease the score I keep the swap, otherwise I reject it. After 100 iterations
I stop, and record the resulting order and its score.10 I repeat this procedure 10000
times to get a set O of 10000 orders a the set S of 10000 related scores.
Definition 2. The set of orders O is O = {o1,o2, ...,o10000}; The set of scores S is
S = {s1,s2, ...,s10000}.
Then I create the set Q of the orders o ∈ O with the maximum scores:
Definition 3. Let Q be the set of orders with maximum scores Q = {ok ∈ O|sk =
max(sk)}, where O is a set of orders and k = 1,2, ...,10000.
Then for each university I compute the mean of its ranks in the orderings in Q, to
give the prestige scores, which provides a natural ordering or ranking of universities.
Note that the prestige score is not a rank of natural numbers, it is an average value.
This gives a better picture of university prestige where the distances in prestige among
institutions are not of a fixed amount: pairs of universities adjacent in the ordering
might have very different distances in terms of their scores.
I remove universities that graduated fewer than 5 PhDs in the period. Figures 4.2
and 19 show the results of the prestige rankings for SET and SSH. The frequency
scores are in ascending order from the highest prestige (which corresponds to a score
of one) to the lowest.
Prestige ranking and other measures
To test whether the prestige hierarchy underlines by my measure is statistically dif-
ferent from a null model. I generate 5000 random matrices that preserve in- and out-
degree, and also preserve the diagonal. This holds constant the number of PhDs each
10Checking manually, 100 iterations is almost always enough to find a local optimum.
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Figure 4.2: Prestige Ranking for SET 1970-2004. The frequency scores are in ascending order: the highest ranked uni-
versity has the lowest score. The black dots are the mean of the orders with the maximum scores in set Q, red
and green dots are one and two standard deviation from the average. Universities with fewer than 5 PhDs are
excluded.
university graduates, the number each university hires, and the number of graduates
who are hired by their PhD institution. I apply the ranking algorithm to each of these
5000 matrices, and record the maximum score for each matrix. Taking these scores as
the underlying distribution, I obtain a p-value of 0.002. This, I conclude that the hir-
ing matrix has more structure than an equivalent random matrix, and that the hierarchy
present in the empirical matrix is statistically stronger than those present in a random
graph with the same characteristics. As a further robustness check I examine the cor-
relations between prestige and measures of research output. From Web Of Science
(WOS) I download aggregated data of research output for each South African univer-
sity.11 In SET the correlation of the prestige score with total publications 1988-2004
is 0.6 (p-value=0.04); with average citations per paper 0.5 (p-value=0.06); with total
number of citing articles 0.5 (p-value=0.08); citations per capita 0.7 (p-value=0.01);
and papers per capita 0.8 (p-value=0).12 In SSH I find statistically significant cor-
relations of prestige scores with average citations per paper 0.7 (p-value=0.01); with
11I select the university name in the address search, restricting to the period 1988-2004. For the univer-
sities that changed name I search pre and post merger names and I refine the WOS results looking at only
journals publications. Last access February 2018.
12Per capita measures are obtained dividing total records by number of scholars in the database with a
current affiliation in the particular university. This will over-estimate the per capita figures as there are
(some, though few) South African authors in WOS who never apply for a rating. There is no reason to
believe there is any bias in this over-estimate however.
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SET PhDs hired from the top 5 universities
Rank PhD University Placed in SA academia Placed in Top 5 Proportion placed in Top 5
1 Rhodes 38 31 0.816
2 KwaZuluNatal 115 85 0.739
3 Witwatersrand 113 102 0.903
4 Pretoria 165 120 0.727
5 Cape Town 158 116 0.734
Total of top 5 589 454 0.771
Total PhD hires 1011 0.583
Table 4.3: PhDs hired from the top 5 prestigious universities in SET, according to the prestige ranking. The total of SET
PhDs Hired in the period is 1011.
total number of citing articles 0.6 (p-value=0.05); and with citations per capita 0.6 (p-
value=0.05). Thus this measure of prestige correlates well with measures of research
performance, but is not identical to it.13 This is in line with past contributions (Burris,
2004).
Institutional Stratification
Tables 4.3 and 37 illustrate the institutional stratification hypothesis, for SET and
SSH respectively. They show the number of PhDs from the top 5 prestige universi-
ties hired within the other top 5 institutions, and those hired in other institutions. The
results are striking. In SET the top 5 prestige universities produce 58 percent of all
PhDs within the country; among those, 77 percent find a first job within these 5 insti-
tutions.14 This underlines the crucial role of prestige hierarchies in academia. Consis-
tent with US-based work (Burris, 2004; Clauset et al., 2015), I find deep inequalities
among universities in terms of first job placement: South Africa shows a pattern of
stratification similar to those found in more mature knowledge systems. Moreover,
the lower percentage of the first job placement of the top universities in SSH with
respect to SET highlights the diverse hiring processes of the two fields. SSH are often
governed by schools of thought and in South Africa language and culture also play
important roles. This makes hiring processes more complex, more constrained, and
less predictable.
13For SSH I find non statistically significant results for total number of publications and publications per
capita. As discussed previously the methodology of this chapter is less suited for SSH.
14These numbers are 48% and 74% respectively for SSH.
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4.4 Effects of rank change on future career
Changing university when taking up a first job after the PhD means moving within
the prestige hierarchy. In particular, scholars move Up (Down) the hierarchy when
hired by an institution with a higher (lower) prestige ranking than the one from which
they received the PhD. And they Stay in the hierarchy when hired by a university of
the same prestige of the PhD, which is in practice means being hired by their own PhD
institution.
Given the structural hierarchies in faculty hiring, people moving up the hierarchy
are relatively rare, though it does happen. An obvious question to ask is whether
this constitutes a signal regarding future career prospects. If the job market is able
to identify promising (or weak) young scholars, a movement up (or down) would be
predict a stronger (or weaker) future academic career. Further, it could also be that
those who move up, relative to those who move down, on average work at higher
prestige places, which could imply stronger colleagues and collaborators, and better
resources. So there are a priori reasons to believe that movements in prestige between
PhD and first job could be correlated with future research performance. But there
lurks the issue of whether any link between prestige movements and performance is
driven by individual quality or by the resources available at the receiving institution.
4.4.1 Matched pairs
To address this issue I do a matched pair analysis. I compare scholars’ NRF rat-
ings at different points in time (5, 10, 15 and 20 years after they were granted their
PhD), asking whether people with different prestige transitions (Up, Down, or Stay)
but having the same individual characteristics differ in rating. For each time span, I
do a matched pair analysis comparing the transitions: Up vs. Stay, Down vs. Stay,
and Up vs. Down. I match on gender, ethnic group, year of PhD, and either receiving
or sending university. So, for each of the three comparisons I look at pairs of scholars
from the same receiving or sending institution. When I match people with the same
receiving university I compare people with same characteristics hired into the same
institution, but having different PhD institutions. The match using the same sending
institution, instead, compares individuals with a PhD granted by the same university,
but who are hired in different places. To differentiate between sending and receiving
institutions is important also because it is a control for possible Matthew effects on
performance driven by university prestige. That is, the more prestigious a university
is, the greater its ability to attract resources and this can result in higher productivity
of the scholars and therefore higher NRF ratings. I solve this possible source of en-
dogeneity by matching people with same receiving institution. Matching on the same
sending institution controls for the fact that there is more scope for upward (down-
ward) movement for those whose PhDs come from the bottom (top) of the prestige
ordering. It also controls for training effects incurred during the PhD. The matching
technique also controls for the other confounding factors on which I match: gender,
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race and year of degree.
I use a re-sampling technique as follows. To do the Up vs. Stay comparison, I start
with the set U of size Nu of people who move Up, and a set S of people who Stay. Then
I sample with replacement, Nu people from the set U getting U ′. For each member in
U ′ I find the matches in S, and select one at random if there is more than one match.
In this way I create matched pairs Up-Stay. Then I calculate and store the proportion
of those pairs in which the Up person had a higher NRF rating (R) than the Stay
person: Rup > Rstay, and vice versa: Rstay > Rup. I repeat this procedure 10000 times,
obtaining distributions of those proportions, F(p|Rup > Rstay) and F(p|Rstay > Rup).
4.5 Results
The major concern of this chapter is whether prestige movements from PhD to
first job correlate with the future research performance of the scholars. I compare, for
different points in time, the NRF rating of individuals with the same characteristics
but different prestige rank-change movements: Up vs. Stay, Down vs. Stay, and Up
vs. Down. Since prestige could influence individual careers differently as time passes;
I look at people’s ratings 5, 10, 15 and 20 years after their PhD. For each comparison
I study separately people hired by the same (receiving) university and those with a
PhD granted by the same (sending) institutions. Moreover, the matching technique
accounts also for additional confounding factors: gender, ethnic group, and PhD ob-
tained year. As I am interested in the effects of rank change, the null hypothesis, H0,
is that prestige movements are unrelated to research performance:
H0: F(p|Rup(or down) > Rstay) = F(p|Rstay > Rup(or down)). (4.1)
Performing two-sided KS tests, I find that this is not the case; in each comparison the
distributions are different. Given that the distributions are different from each other, I
can ask whether one stochastically dominates the other (less and greater one-sided KS
tests). The results for the tests are in Appendix 38.15
The definition of first order stochastic dominance is typically given as
Definition 4. a CDF F(x) First-Order Stochastic Dominates G(x) i f f F(x) ≤ G(x)
for all x (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Figure 4.3 shows the results of Up vs. Stay. Looking at people hired by the
same institutions but different PhDs (left column), and at those with the same PhD
institution but different first jobs (right column), I find consistent results. After 5
years F(p|Rup > Rstay) (black curve) stochastically dominates the other F(p|Rstay >
Rup) (grey curve); while 15 and 20 years later I have the reverse: F(p|Rstay > Rup)
dominates F(p|Rup > Rstay). This tells a consistent story. In the short term, those
15Additionally I perform a robustness check following a bootstrap technique in appendix C.21.
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(a) First Job, 5 years after PhD
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(h) PhD, 20 years after PhD



















































lllllllllllllllll llll l l l l
Up > stay
Stay > up
Figure 4.3: Up versus stay comparison. The black curves are cumulative distribution functions of the proportion of ob-
servations in which Rup > Rstay was the case for p% of the matched pairs. Grey curves are the CDFs for the
Rstay > Rup proportions. From top to bottom 5,10,15, and 20 years after PhD. Pairs matched using gender,
race, PhD obtained years and first job university (left column) or PhD institution (right column).
who are promoted, moving up in prestige, have higher ratings than do those who
stay; but in the long term the opposite is true: those who do not move (stay) have
higher ratings. So in the long term, looking at people with the same first job, I find
that those with “better” PhDs (stay) do better; while looking at people with same PhD
institution, those with “worse” jobs (stay) perform better. Intuitively, the former seems
reasonable, the latter odd. I return to this below.
Figure 4.4 shows the results for the Down vs. Stay comparison. With two excep-
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(a) First Job, 5 years after PhD
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(c) First Job, 10 years after PhD
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(e) First Job, 15 years after PhD



























































(f) PhD, 15 years after PhD
































































(g) First Job, 20 years after PhD





























































(h) PhD, 20 years after PhD
































































Figure 4.4: Down versus stay comparison. The black curves are cumulative distribution functions of the proportion of
observations in which Rdown > Rstay was the case for p% of the matched pairs. Grey curves are the CDFs
for the Rstay > Rdown proportions. From top to bottom 5,10,15, and 20 years after PhD. Pairs matched using
gender, race, PhD obtained years and first job university (left column) or PhD institution (right column).
tions (first job match 20 years, and PhD match 5 years) I find that F(p|Rstay > Rdown)
stochastically dominates F(p|Rdown > Rstay). That is: those who stay have higher
ratings than those who move down in prestige. In particular looking at those with the
same first job (left column) I have that those with “worse” PhDs (stay) do better; while
when I look at people with same PhD institution (right column), those with “better”
jobs (stay) perform better. Again I find that in general those who do not move after
their PhD have higher ratings.
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In the case of Down versus Stay, matched on PhD, the value of staying seems rea-
sonable: of two people with equivalent PhDs, the one who stays will have the higher
prestige job and a higher rating. Similarly in the case of Up versus Stay matched on
first job: of two people with the same job, the one with the more prestigious PhD
(the one who stays) will have a higher rating. However, Down-Stay matched on job,
and Up-Stay matched on PhD seem somewhat paradoxical, as in the first case the less
prestigious PhD (with the same job) does better, and in the second the less prestigious
job (with the same PhD) does better. I discuss this apparent paradox below.
Figure 4.5 shows the Up versus Down comparison. It should be noted that because
in both groups the sample is relatively small, this comparison is less reliable, and
needs cautious interpretation. To have a reasonable number of matches I relax the
matching of PhD obtained year, here considering an interval of six years. That is,
two agents match on PhD year if they are within ±3 years of each other. Figure
4.5 shows, looking at researchers hired by the same institution (left column), that
F(p|Rdown > Rup) dominates F(p|Rup > Rdown). Those moving down to a job from a
higher prestige PhD institution do better than those moving up to the same job from
a lower prestige institution, and the gap increases over time (the distance between
the two cumulative distributions increases). This seems reasonable: all else equal,
a higher prestige PhD is good. Matching people with the same PhD institution (right
column) I find that F(p|Rup >Rdown) dominates F(p|Rdown >Rup). That is, those who
move up in prestige (hired by a more prestigious institution) perform better in ratings
than those hired by less prestigious universities. This also seems reasonable: all else
equal, a higher prestige job is good. So comparing people who experience mobility in
the transition from PhD to first job is found that, holding job constant, coming from
“better” PhD (down) is good; while holding PhD constant, going to “better” job (up)
is good.
To summarise the results in a more intuitive way: when I compare people who
experience transitions from the PhD to first job with those who do not (that stay) I find
a beneficial inertia effect. Generally speaking, those who stay in the same university
after the PhD have higher rating. This positive effect of inertia might be due to various
factors. In some instances training effects from the PhD work to support the result:
those trained at a particular institution will have skills and expertise which fit well into
the research taking place there, and perhaps complement that of the institution very
well. This argument may be particularly pertinent in a small country like South Africa,
where not all universities are expert in all fields. There is considerable specialization
and “division of labour” among the universities regarding research fields, implying
that in many disciplines there are only few institutions with strong research presence.
This would also explain the heavy diagonal in the hiring matrix.
However, the value of institutional inertia may also simply relate to the way the
PhD job market works. A university has better information about its own graduates,
and so it can make better judgements with respect to their intrinsic quality. Moreover,
any research-focussed university will have strong incentives to keep its best graduates
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Figure 4.5: Up versus down comparison. The black curves are cumulative distribution functions of the proportion of
observations in which Rup > Rdown was the case for p% of the matched pairs. Grey curves are the CDFs for
the Rdown > Rup proportions. From top to bottom 5,10,15, and 20 years after PhD. Pairs matched using gender,
race, PhD obtained years and first job university (left column) or PhD institution (right column).
so as to enhance its own reputation rather than that of its rivals. The comparison of Up
vs. Down instead tells the role of university prestige; when people experience PhD
to first job mobility their movements in prestige are crucial: holding PhD constant,
moving to a more prestigious first job is better; and holding first job constant, having a
more prestigious PhD is better. It appears that training and resources (broadly defined)
both contribute.
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4.5.1 Possible cohort effects
The results show that there are some differences in the effects of prestige move-
ments depending whether the scientist is observed 5, 10, 15 or 20 years after PhD.
One possible explanation is cohort effects. These could drive this observation because
the cohort composition is different in each time sample. Specifically, since the rating
data run only from 1983 to 2012, observations on the ‘5-year’ ratings include PhDs
from 1970 to 2004; whereas 20-year ratings include only PhDs from 1970 to 1992.
To test for this cohort effect I repeat the analysis restricting the sample to only older
scholars, with a PhD granted before 1992. Figures 15, 16, and 17 in Appendix C.18
show the results for the restricted sample. These results are consistent with the ones
discuss above, so I can exclude this hypothesis: the results are not driven by changes
in the cohort composition.
4.5.2 Size effects
PhD production and graduate hiring are very skewed, and some universities are
bigger then others. The prestige ranking looks not only at faculty production but it
considers in particular the quality of placement. So a small institution could achieve
high prestige by placing a small number of graduates at high prestige universities. In
order to exclude the possibility that size effects drive the measure I re-run the algo-
rithm using the logs of the entries in the matrix. This is a monotonic transformation of
university sizes but makes the differences between them much smaller, so results are
less likely to be driven by size alone. The prestige ranking results are almost identical.
Further, the correlation of out and in-strength of the adjacency matrix, is not statisti-
cally distinguishable from zero (cor=0.3; p-value=0.3)16. This implies that amounts
of hiring and placement are unrelated, so universities with high production of PhDs
are not the ones that hire more. One other suggestion that the results are not driven by
size comes from the fact that Rhodes University, consistently ranked first in prestige,
is much smaller than the other “top 6”.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter reveals important aspects of how the PhD job market works in South
Africa and the results tend to be in line with previous work. As is often observed in
other settings, I find that institutional stratification in higher education holds in the
South African context. The 5 most prestigious universities produce between 48 and
58% of all PhD graduates (who enter academia) in the country and they tend to hire
graduates from this elite group. Occupational segregation is also present in South
Africa as elsewhere: under-represented groups are less likely to get jobs in higher
prestige universities than are white males.
16This is done removing the diagonal of the matrix
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Looking at the relation between prestige transitions from PhD to first job and in-
dividual research performance I find two main results. On the one hand, comparing
people who experience a prestige transition with those who do not, I find a positive
inertia effect. Those who stay in the same institution after the PhD have higher perfor-
mance than those who move. At first glance, what appears to matter is not moving up
or down the prestige hierarchy, but rather resting in an established environment. How-
ever, when I compare explicitly those who make upward and downward transitions, I
find that university prestige is deeply related with academic performance, consistent
with previous literature (Burris, 2004; Clauset et al., 2015). Holding PhD prestige
constant, those with a more prestigious first job have better long run performance then
those with a less prestigious first job. But similarly, holding first job constant, those
having a PhD from a more prestigious institution have better long run performance
than those with a less prestigious PhD. This suggests that prestige is at the very least
a signal of quality, but possibly also has causal effects. More prestigious PhD pro-
grammes may attract better students and or give better training.
The results in this chapter underline the big role played by inertia in the South
African PhD job market. In the data, of the rated researchers in South Africa, histori-
cally roughly two thirds of those going into the professoriate do not change institutions
at the completion of the PhD.17 This is maybe related to culture, institutional organisa-
tion, and history. But it seems likely that it will disappear over time. In many locations
it has been common in the past, but today in North America (or the anglo-saxon world
more generally) it is rare that a department will hire its own graduates, and while still
more common in Europe, it appears to be disappearing, even in countries like France
and Italy.
I observe that those who do not change institutions after the PhD tend to have
higher NRF ratings later in their career. To return to the discussion in the introduction,
this suggests that imperfect information is fairly severe in PhD hiring: universities
have good information about their own graduates, and can successfully “pick the win-
ners”. Of their own students, they have better information on candidates’ intrinsic
qualities than do other institutions, and so can make better judgements. Further, they
have strong incentives to encourage their best students to stay, rather than to let them
drift away to strengthen competing institutions. This is consistent Robert Merton’s
observation that “leading universities manage to identify early, and to retain to their
faculties, those scientists of exceptional talent: they keep 70 percent of future [Nobel]
laureates, in comparison with 28 percent of other Ph.D.’s they have trained.” (Merton
(1968) page 7).
To understand why those internally selected perform better over a long period of
time this chapter suggests to look further at the deep causes of the positive role played
by inertia. The role of inertia might be related not only to the general dynamics of the
17In spite of the 2004 reforms, this feature remains part of the SA academic world: in the period 2004 to
2012 it still the case that about two thirds of graduate receive their first appointment at their PhD institution.
The fraction is slightly higher in SET, slightly lower in SSH.
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university system and the PhD job market, but might also be linked to the behaviour
of the scholars in terms of co-authorship and specialization. In particular, young re-
searchers who do not experience mobility may have different collaboration patterns
than do their counterparts. They can have more stable co-authorship linkages able to
sustain their careers, especially in the early stages. Coupled with the Matthew effect
this would create both short and longer term positive effects of inertia. Furthermore,
the research orientations of those who stay and those who move may be different
in terms of specialization. Those internally selected could be more specialized in a
particular area of research that is more germane to the home department, and this spe-
cialization could drive their long-run performance. This would be true in any small
country whose institutions have specialized in particular areas. This type of further re-
search at micro level could shed new light on the university system not only of South
Africa but also of other countries with low first job mobility.
It is important to realize that this is an historical analysis. The most recent PhD
in the data is from 2004, and the most recent ranking from 2012. Indeed, one limita-
tion of the chapter is that consider the hiring network and consequentially the prestige
hierarchy among universities as fixed across time. In contrast, the South African uni-
versity system experienced large changes as for example the reform in 2004. The
research performance of universities changed substantially over the period. In partic-
ular, among the formerly black universities there have been several notable changes
in research output (University of Fort Hare or the University of the Western Cape for
example), suggesting that some of these universities may be entering a different era
and playing a different role in the system. However, there is little reason to believe
that information asymmetries surrounding PhD hiring will disappear any time soon,
in South Africa or elsewhere, so the results regarding effects of mobility on career
success are likely to be robust.
Because in principle universities have as their raison d’être the creation and dif-
fusion of knowledge, and because by its nature knowledge changes relatively slowly
(that is to say, what is true does not change quickly) universities tend to evolve rela-
tively slowly, and so do their standings relative to each other.18
Seen from this perspective, stratification, and to a lesser extent inertia, in hiring is
a natural outcome. These two forces are a source of the Matthew effect at the univer-
sity level, and tend to create stasis, or possibly even reinforce the gaps in university
hierarchies. Whether or not in general a hierarchical or even two-tier university sys-
tem is good or bad, in the South African context where the current hierarchy is born
of the apartheid period, one can argue that the existing hierarchy is not ideal. The top
universities in the current structure tend to be the historically white universities, and
there, even 20 years after apartheid ended, the professoriate remains predominantly
white, and for structural reasons is likely to remain so for many years (Barnard et al
2017). Here the hierarchy of the universities is socially problematic. In this respect
18For a discussion of this see for example Cowan et al. (2010) pp. 278-299
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a policy devoted to increasing the in-house capabilities of the latter and the exchange
of expertise between universities could help to reverse this trend, and to create a more
equal and productive system.
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Chapter 5
University prestige in the Ph.D.
job market and the
big-fish-little-pond effect
This chapter is a natural expansion of the previous one. Here I investigate how the
hierarchical stratification of university prestige affects scholars’ career achievements
focusing on 898 STEM Ph.D. graduates that enter into their first academic job in Mex-
ico between 1992 and 2016. The previous chapter shows how prestige and mobility
are important aspects of academic life and how inertia plays a critical role during early-
career. Indeed, job market candidates compete for positions at universities but many of
them have thin research records, making signals of quality such as the prestige of the
Ph.D. institution of crucial importance. I further develop the technique described in
the previous chapter to rank university prestige based on the hiring networks among
universities. In order to overcome a possible drawback of the methodology, here I
use a dynamic version of the ranking algorithm, which includes new information in
the job market and prestige dynamics. Finally, I use the quasi-experimental method
based on matched pairs of individuals developed in the previous chapter. The chapter
confirms the role of inertial also in the Mexican context — scholars hired internally
sustain higher performance over their careers in comparison to those who move the
hierarchy. Interestingly, the chapter shows that scholars who experience upward pres-
tige mobility exhibit, on average, lower academic performance than the other groups.
I will argue that the negative (positive) relation between upward (downward) pres-
tige mobility and performance can relate to a “big-fish-little-pond” effect (BFLPE) or
observationally equivalent mechanisms that underline the need for further research.
The evidence of a BFLPE-like effect has policy implications because it can hinder
the flows of knowledge throughout the science system and individual achievements as
well.
0This chapter is based on Gonzalez-Sauri and Rossello (2019), UNU-MERIT working paper series.
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5.1 Introduction
Training, collaboration, and mutual evaluation characterise an academic profes-
sion. Those tasks imply that scholars know each-other and/or their work and contri-
bution. In those circumstances, networks among scholars and institutions naturally
emerge. However, a prestigious position in such networks is more likely to generate
positive network effects. In particular, Matthew effects can enhance individual per-
formance, productivity, and prominence (Merton, 1968; Bol et al., 2018; Teplitskiy
et al., 2020; Horta et al., 2018). To decompose performance and endogenous net-
work effects, sociology, economics, and science of science examined the relationship
between the prestige of the university affiliation of an individual and her/his perfor-
mance (Fox, 1983; Headworth and Freese, 2016; Su, 2011). Those studies highlight
that university prestige is positively associated with individual performance. But, at
the same time, results appear mixed when the endogeneity of university prestige is ac-
counted for (Allison and Long, 1987; Williamson and Cable, 2003; Bair, 2003; Miller
et al., 2005; Laurance et al., 2013; Lawson and Shibayama, 2015). In particular, much
of the evidence accumulated so far indicates that prestige from the Ph.D. institution
increases the chance of getting further prestigious appointments. Under certain cir-
cumstances, Bedeian and Feild (1980) even suggest that institutional prestige from
the Ph.D. might be more important than research records before the first-job appoint-
ment. However, these results are to a certain extent expected, science systems exhibit
Matthew effects, where a “good” initial affiliation is likely to be followed by other
prestigious appointments and higher academic performance.
These studies have been conducted in top-tier institutions, mostly in North Amer-
ica (Clauset et al., 2015). Those universities often have a long history and are well
known and integrated internationally (Demeter and Toth, 2020). In contrast, less ma-
ture knowledge systems have higher resource constraints and many institutions are
relatively new and less known. Thus, the presence of a star scholar as well as win-
ning (or not) a grant may change prestige and output of an entire department (Azoulay
et al., 2012). In similar circumstances, prestige can be more volatile and the distance
between prestige and “quality” could be potentially larger compared to mature univer-
sity systems.
The gap between prestige and “quality” can also change for individuals through-
out their careers. Such a gap is potentially larger when signals of quality matter
the most. After Ph.D. graduation early-career scientists have often thin publication
records (Pifer and Baker, 2013). Additionally, a senior faculty member and her/his
lab often supervises the student’s doctoral research. Thus, hiring PhD job market
candidates is potentially problematic. On the one hand, information about abilities is
noisy making signals of “quality” relevant for hiring decisions (Cowan and Rossello,
2018). On the other hand, the sorting of candidates done by the Ph.D. job market
could have long-run consequences because of Matthew effects. In this respect, past
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research highlights that Matthew effects and cumulative advantages start early in the
career (Bol et al., 2018; Lee, 2019). Therefore, the transition into the first job and the
following years might have consequences for scholars future careers (Bazeley, 2003).
At the same time, for universities, forming and hiring Ph.D. graduates is essential
for their competitiveness — young scholars will fill academic positions over a long
period. Indeed, the Ph.D. job market involves the decisions of both Ph.D. graduates
and hiring committees at universities.
All these decisions are embedded in the university hiring networks of Ph.Ds. The
university hiring network has been extensively studied and generates predictable hir-
ing flows from one university to other (Barnett et al., 2010; Clauset et al., 2015; Cowan
and Rossello, 2018; Lang et al., 2019). Indeed, past research shows that the univer-
sity hiring networks tend to contain an implicit hierarchical order of prestige among
institutions (Barnett et al., 2010; Mai et al., 2015). This hierarchy of prestige comes
to existence because hiring decisions in the academic labour market are pairwise eval-
uations of “quality” between candidates and universities. I take advantage of this
pairwise assessment of quality and I use it to extract information about the distribu-
tion of prestige among universities (Cowan and Rossello, 2018; Clauset et al., 2015).
However, often such methods do consider prestige as fixed across time. In contrast,
prestige may change according to modes, tastes and new information. If for example,
frauds and misbehaviour are found within a prestigious department its reputation will
decrease. In the same way, if a department wins a large National grant its reputation
will improve. In contrast with past research, this chapter proposes a ranking algorithm
that updates the new information contained in the univerisity hiring networks. Thus,
I make dynamic the ranking algorithm proposed by (Cowan and Rossello, 2018). In
this way I account for various confounding factors driven by the possibility of new
information contained in the Ph.D. job market.
This chapter asks how prestige stratification affects labour market mobility and
future academic performance in Mexico. Most of past literature assumes that prestige
is static and that has on performance an absolute effect. In other words, individuals
perform at their best in prestigious environment irrespective of their past experiences.
However, the effect of prestige on performance can be relative for the individual to
the movements she/he does in the hierarchy. This pattern seems to be more complex
and nuanced. The previous chapter, studying prestige stratification in South Africa,
finds that scholars who experienced upward prestige mobility exhibit lower academic
performance in comparison to their Ph.D. fellows who kept their position in the hier-
archy.
Indeed, after graduation, scholars can move to other institutions or be hired inter-
nally. When hired internally, researchers keep their current social capital and hold their
position in the prestige hierarchy. In contrast, when they move, they experience up-
ward (downward) prestige mobility — they are hired in a university more (less) presti-
gious compared to their Ph.D. Analysing these prestige changes rather than solely the
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effect of the Ph.D. granting institution can offer a deeper insight into how university
prestige stratification relates to early-career and academic performance.
Those prestige changes may involve numerous psychological mechanisms and the
working environment experienced by agents. Those mechanisms relate to how indi-
viduals perceive their place in this prestige hierarchy and relate to one other. Indeed,
beyond the absolute link between prestige and performance, we should consider that
prestige can affect individual performance also in a relative way. In particular, the ef-
fect that prestige has on individual performance may relate to the “profile of prestige”
an individual is accustomed to.
For example, the psychological literature finds the big-fish-little-pond effect (BFLPE),
where individual performance relates to the average performance of her/his peers.
That is agents might perform “better” ( “worse”) in an environment with a “lower”
(“higher”) competition where the perceived average ability of peers is lower (higher).
Testing these psychological mechanisms is beyond the scope of this work, but I high-
light a non-linear association between prestige and performance (see section 5.8 for
more details).
With these premises, this chapter incorporates a dynamical representation of pres-
tige across time and the idea that university prestige and its effect on performance is
relative for each individual. In particular, I test the effect that the movements in the
prestige hierarchy have on individual performance. Based on a sample of 898 Mexican
Ph.D. graduates in STEM between 1992 and 2016, I find a “lock-in” where Ph.D. can-
didates hired internally exhibit higher academic performance throughout their careers
than those who move up or down the hierarchy. Further, concentrating the analy-
sis on large movements in the hierarchy I find evidence for a sort of BFLPE where
an upward (downward) prestige mobility in the transition into the first academic job
negatively (positively) relates with academic performance. Both results underline a
complex association between prestige stratification and individual performance
5.2 Prestige, mobility and performance
In section 4.2 the previous chapter reviews the literature on university prestige.
Here I provide a brief summary
5.2.1 University prestige
The main approaches for ranking universities by prestige are input-output (De-
backere and Rappa, 1995; Chan et al., 2002; Kalaitzidakis et al., 2003; Oyer, 2008;
Buela-Casal et al., 2012), survey (Abbott and Barlow, 1972; Cyrenne and Grant, 2009;
Moodie, 2009; Olcay and Bulu, 2017), and network-based measures (Barnett et al.,
2010; Cowan and Rossello, 2018; Zhu and Yan, 2017; Nevin, 2019).
108
Chapter 5 Section 5.2
Network-based measures are a new framework to rank universities that exam-
ine a social process in which scholars recognize quality in their work and this eval-
uation is cross-validated by the interactions between institutions. Following these
lines, the ranking approach in this chapter builds upon the idea that the Ph.D. hiring
networks contain information about how agents evaluate each-other quality (Clauset
et al., 2015). I apply the new methodology proposed by Cowan and Rossello (2018) to
study the effect of prestige stratification on academic performance in the context of the
South African science system. They consider university hiring patterns as revealing
of pairwise assessments of quality between Ph.D. graduates and hiring committees. In
other words, since hiring implies underline decisions for agents, they exploit the infor-
mation contained in the movements in the labour market to approximate the distribu-
tion of prestige. As a further expansion of their methodology, this ranking algorithm
is dynamic across time. Thus, I consider the job market of variable sizes that conse-
quentially changes the prestige of the institutions involved. A dynamic perspective to
rank universities is more suited in a large developing setting where the distribution of
prestige is potentially more volatile.
5.2.2 The link between mobility and performance
The literature studies the relationship between university prestige and mobility to
understand how the prestige of the Ph.D. granting institution affects the placement
and subsequent labour market outcomes. In the Ph.D. job market, both individuals
and universities have incentives to make accurate choices.
However, the asymmetry of information in the Ph.D. job market makes the pres-
tige of the Ph.D. granting institution a signal for the unobserved skills and abilities
of applicants. Indeed, past literature shows a positive relationship between the pres-
tige of the Ph.D. granting institution and future employment (Crane, 1970; Debackere
and Rappa, 1995; Bedeian et al., 2010; Lawson and Shibayama, 2015; Pinheiro et al.,
2017; Headworth and Freese, 2016). Ph.D. graduates from prestigious institutions
tend to get “better" job compared to graduates from lower-tier universities. Similar
results suggest that a prestigious Ph.D. function as a key mechanism to alleviate the
asymmetry of information between candidates and hiring faculties. Moreover, since
a “good” affiliation provides opportunities, networks, and resources this first sorting
of the job market has potential long-run consequences on career achievements (Oyer,
2008; Bedeian et al., 2010). A similar early-career advantage is potentially problem-
atic when quality and prestige do not entirely overlap. In this respect, some studies
argue that institutional prestige from the Ph.D. granting institution is more important
than researchers “quality” for obtaining a first academic job (Long et al., 1979; Allison
and Long, 1990; Baldi, 1995; Gerhards et al., 2018).
Another group of studies pay attention to how changes of institutional prestige
relate to academic performance and academic achievement of scholars. Oyer (2008)
use a longitudinal sample to estimate how changes in institutional prestige affect the
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academic performance of economists. He shows that even after controlling for proxies
of individual-level ability, that early academic prestige positively correlates with aca-
demic performance measured by publication productivity. Moreover, he shows that
scholars generally move down the prestige ranking over their careers. He argues that
this is because high ranked universities produce a significant percentage of the total
graduates that later move to lower-ranked universities. Chan et al. (2002) examine the
mobility of scholars publishing in 16 top financial journals. They find that upward
ranking mobility is rare and that scholars who experienced it produce twice as many
publications compared with average production of scholars from destination universi-
ties. He furthers shows that after controlling for ability using publication productivity,
the rank of the Ph.D. grading institution predicts upward ranking mobility through
their academic careers. Azoulay et al. (2014) take an alternative approach, comparing
academic performance of scholars before and after upward mobility given by a presti-
gious academic recognition. They find that gains from upward ranking mobility have
a lower effect on scholars that have above average citations than on scholars with low
or below average citations. In general, these studies suggest that upward ranking mo-
bility is associated with higher academic performance, but this is not always the case.
Cowan and Rossello (2018) offer a closer look at how prestige differentials from the
Ph.D. to the first job relate to academic performance. They use a quasi-experimental
methodology based on matching pairs examing a sample of 1011 South African job
market candidates in STEM. They show that scholars hired internally (maintaining
their place in the prestige hierarchy) exhibit on average higher performance compared
with scholars that move up in the prestige rank. Their work underlines that the link
between prestige changes and performance might be complex and non linear. In the
following subsection I discuss psychological mechanisms that can play a role.
5.3 Data
Data originates from the Mexican National Council of Science and Technology
(CONACYT). Data were collected through the most extensive science policy of the
country, the National System of Researchers (NSR), whose aim is to increase the pro-
ductivity, quality and competitiveness of Mexican researchers. NSR was implemented
in 1985 when the primary motivation behind the policy was the rising concern about
technological capabilities and performance of the Mexican science system under the
threat of inflation and budget cuts. Reyes Ruiz and Suriñach (2015) describe how the
policy evolved across the years, but in general, its structure is substantially unchanged.
The general framework of NSR is the following. Each researcher applies to the
NSR submitting her/his curriculum vitae and publications and is assigned to one of
seven different research disciplines. For each discipline, the NSR forms a commit-
tee of prominent researchers that evaluates the performance of applicants following a
peer-review process (described in Appendix D.24). In contrast to bibliometric mea-
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sures, a peer-review evaluation has the advantage of including a holistic evaluation
taking into account the validation practices of each discipline within the country. The
evaluation process ends with a rating that systematises the academic performance of
researchers in 5 ordered categories. In the chapter, I use those categories to measure
the academic performance of individuals.
I focus on STEM graduates excluding from the analysis those in Social Sciences
and Humanities to reduce the potential influence that schools of thought have on the
Ph.D. job-market.1 The sample spans 25 years representing 898 Ph.D. job-market can-
didates hired in a Mexican university between 1992 and 2016. I include 36 Mexican
institutions2 and longitudinal records for each scholar of academic performance and
individual level controls as gender, discipline, graduation year and evaluation year.
5.4 Interactive Prestige Ranking
In this section, I describe the interactive algorithm based on universities hiring net-
works that I use to rank Mexican universities according to their prestige. This method
is based on the idea that movements in the academic job-market contain information
about how universities and Ph.D. graduates perceive each other’s quality.
The hiring network, G=(V,E), represents the movements in the Ph.D. job-market.
The vertices V of the network are the universities participating in the job-market and
edges E represent movements of Ph.D. graduates from one university to another. A, in
Table 5.2, is the weighted directed adjacency matrix of the hiring network representing
the flows of graduates from Ph.D. to their first-job institution. Each entry in the matrix
(ai j) represents number of Ph.Ds. where the diagonal elements (aii) are the Ph.D.
graduates hired internally (trained and hired by their faculty) while the off-diagonal
entries (ai j with i 6= j)) are graduates from university i hired as their first academic job
in university j.
Following the previous chapter, the ranking algorithm is based on two key as-
sumptions. The first concerns universities, that is, they try to improve their status
and quality and in pursuing it they try to hire from universities “better” then them-
selves. The second assumption considers scholars, and they want to be hired by the
most prominent institution. When both academics and institutions satisfy those de-
sires fully, in A exists a unique order of university names (rows/columns names) such
that Ph.D. graduates only move down the hierarchy. In other words, under this as-
sumption, rows and columns of the adjacency matrix A can be rearranged in an upper
triangular matrix such that all entries below the diagonal are equal to zero. I define
this unique order o∗, where the sum of rows have a global maximum score equal to s∗.
1CONACYT Research Areas included are I, II, III, VI and VII. Respectively, Physics-Mathematics and
Earth Sciences, Biology Chemistry and Life Sciences, Medicine and Health Sciences, Biotechnology and
Agricultural Sciences, and Engineering. See Appendix D.24.
2The list of institutions is presented in the Appendix D.22
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Geographic location and other recruiting criteria imply that the Ph.D. job-market
often departs from this strict assumptions. Thus empirically the order is not unique and
A it is not a perfect upper triangular matrix. However, since prestige is an important
selection criteria for university and scholars I apply the heuristic algorithm proposed
in the previous chapter to find the set of orders that gets as closer as possible to s∗ and
have the minimum number of violations from a upper triangular matrix configuration.
In particular, as described in the previous chapter, to approach the underlying pres-
tige hierarchy the algorithm works at follows. The algorithm for k= 10000 times starts






For 100 times the algorithm tries to improve the score sk in the following way. For
each iteration two nodes (both rows and columns) are randomly selected and swapped.
If the swap does not decrease the score it keeps it, otherwise it rejects it. After this
100 searches the obtained order ok and score sk are recorded, obtaining a set of n-tuple
O = {o1,o2, . . . ,ok} orders and their associated scores S = {s1,s2, . . . ,sk}.
From these two sets O and S, the algorithm selects the set Q = {om ∈ O | sm ≈
s∗} of orders that reach the highest score. Each n-tuple of the set Q = {q1, . . . ,qm}
contains a possible university rank R(v) = {r1,r2, . . . ,rm} Then for each university the






which is in other words the mean of its ranks in the set of orders with maximum score
Q.3 The prestige score of each university provides a natural ordering or ranking of
universities that is the measure of prestige.
A key assumption of this algorithm is that a single adjacency matrix A captures
the underlying hierarchy of prestige. This implies that in all universities (nodes) and
scholars participate in the labour market and the size of the market is fixed. However,
movements between universities over an interval of time can be constrained by various
forces.
The assumption of a fixed hiring network to measure prestige is consistent with
previous evidence that finds prestige to be persistent across time. However, in a less
developed higher education system prestige might be more volatile. Trends, winning
a grant or a famous scholar can highly influence the prestige of such institutions. To
account for these possibilities, I relax the assumption that the hiring network is fixed
3Further details of the procedure are described the Algorithm 1 from Appendix D.23.
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across time adopting a dynamic computation of the algorithm. The proposed variation
iterates the previous algorithm over closed intervals, t = [y−∆,y+∆], of time centred
around the Ph.D. graduation year y, with fixed windows of ∆ = 3 years. This implies
that the hiring network and the scholars and universities involved are different for each
time window. 4 However, not all institutions are present across t intervals, for instance,
more recent universities are not listed in the early years of the sample. Hence, the final
scores of the Interactive Prestige Ranking is the average score of each university i over
t intervals of time.
After the computation of the ranking, I distinguish between three groups of schol-
ars, Up, Down and Stay, that exhibited different changes in the prestige during the
transition between Ph.D. graduation and first job in the following way. For each re-
searcher in the sample, I calculate the difference between the Ph.D. prestige rank and
the one of her/his first job institution The difference is positive (negative) for the group
of scholars that move Up (Down) which experience upward (downward) prestige mo-
bility — they are hired by a university more (less) prestigious than their Ph.D. The
difference is equal to zero for scholars who Stay experiencing internal hiring — those
hired by their Ph.D. institution.
5.5 Prestige Ranking Results
Table 5.1 shows the ranking of Mexican universities using the dynamic ranking
with a 3 years time window.
The aggregate adjacency matrix in Table 5.2 illustrates the mobility from the Ph.D.
to first job for the complete sample over the entire period. The matrix displays a heavy
diagonal representing Ph.Ds. hired internally. Looking at the movements in the pres-
tige hierarchy, Table 5.3 highlights a high level of stratification in the Mexican univer-
sity system. Where the 10 most prestigious Mexican universities produce the 68% of
Ph.D. graduates and nearly half of them are hired as a first-job in those institutions.
4The number of universities is very small in early years of the sample their analogous adjacency matrices
yield trivial orders of small length. To overcome this, I aggregated the first years of the sample up to the
year 2000.
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Table 5.1: Ranking Mexican Universities 1992-2016 for STEM Sciences.
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4
1. CINVESTAVa 10. UAM 19. BUAP 28. TEC
(2.5294) (2.684) (3.203) (4.8494)
2. CICESE 11. UAEM 20. UASLP 29. UDG
(2.6497) (4.0295) (3.5339) (3.9136)
3. UNAM 12. INECOL 21. CIMAV 30. UGTO
(1.3432) (4.3667) (4.7517) (3.8549)
4. CINVESTAVb 13. IBERO 22. IPN 31. IMSS
(2.0916) (7.3052) (3.0192) (3.7836)
5. IMP 14. CICY 23. UV 32. UNISON
(2.4086) (4.641) (4.778) (5.8237)
6. ECOSUR 15. CIO 24. UADY 33. UMICH
(3.0022) (4.8308) (6.7742) (4.8774)
7. IPICYT 16. COLPOS 25. UAEM 34. UAEH
(4.5405) (4.937) (3.8454) (4.6305)
8. CIBINOR 17. CIQA 26. UCOL 35. UANL
(4.8267) (6.7092) (4.6986) (3.8814)
9. INAOE 18. CIAD 27. UAQ 36. TECNM
(4.3645) (6.5083) (6.3504) (3.2274)
a Zacatenco unit. b All units but Zacatenco. (*) Brackets correspond
to standard deviations. Full names of universities are listed in Appendix
D.22.
Table 5.2: Ph.D. to First-Job Mexican Faculty Hiring Matrix 1992-2016 for STEM Sciences.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
1. CINVESTAVa 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. CICESE 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3. UNAM 0 1 178 10 3 2 2 2 2 13 11 3 0 2 1 0 1 2 7 2 1 30 4 0 4 1 3 7 6 5 0 2 6 10 2 4
4. CINVESTAVb 0 1 9 22 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 2 4 6 2 12 1 1 1 5 0 1 4 5 2 2 3 2 5 2
5. IMP 0 0 2 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
6. ECOSUR 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
7. IPICYT 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
8. CIBINOR 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9. INAOE 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
10. UAM 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0
11. UAEM 0 0 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
12. INECOL 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13. IBERO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14. CICY 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
15. CIO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
16. COLPOS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17. CIQA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
18. CIAD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1
19. BUAP 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
20. UASLP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
21. CIMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22. IPN 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 1 1
23. UV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
24. UADY 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25. UAEM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
26. UCOL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
27. UAQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
28. TEC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
29. UDG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
30. UGTO 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
31. IMSS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0
32. UNISON 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0
33. UMICH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
34. UAEH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
35. UANL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 0
36. TECNM 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Entries in the matrix correspond to the number of Ph.D. graduates from university i hired by
university j for their first-job. Full names of universities are listed in Appendix D.22.
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Table 5.3: Prestige movements per university prestige 1992-2016. The table presents how many scholars in each university
tier moved the prestige hierarchy considering Ph.D. institutions (top) and first job (bottom).
down stay up tot %
Ph.D. Tier 1 304 283 17 68 %
Ph.D. Tier 2 54 49 22 14 %
Ph.D. Tier 3 38 48 12 10 %
Ph.D. Tier 4 10 47 14 8 %
Job Tier 1 49 283 46 42 %
Job Tier 2 64 49 13 14 %
Job Tier 3 144 48 2 22 %
Job Tier 4 149 47 4 22 %
115
Chapter 5 Section 5.6
5.6 Matched Pairs Analysis
In this section, I examine how movements in the prestige hierarchy in the transi-
tion from the Ph.D. the first-job affects scholars academic performance. I test it by
using a quasi-experimental technique based on matching, which was developed in the
previous chapter and this section summarises it briefly.
The technique compares the academic performance of matched pairs of scholars
in the three groups, Up, Down and Stay matching individual characteristics and place-
ment (or hiring) institution. When individuals are paired holding constant their Ph.D.
institution, I test how changes in prestige relate to academic performance irrespective
of training. Similarly, the comparison done matching scholars by their first-job exam-
ines how prestige movements affect scholars performance for agents with the same
first academic job. Since early-career changes in prestige might impact academic per-
formance differently as time passes, I compare the performance of matched pairs of
scholar between groups in the short (up to 2 years), medium (3-5 years) and long-run
(6-25 years) after graduation.
The method combines exact and random matching. It starts from the smaller group
and for each individual finds at least one match in the other group. If there is only one
possible match the pair is formed5. Otherwise, if in the larger group there is a set of
individuals with the same characteristics, that can match the one in the smaller group,
I form the pair drawing one at random in that set. I apply a re-sampling technique
to the matching methodology described above to reduce small sample biases as it
follows. For each comparison Up vs. Stay, Down vs. Stay, and Up vs. Down I
generate n = 10000 bootstrap samples of the group on the left-hand side (the smaller)
of its same size s. For each of the 10000 samples of size s, I create matched pairs
of scholars matching on gender, age, discipline, graduation year and Ph.D. (or first
job) university. In order to compare their performance, in each sample I estimate
the proportion of pairs, p∗ = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), in which one group gα have higher

















Where academic performance g is the individual NSR research rating.6 For each
5Given how prestige operates it implies that the sizes of the groups Up, Down, Stay are different and are
likely to have sizes ordered in this way Stay > Down >U p. Thus, in the comparison Down Vs. Stay Down
is smaller than Stay and it can be considered the “treatment” group. That is the pairs are done starting the
search from the individuals in Down looking for a match in Stay. In contrast, in the comparison Up vs.
Down Up is smaller than Down; So the pairs will be formed starting from elements in Up and looking for
matches in Down
6NSR rating is one of 5 ordered categories
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group in the comparisons Up vs. Stay, Down vs. Stay and Up vs. Down, I estimate the
two p∗ and construct their F(p∗) cumulative empirical distribution function (CEDF).
To assess the performance of one group over the other I test for first order stochas-
tic dominance (Levy, 1992). This test implies higher performance of gα over gβ if
F(pα) ≤ F(pβ ) for all p∗.7 I compare the two CEDFs running a two-sided and a
one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS test).
The null hypothesis of a two-sided test is H01 : F(pα) = F(pβ ) — the two CEDF
are drawn from the same distribution. Rejecting the null hypothesis H01 implies that
the academic performance is statistically different between the two groups. The null
hypothesis of the one-sided test is H02 : F(pα)≥ F(pβ ). Rejecting the null hypothesis
implies that F(pα) stochastically dominates F(pβ ), in other words, that the increase
in academic performance associated with a change of prestige from group gα is sta-
tistically different and greater than gβ .
5.7 Matched Pairs Results
In this section, I compare scholars performance of Up vs. Stay, Down vs. Stay,
and Up vs. Down in the short, medium and long-run. In particular, I examine the
CEDF of the proportion in which one group received a higher NSR rating than the
other. Up, Down, and Stay represent prestige changes from the Ph.D. to the first-job
where prestige is measured with the interactive ranking with a moving time window
of 3 years.8 9 Results of the KS-tests of H01 and H02 in Appendix D.26 show for every
comparison that the CEDFs are different and one group stochastically dominates the
other. I find consistent results both using the dynamic and the static prestige ranking,
where the latter is in Appendix D.25. The similarities between the two results do not
necessarily suggest that the distribution of prestige is stationary but rather that the as-
sociation between changes in prestige during early career and academic performance
are consistent, irrespective of changes in the hierarchy.
Figure 5.1 compares the NSR research performance of matched pairs of scholars
who Stay and move Up the hierarchy. In all figures, scholars match if they have the
same gender, age, discipline, and graduation year. Additionally, figures on the left
match scholars with the same Ph.D. while those on the right-hand side match those
with the first-job institution. The matching procedure allows us to compare scholar
with same Ph.D. (or first-job) and characteristics but experiencing different prestige
movements. In both cases, the CEDF of Stay > U p (solid lines), is located below
that of U p > Stay (dashed lines) implying that the Stay group stochastically domi-
nates the Up group. The implication of the results is the following. On the one hand,
looking at scholars with the same (Ph.D.) training (left-plots) I find that those hired
internally have on average a better research performance than those experiencing up-
7Graphically this is inspected if F(pα ) lies below and to the right of F(pβ ).
8Details on the dynamic rank computation are in section 5.4.
9I execute the algorithm with a time window of ∆ = 3 and run robustness checks using other time ranges
(∆ = 5 and ∆ = 8) and the results are consistent.
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Figure 5.1: Up versus Stay comparison. The solid curves are CEDFs of the proportion of pairs in which
RStay > RU p. Dotted curves are CEDFs for RU p > RStay. Pairs matched by gender, age, dis-
cipline, graduation years, and same Ph.D. university (left), or same first-job university (right).
From top to bottom: short-run (Up to 2 years), medium-run (3-5 years), and long-run (6-25
years) after Ph.D. graduation.
ward prestige mobility (hired into a university more prestigious than their Ph.D.). On
the other hand, comparing scholars with the same first-job (right-plots) but different
training (Ph.D.) I find that internal hired perform better than those coming from less
prestigious Ph.Ds. (Up). These results suggest that scholars who manage to secure po-
sitions at their faculty after graduation demonstrate higher NSR levels of performance
than those who migrate to upper ranked institutions.
Results for the comparison between the Down and Stay groups are in figure 5.2.
In this case, I compare scholars who take academic positions in their faculties after
graduation and Ph.D. graduates experiencing downward prestige mobility. Results
are the same matching the pairs on the Ph.D. or the first-job institution — the CEDF
Stay > Down stochastically dominates Down > Stay. In line with previous results,
plots on the left-hand side show that scholars with the same Ph.D. training moving
(down) to a less prestigious institution in their first-job tend to have a lower NSR rating
than those hired internally (stay). Similarly, plots on the right-hand side compare
scholars with the same first-job and indicate that those hired internally (stay) have a
higher performance than those moving down the hierarchy.
The last comparison in Figure 5.3 examines performance differences between
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Figure 5.2: Down versus Stay comparison. The solid curves are CEDFs of the proportion of pairs in which
RDown > RStay. Dotted curves are CEDFs for RStay > RDown. Pairs matched by gender, age, dis-
cipline, graduation years, and same Ph.D. university (left), or same first-job university (right).
From top to bottom: short-run (Up to 2 years), medium-run (3-5 years), and long-run (6-25
years) after Ph.D. graduation.
scholars who experience upward and downward prestige mobility. Results show that
the CEDF of the proportion of pairs of scholars where the performance of Down >U p
stochastically dominates U p > Down. The stochastic dominance of one over the other
implies that scholars who experience downward prestige mobility sustain higher per-
formance over their career than those experiencing upward mobility in their early
career. These results are consistent both matching pairs keeping fixed the (Ph.D.)
training (left-plots) or the first-job (right-plots) institution. In the first case, comparing
scholars with the same (Ph.D.) training, I find that those moving down the hierarchy
have higher performance than those moving up to more prestigious first job institu-
tions. The second, pairing scholars with the same first job but different Ph.Ds. institu-
tion, I find that those coming from more prestigious Ph.Ds. (down) have a higher NSI
rating on average than those moving up from less prestigious Ph.D. institutions.
These results seem counter-intuitive at first glance since most studies have asso-
ciated upward ranking mobility with higher academic performance.10 In particular,
10Moreover, I should consider that those that start high in the hierarchy have few options to move up the
ranking and they are more likely to move down, while the opposite is true for those low in the prestige hier-
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Figure 5.3: Down versus Stay comparison. The solid curves are CEDFs of the proportion of pairs in which
RDown > RStay. Dotted curves are CEDFs for RStay > RDown. Pairs matched by gender, age, dis-
cipline, graduation years, and same Ph.D. university (left), or same first-job university (right).
From top to bottom: short-run (Up to 2 years), medium-run (3-5 years), and long-run (6-25
years) after Ph.D. graduation.
the first result of a negative impact of upward prestige mobility comparing scholar
with the same training contradicts the previous results of Chan et al. (2002). However,
their analysis is slightly different. They use a longitudinal analysis in one sub-field of
economics and their sample is limited to scholars with publications in 16 top journals
in finance. In contrast to us, they find that scholars who experience upward prestige
mobility publish twice as many as their colleagues.
What is most interesting is that what I found is a pattern through the career of
scholars and for both dynamic (Figure 5.3) and static ranking estimations (Appendix
D.25). Nevertheless, these findings require further research that I discuss in section
5.8.
5.7.1 Robustness check
In this sub-section I provide as a robustness check a regression analysis aimed at
offering complementary results. In particular, I examine whether an alternative ap-
archy. This implies that those moving up (down) are more likely to have Ph.Ds. in less (more) prestigious
institutions.
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Table 5.4: Ordered logistic regressions: The impact of prestige changes (Up, Down, Stay) on academic performance. The
dependent variable is the individual NSR research rating in 5 ordered categories (see Appendix D 24 for details).
The main dependent variables are the dummies Up, Down and Stay. Where Down is the baseline category.











Male 0.37390∗∗ 0.40277∗∗∗ 0.40828∗∗∗
(0.11388) (0.11260) (0.11415)
Age 0.01767 0.01921 0.01764
(0.01365) (0.01383) (0.01385)
Discipline II −0.19528 −0.17127 −0.17966
(0.15857) (0.15540) (0.15630)
Discipline III −0.45132 −0.53938 −0.46020
(0.31462) (0.30761) (0.31410)
Discipline VI −0.56758∗∗ −0.57312∗∗ −0.55852∗∗
(0.21150) (0.20922) (0.21395)
Discipline VII 0.05683 0.04987 0.08791
(0.17391) (0.17424) (0.17439)
AIC 9982.40999 9972.24112 9954.94310
BIC 10247.63255 10230.99483 10233.10335
Log Likelihood -4950.20500 -4946.12056 -4934.47155
Deviance 9900.40999 9892.24112 9868.94310
Num. obs. 4764 4764 4764
Clustered standard errors (individual): ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
proach confirms the previous results. Thus, I run Ordinal Logistic Regression models
using as the dependent variable the research performance proxies by the 5 ordered
NSR rating categories (See Section 5.3) where the main explanatory variables are
prestige changes dummies Up and Stay where Down is the baseline category. I use as
additional control variables the prestige of the Ph.D. institution, age, gender, year of
Ph.D. graduation and discipline.
Results of models 2 and 3 in table 5.4 show a positive and significant association
between the likelihood of a high NSR rating and scholars experiencing internal hiring
(Stay) in comparison to those who move down. The lack of a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between upward mobility and performance (when Up is compared
to Down) also suggest that scholars hired in their Ph.D granting institution perform
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better than those experiencing upward prestige mobility.
5.8 Discussion
The main findings underline a complex relation between prestige movements and
performance. In particular I find a positive association between internal hiring and
research performance in comparison to scholars moving in the hierarchy. Moreover, I
find that scholars experiencing downward prestige mobility show higher performance
compared with colleagues with similar characteristics moving upward in the prestige
hierarchy. A similar phenomenon can be observationally equivalent to various mecha-
nisms that require further research. Below I provide possible explanations and findings
in the past literature. In particular, I focus of the BFLPE, peer effects, and the “what
does not kill me makes me stronger” effect.
Psychology research in self-cognition underlines the importance of academic self-
concept in educational settings. The notion of academic self-concept relates to the
beliefs an individual has on her/his academic aptitude and academic achievements.
This comes to existence because the view that agents have on themselves is not al-
ways accurate. For example, academic self-concept of an individual is accurate when
is aligned with her/his (objective) outcomes, such as scholastic aptitude, intelligence
test scores and actual academic performance. However, in many cases individuals
view of themselves may be odd. This often manifests when an individual compares
herself/himself with peers. In similar cases, the social comparison is an assessment
that may impact for better or worse on individual performance. This hypothesis is
called the BFLPE, where the academic self-concept of a student is determined both
on her/his academic achievement levels and on the average achievement levels of the
other students in her/his school.11 According to this hypothesis a student will have a
lower academic self-concept in an academically selective school, where the average
achievement of peers is high, than in a non-selective one (Werts and Watley, 1969;
Astin, 1969; Marsh and Hau, 2003; Marsh et al., 2008; Salchegger, 2016; Rosman
et al., 2020; Von Keyserlingk et al., 2020). In terms of performance, the BFLPE hy-
pothesis predicts that a lower level of academic self-concept is likely to be associated
to a lower performance and to potentially undermine students future achievements
(Marsh and Hau, 2003).
Many empirical results confirm the BFLPE and found it to be strong in different
cultural settings. For example, in a large cross-country comparison Marsh and Hau
(2003) find a strong support for the BFLPE. The study samples 3849 schools in 26
countries, looking a total of 103558 students of age 15 for the year 2000. They use
as dependent variable the individual self-concept measured in the Cross Curriculum
11Still is unclear when academic self-concept first manifest in children. For Tiedemann (2000) academic
self-concept develops in children from age 3 to 5 because of family and early educators’ influences. In
contrast, more recent studies suggest that academic self-concept develops much later between the age of 7
and 11 years old (Leflot et al., 2010; Rubie-Davies, 2006).
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Competencies survey. While their main independent variable is the average PISA test
score of the student’s school, which it proxies how much the school is selective. All
countries, with the exception of Korea and Hungary, display a negative and signifi-
cant coefficient of school average score supporting the BFLPE. However, very little
research focuses on higher education settings and most of the empirical results related
to the BFLPE has been conducted in children or adolescents at school age (Salcheg-
ger, 2016). Indeed, beside the evidence in students of young age, a similar mechanism
that explains how social comparison influences the beliefs and, consequentially, the
individual achievement can be relevant also among adults. Recent advances study the
BFLPE in young adults. Rosman et al. (2020) test the BFLPE in a sample of 115 first-
year undergraduate psychology students at the Leinbniz Institute in Germany. They
find no support for the BFLPE, in their sample entering the university setting does
not modify students’ academic self-concept. However, their sample is small and not
representative of students in higher education. In contrast, in a larger and more repre-
sentative study, focusing on 2182 German students in the transition from high school
to universities, Von Keyserlingk et al. (2020) find strong evidence for the BFLPE.
Adults potentially are more used to competition and the BFLPE may be less rele-
vant for them. However, becoming a scientist in academia has career phases where the
social comparison might matter. The transition from the Ph.D. to the first academic
job is the ideal moment to look at similar mechanisms, especially when individuals
change environment.12 Indeed, when individuals change environment, or advance in
their career, the group of peers also changes. For example, after Ph.D. graduation
scholars can be hired internally or move to different institutions. Thus, scholar mobil-
ity implies that individuals who change affiliation consequentially change their peers
and their place in the prestige hierarchy of the university system. Similar changes in
social comparison mechanisms could affect individual performance. BFLPE is one
possible mechanism behind my findings in this chapter. In my opinion, the BFLPE
should be further investigated in university settings in the future.
In an academic setting other mechanisms may produce outcomes similar to the
BFLPE. In more general terms, learning and social comparison can be coupled and
generate various peer effects in an academic environment that in turn influence per-
formance (Hottenrott and Lawson, 2017). Most of the literature, looking at scholars
in academia, focuses on how social comparison generates positive peer effects. How-
ever, past research underlines that, depending on the level of the competition, peer
effect can also be negative (Stapel and Koomen, 2005). This also refers to the unit
of analysis, for example at the group level the peer effect can be positive and at the
same time it can be negative looking at the individual level. This will happen when
the group benefits from the contribution of a new member but, at the same time, the
group has a negative effect on the newcomer’s performance.
12In the literature the BFLPE is predicted to be stronger when individual change environment. See the
case study in (Marsh, 1991).
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For example, Slavova et al. (2016) study the peer effect that social comparison has
at the group level. They examine whether hiring a new scientist affects the scientific
performance of the incumbents in the hiring department. Their empirical focus is a
sample of 94 U.S. chemical engineering departments between 1996 and 2004. They
find that a new hire generates a positive peer effect in the performance of the depart-
ment. However, their results show that only colleagues with a recent tenure where
affected. As a limitation their analysis does not consider what is the impact of chang-
ing department peers for the newcomer. Related to this, they suggest that peer effects
can be positive or negative depending on scientific specialization and the level of com-
petition/collaboration within the department. A department more specialized and with
more internal collaborations will be more likely to integrate the new scientist and ex-
perience positive peer effects compared to a less specialized and more competitive
one.13
The way in which people are integrated or promoted in a new workplace can affect
individual self-esteem and academic self-concept as well. In general, the literature
associates high self-esteem and self-concept to high career outcomes. However, there
are cases where this association appears to be negative. Other research shows that
individuals with high self-esteem have negative outcomes in terms of work effort and
performance (Whelpley and McDaniel, 2016; Sherf and Morrison, 2019; Li et al.,
2020). Weiss and Knight (1980) find that individuals with high self-esteem exert less
effort in searching for information and have lower performance in comparison with
people with lower levels of self-esteem.
Moreover, in academia a rejection can have a negative impact on self-esteem and
academic self-concept, however, it can also generate positive effects on performance.
The latter relates with the mechanism “what does not kill me makes me stronger”.
In a recent contribution Wang et al. (2019) compare publication and citation records
of 561 narrow wins and 623 near misses scientists who applied to the NIH grant14.
Overall they find that those rejected have 10% chance of disappearing permanently
from the NIH granting system. Yet, despite an early setback, individuals with near
misses proposal (who persevere) systematically outperform those with narrow wins in
the longer run. This result could be consistent to a BFLPE in early career scientists,
where an initial promotion or confirmation of abilities may be counter-productive for
future performance.
13This suggest that social comparison creates peer effects that are context specific. Indeed, the internal
level of competition affects the behaviour of both the group of incumbents and the newcomer. When
resources are scarce, the level of competition to access them increases and in extreme cases a newcomer
can be perceive by the group as a treat. In this case the effect of the social comparison may negatively affect
the performance. An extreme case of thereof are bullying episodes or misbehaviour in academia (McKay
et al., 2008; Keashly and Neuman, 2010; Giorgi, 2012). See Henning et al. (2017) for a review on the topic.
However, most of this research is limited to voluntary surveys with little representativeness and mostly on
administrative staff at universities.
14NIH (National Institutes of Health) is the largest public funder of biomedical research in the world
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In light of the mechanisms mentioned above, we can interpret the results of the
Mexican Ph.D. job market as follows. Scholars who move down might think they
are “big shots” relative to their new peers and this is beneficial to their performance;
or their new colleagues might think they have made a catch and give them more re-
sources; or an initial “failure” - moving down in the hierarchy - might lead to efforts
to “regain previous prestige”.
All of which would be consistent with the apparently paradoxical result in this
chapter and of essential consideration for future research and policy.
5.9 Conclusion
This chapter is the first studying how prestige stratification affects scientific perfor-
mance of early career scientists in the Mexican higher education system. The majority
of comparable analyses looked at university systems in developed economies espe-
cially in North America, where mobility after the Ph.D. tends to be high and systems
more integrated. In the U.S. for example there are often hiring practices that prevent
universities from hiring their own graduates immediately after the Ph.D. Studying
these mechanisms in less mature settings with higher resource constrains has policy
implication because the gap between prestige and performance can be larger then other
settings.
The findings in general suggest that there is a negative relation between mobility
during early-career and academic performance. Moreover, when I decompose mo-
bility looking at prestige differentials between Ph.D. and first-job institution, I find
that scholars who Stay or move Down the hierarchy remain mostly in first-tier (top
10) institutions.15 Results of the matched pairs analysis provide evidence of the same
association of prestige movements and performance in the short-, medium- and long-
run. Further comparing those moving up with those moving down the hierarchy I find
that those moving down have sustained higher performance than those moving up.
The reasons why promising scholars experiencing upward prestige mobility have
lower performance than their colleagues (with the same Ph.D.) that stay or move
downwards requires further investigation as highlighted in the previous section. A
similar finding is somewhat reminiscent of the work by Robert Frank in the 1980s re-
garding “choosing the right pond” in which the author found that some highly produc-
tive individuals choose to work in low prestige environments where they gain status
and perform well by being at the top (Frank, 1985).
The counter intuitive result of this chapter requires further scrutiny. In particular,
it should be interpreted considering that Mexico is potentially subjected to both a
brain-drain and a brain-gain phenomenon. Indeed, this chapter considers Mexico as
a close system but many Mexican researchers migrate to and from the US to continue
15Those moving Up the hierarchy, get their Ph.D. degree mostly from second-tier (bottom 30) institutions
but move to first-tier institutions with their first job. This is an expected result in the light that those
graduating from prestigious universities have fewer possibilities to move higher in the hierarchy.
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their research. In the case of Mexico, there are a considerable number of Mexican
individuals who receive their Ph.D. training in the US and then they return to Mexico.
For example, Finn (2011) estimates that only 40% of Mexican Ph.D. graduates, trained
in the US, are hired in a US university.16 This suggests that at least some of them will
return to Mexico and they are likely to receive a position in a Mexican university. This
might increase the competition between young scholars and those trained in the US
might receive more resources or continuing their collaborations with US scholars.
Similarly to the higher education system in the U.S. and other developed economies,
I find a large stratification in the Mexican university system but low mobility (around
50% of Ph.D. graduates are hired by their faculty), with a few prestigious institutions
(around 10) producing the majority of Ph.D. graduates that are subsequently mostly
hired in these same institutions. A high concentration of prominent scholars in a few
academic institutions reveals large inequalities in the distribution of prestige. On the
one hand, the stratification of higher education could promote higher levels of spe-
cialization with a targeted allocation of resources. On the other hand, it can also
reveal a structural problem in the science system, a “lock-in", where researchers are
trained and hired by elite institutions and flows of knowledge are reduced throughout
the national science system. In the case of Mexico a structural “lock-in" could be
additionally reinforced by the negative association between mobility (upward prestige
mobility in particular) and performance.
16See https://orise.orau.gov/stem/reports/stay-rates-foreign-doctorate-recipie




This thesis proposes new methods to study social transformations by examining
the entry process in a workplace and it uses the empirical focus of the South African
and Mexican Academia.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the entry process in the labour market and
social transformations are tightly linked. The entry process changes the demographic
composition of a workplace and is a main channel to social transformations. In gen-
eral, the entry process follows systemic and individual level mechanisms.
Systemic mechanisms influencing the entry process are the interaction of the de-
mographic groups in a population, the relation between the old and the new genera-
tions, the level of homophily, Matthew effects and the connections between institu-
tions of different status.
The mechanisms at the individual level that play a role in the entry process are the
individual output, the social connections of the individuals, the training, the relation
between the trainee and his/her advisor, and mobility.
I examined individual and system level mechanisms. Indeed, this thesis relied on a
theoretical framework which connects the economic literature (focusing on individual
mechanisms) and the sociological literature (which concentrates on systemic charac-
teristics) to explain the entry process in the workplace. In the preceding chapters, I
developed new empirical methods to integrate the two perspectives.
The chapters of this work focused on career stages which are crucial in the entry
process. Indeed, the entry process has many dynamics and potential bottlenecks which
can enhance or inhibit social transformations. In the case of academia, the main steps
of the entry process are: education (especially at the master level), doctoral work and
training, and the first job after the doctorate. The general framework of the thesis
analysed these three periods of a career in academia.
In Chapter 2, I studied the relations of training during education, which in academia
corresponds to student thesis supervision. Related to this, I focused at the whole sam-
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ple of students (and their advisors) before any selection takes place. I looked beyond
labour market outcomes, examining homophily in the formation of the relation be-
tween the student and their advisors.
In Chapter 3, I looked at training more closely. I focused on a smaller sample
representing the promising students likely to make an entire career in academia, the
Ph.D. students. I studied individual productivity during the doctorate including the
supervisor characteristics.
In Chapter 4 and 5, I looked at the first job after graduation. I focused on the tran-
sition from the Ph.D. to a first job; including those who obtain a first job in academia
within five years after graduation. I examined the link between Ph.D. to first job hiring
flows, institutional prestige and research quality.
Beyond the general framework, each chapter examined systemic and individual
mechanisms of the entry process in a workplace. The chapters of this thesis provided
interesting results and new empirical methods.
In Chapter 2, I found that the formation of student-supervisor relation can operate
as a first bottleneck preventing social transformations.
I developed a new methodology to separate choice homophily from that induced
by the system which solves causal issues creating a null model of type-blind tie for-
mation that incorporates network structures and individual characteristics (i.e. super-
vision capacity, popularity, department norms). Using those results, I examined how
population groups relate one other. I developed a model with interacting populations
and estimated homophilous preferences in the demographic groups using aggregate
department level data of student, supervisor, and tie composition. The methodology
can be used for monitoring social transformations within organisations and it is suit-
able in the presence of sparse register data. I applied the described methods to register
data of student-advisor relations at South African universities between 1973 and 2014.
My results underline that in the university system both race-based and gender-
based homophily influence tie formation. The observed racial (gender) homophily
in the system arises from institutional constraints, network structures, and choices
made by individuals. In particular, half of the observed homophily is induced by the
system through institutional constraints and network structures and half is driven by
choices. The latter originates primarily in new members of the former dominant group
(white/male students). However, when the sample of students is restricted to promis-
ing students who enter academia, white professors also display choice homophily.
Further, I found that during a transition phase of social transformations homophily
can mechanically increase even if there are no behavioural changes among individ-
uals, under certain circumstances. In terms of policy recommendations, Chapter 2
underlines that to achieve sustainable social transformations a demographic change
is not enough and that structural constraints and behavioural aspects should be tack-
led together. In particular, white (male) students and their advisors is a critical target
group for intervention.
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In Chapter 3, I focussed on the individual mechanisms related to training, testing
the link between homophilous/heterophilous (same-/cross- type) ties and productiv-
ity. In particular, I studied whether student-advisor gender and racial couple affects
student’s doctoral productivity. I used an econometric technique, employing a panel
data analysis with a quantile regression approach. This approach studies the link be-
tween homophilous/heterophilous ties and productivity looking at different student
productivity-profiles. I found that on average female students publish less than males.
This difference exists for female students working with a male advisor (heterophilous
ties) and not those working with a female supervisor (homophilous ties). But look-
ing at this link for different student productivity-profiles I found the following. In the
whole sample, female students with a high (or low) productivity-profile studying with
female advisors are as productive as male students with a high (or low) productivity-
profile studying with male advisors. Decomposing the joint effect of gender and race
I found different results looking at same- and cross-racial supervision. For same-race
supervision, the gap in average performance between female students and male stu-
dents is mainly driven by a gap in the right hand tails of the productivity distribution
(students with high productivity profiles). In contrast, cross-racial supervisions dis-
play a smaller gender gap that is u-shaped over student productivity.
Chapter 3 underlines the role that female advisors have for female students. Fur-
ther, it shows the crucial role that cross-racial ties have in reducing gender productivity
differences. Moreover, the chapter points out that same-(cross-) racial ties have a het-
erogeneous effect on student productivity depending on her/his productivity-profile.
In terms of policy advice, the evidence from the chapter shows that promoting cross-
racial ties and female supervision have potential in decreasing the gender gap.
Chapters 4 and 5 focused on the micro and macro mechanisms of the Ph.D. job
market, I studied the link between hiring, university prestige, and research quality.
I developed a technique to rank university prestige and used it to test whether pres-
tige movements affect scholar research quality. To achieve this, I developed a new
quasi-experimental method, based on matching. I compared the quality performance
of matched pairs of individuals with the same training (or same job) but different
movements in the prestige hierarchy.
I found that the university system has a hierarchical prestige ordering with specific
hiring flows. In this stratified hierarchy, blacks and females are disadvantaged — they
tend to experience more mobility and to move down in the prestige hierarchy when
hired in their first job in academia. Overall, inertia has a positive role in the system:
those who make large movements in terms of prestige have lower research ratings than
those who are hired by the same university granting the Ph.D.. This inertia also affects
the long run (20 years after Ph.D. graduation). The results in the Chapters suggest
that the hierarchical stratification of the university system is a constraint to social
transformation because it systematically disadvantages upward (prestige) mobility (of
black and female Ph.D.s in particular) with effects also in the long-run. In terms of
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policy, any intervention aimed at counteracting this hierarchical stratification allowing
a fruitful exchange between institutions will promote social transformations. Further,
developing incentives to allow black and female students to stay after Ph.D. and built
their research capacity before moving institution could also be beneficial.
Besides the policy advices that this research have raised, the work have some lim-
itations that will require a further scrutiny. A limitation of the work is that it looks
at social transformations in the entry process in academia. But the different levels of
social transformations within an organisation could act differently on individuals de-
pending on the period in the career. Further, the hierarchical structure of the university
system is endogenous and created by multiple channels of interaction between agents,
departments, and institutions.
Future expansion of this work will study social transformations looking at agents
longitudinally over the career and incorporating the endogenous nature of the hierar-
chical structure of the university system looking at multiple channels of interaction.
As a general remark, this research concentrates in academia. Academia is a knowledge-
intensive and desirable profession, but above all is the "temple" of knowledge and for
centuries exclusively for white males. Women and people of colour for centuries were
prevented from actively participating in the higher education system. Indeed, both the
South African Apartheid and segregation in the U.S. were designed to impede people
of colour to access quality education. Access to quality education has always been
at the top of the agenda of civil rights moments. In 1906, The U.S. scholar William
E. B. Du Bois, the first African American to hold a doctorate, included education as
the fifth priority for the fight for civil rights. In the second annual meeting at Harpers
Ferry in West Virginia, he used these words:
“[...] Fifth. We want our children educated. The school system in the
country districts of the South is a disgrace, and in few towns and cities
are the Black schools what they ought to be. We want the national gov-
ernment to step in and wipe out illiteracy in the South. Either the United
States will destroy ignorance, or ignorance will destroy the United States.
And when we call for education we mean real education. We believe in
work. We ourselves are workers, but work is not necessarily education.
Education is the development of power and ideal. We want our children
trained as intelligent human beings should be, and we will fight for all
time against any proposal to educate black boys and girls simply as ser-
vants and underlings, or simply for the use of other people. They have
a right to know, to think, to aspire. These are some of the chief things
which we want. How shall we get them? By voting where we may vote,
by persistent, unceasing agitation, by hammering at the truth, by sacrifice
and work.” BlackPast, B. (2010, July 26) (1906) W.E.B. Du Bois, “Men
of Niagara”. Retrieved from https://www.blackpast.org/africa
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n-american-history/1906-w-e-b-dubois-men-niagara/
For the primary cultural and intellectual role of higher education and its role in a
society social transformations at universities are essential. However, this work under-
lines how the entry process is tightly related to social transformations and how a lack
of transformations in prestigious positions (universities and academic ranks) might
slow down transformations at lower levels. In general terms, this work is aimed at
examining how systemic mechanisms work for different demographic groups.
In the world, excluded groups are everywhere, rich and poor economies struggle
for inclusion and in many cases, fail to provide equal opportunities for all. In order to
achieve substantial and sustainable social transformations there is the need to empower
those groups. Here, I focus at one of the main channel: their inclusion in the labour
market. However, as a general lesson, my work shows how systemic mechanisms cou-
pled with individual incentives produce inertia in the workplace. In particular, inertia
arises from choice for association within and between individuals and institutions.
The inertia acts at maintaining group and power relations unchanged, to the disad-
vantage of under-represented groups. Besides this disheartening result, this work also
highlights a positive lesson. This inertia it is not permanent and systems contain the
seed for the social change. For example, the inertia of homophilious relations coupled
with the subsequent generations of workers might produce an increasing aggregate
level of homophily in the system creating tensions over resource allocation. This ten-
sion eventually can destabilise the status-quo and accelerate changes. Moreover, at
the individual level my findings highlight that when agents overcome the inertia of
systemic mechanisms creating (or searching for) uncommon relations they perform at
the highest levels underlining the aggregate gain of inclusion.
This work suggests an inherent truth about development and more generally about
how societies can or cannot change. Transformations follow a non linear path travers-
ing periods of lights and shadows. Moreover, transformations are not unidirectional
and not uniformly distributed. Indeed transformations are often localised and concen-
trated over time and space. The concentration of transformations in particular loci is
intrinsically related to the succession of different generations and the inertia produced
by systemic mechanisms. The two produce tension over the accumulation of resources
and are (pre-)condition for a societal change to germinate. Any process of change of-
ten implies a collective effort and painful transitions that need constant monitoring,
targeting, and activism.
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A.1 Permutation Test results, Choice and Induced Ho-
mophily
Figure 1: Permutation test for student supervisor data 1973-2014 for top institutions and Phd students. The permutation
is done keeping fixed the number of ties and the supervisor and permuting the students. Permutation without
constraint (left) and with institutional constraints (right). Permutation is repeated 100 times for each of time
period. The Observed proportions of racial student-supervisor relations (solid lines) are plotted versus the results
of the permutation test (dashed lines) with respective two standard deviation from the mean. As top institutions
we include: Cape Town; Pretoria KwaZuluNatal; Stellenbosch; Rhodes; Witwatersrand; and Western Cape
University;"
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Figure 2: Induced and Choice Homophily comparison looking racial ties in student supervisor relations 1973-2014. We
compare results of assortativity of two sub-samples: Top Universities vs. Ph.D. Sub-sample . The panel contains
4 series: aggregated (upper series) versus department level (lower series) crossed with Top Universities (white
background) versus Ph.D. (grey background). Upper series are system-level permutations, including both in-
duced and choice homophily; lower series are department-level permutations, excluding much of the induced
homophily. Each box plot represents 100 permutations and associated assortativity calculation, as described in
section 2.4.2, and equation 2.4.
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A.2 List of Institutions and Fields in the data
For South African Institutions we use post 2004 merger names listed below:
University Stellenbosch, University Cape Town, University Pretoria, University Fort
Hare, University Western Cape, University Free State, University KwaZulu Natal,
University Johannesburg, University Limpopo, Durban Institute Technology, Tshwane
University Technology, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Rhodes University,
University Venda, Cape Peninsula University Technology, University South Africa,
University Zululand, North West University, Walter Sisulu University, Vaal University
Technology, University Witwatersrand, Vista University, Central University Technol-
ogy, CGS, CSIR, ARC, SAAO, Natal Museum, Monash SA University, HMO, HSRC,
NECSA, NHLS, MRC, NRF, Mintek, National Museum Bloemfontein, Sasol, DBSA.
The scientific fields considered are:
Agricultural sciences, Health Sciences, Biological sciences, Pharmaceutical Sciences,
Chemical sciences, Technologies and applied sciences, Law, Engineering sciences,
Physical sciences, Social Sciences, Medical sciences: Basic, Arts, Humanities, Earth
and marine sciences, Mathematical sciences, Information and Computer science, Eco-
nomic sciences, Medical sciences: Clinical.
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A.3 Robustness check
I further examine homophilous preferences of the groups looking yearly student-
supervisor ties. As robustness check, I use a logistic regression approach. For consis-
tency as above, I remove the departments without population variability and that have
per period fewer than 10 supervisions. The presented logistic regression models pre-
dict the likelihood of same-type tie versus cross-type tie with the following structure:
logit(pi j) = α +βXi + γX j +δXi j (1)
Where i j is the tie between student i and professor j. The dependent variable is equal
to 1 if the student and the advisor are of the same race (gender) and zero otherwise. Xi,
X j are agents’ covariates and Xi j are the covariates of the tie. The main independent
variables are the dummies student and professor race (gender), both equal to 1 for
white (male) and zero otherwise. As additional control I include student and profes-
sor gender (race), the student enrollment year, the fraction of black (female) students
and professors (computed in the 5 time periods considered), professor age, professor
rating1 (a control for professor “quality”) 2, and department dummies (institutional
constraints of university and field). Looking at homophilous preferences of the differ-
ent groups I interpret, for example, a positive coefficient of studrace means that white
students more likely to form same-type ties compared to black students and thus have
stronger homophilous preferences than black students.
Table 5.4 shows in models 1 and 2 (3 and 4) results using as dependent variable
same-race (same-gender). I report estimation done in the whole sample and for the
sub-sample future academics. Previous results are consistent. White (male) students
form same-race (same-gender) ties more likely than white (male) ones; while black
(female) advisors form same-race (same-gender) ties more likely than white (male)
colleges. In contrast, in the sub-sample of future academics (model 2) white professors
are more likely to form same-race ties then black professors. In table 1 and in the table
2 in the Appendix A I control for sub-population sizes and results are unchanged.
1Professor rating is the individual evaluation of the research quality of a professor and it covers the
period 1983 – 2012. The NRF grades researchers following an examination of a candidate’s research output.
The process involves international referees who evaluate the CV and published papers of the professor. This
process ends with a rating: one of 7 ordered categories. See Section 2.3.
2I have to remark that this variable reduces the sample. To account for this, I estimated the presented
models also excluding the variable and I found the same results. The rating variable does not show a
systematic effect.
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Table 1: Results of logistic regressions of yearly student-supervisor racial tie data. Dependent variable same-race is 1 for
same-race ties and zero for cross-race ties. Models 3 and 4 are for the sub-sample of future scholars. Faculties with
fewer than 10 observations and without population variability are excluded. Where variable studrace (studgender)
is a students’ dummy 1 for white (male); race (gender) is a professors’ dummy 1 for white (male). Age is
professor’s age; YearFirstRegistration is the students’ registration year. Sb and Tb are proportions of black
students and professors aggregated for each time period. Universities + Field are department dummies, and
Rating is professors’ NRF rating (7 rating categories).
Dependent variable:
same-race ties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
studrace 3.025∗∗∗ 3.027∗∗∗ 2.655∗∗∗ 2.659∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.105) (0.105)
race −0.834∗∗∗ −0.837∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.117) (0.117)
studgender −0.092∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.024 −0.021
(0.043) (0.043) (0.103) (0.103)
gender 0.197∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.193∗ 0.193∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.104) (0.104)
age 0.001 0.002 −0.003 −0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
YearFirstRegistration −0.008 −0.016 0.022 0.008
(0.015) (0.016) (0.037) (0.038)
Sb −1.257 −0.213 −0.902 −5.404
(1.838) (1.927) (11.861) (12.286)
Tb 1.526 −8.331 0.921 −16.390
(1.584) (5.564) (8.285) (14.659)
Sb:Tb 12.410∗ 27.080
(6.715) (18.899)
Constant 14.864 32.915 −46.270 −14.099
(30.474) (32.008) (72.927) (76.235)
Universities + Field yes yes yes yes
Rating yes yes yes yes
Observations 14,924 14,924 2,934 2,934
Log Likelihood -7,351.759 -7,350.050 -1,411.695 -1,410.666
Akaike Inf. Crit. 14,833.520 14,832.100 2,939.390 2,939.332
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A.4 Gender Analysis
A.4.1 Future Academics
Figure 3: Student-Supervisor network for Future Academics 1973-2014. The side of the nodes are proportional to node































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A Section A.4
A.4.2 Permutation Test
Figure 4: Permutation test for student supervisor data 1973-2014. The permutation is done keeping fixed the number of
ties and the supervisor and permuting the students. Permutation without constraint (left) and with institutional
constraints (right). Permutation is repeated 100 times for each of time period. The Observed proportions of
gender student-supervisor relations (solid lines) are plotted versus the results of the permutation test (dashed
lines) with respective two standard deviation from the mean.
(a) All, no constraints















































(b) All, University & Field













































(c) Future Academics, no constraints
















































(d) Future Academics, University & Field

































































































(f) SET only; University & Field































































































(h) SSH only; University & Field





















































Appendix A Section A.4
Figure 5: Permutation test for student supervisor data 1973-2014 for top institutions and PhD students. The permutation
is done keeping fixed the number of ties and the supervisor and permuting the students. Permutation without
constraint (left) and with institutional constraints (right). Permutation is repeated 100 times for each of time
period. The Observed proportions of gender student-supervisor relations (solid lines) are plotted versus the
results of the permutation test (dashed lines) with respective two standard deviation from the mean. As top
institutions we include: Cape Town; Pretoria KwaZuluNatal; Stellenbosch; Rhodes; Witwatersrand; and Western
Cape University;"
(a) Top Institutions













































(b) Top Institutions; University & Field
















































(c) PhD Students only












































(d) PhD Students only; University & Field















































Appendix A Section A.4
A.4.3 Choice and Induced Homophily
Figure 6: Induced and Choice Homophily comparison looking gender ties in student supervisor relations 1973-2014. We
compare results of assortativity of different sub-samples: All vs. Future Academics (a), SET vs. SSH (b). Each
panel contains 4 series; In Fig.(a): aggregated (upper series) versus department level (lower series) crossed with
total sample (white background) versus future academics (grey background). And similarly for Fig. (b). Upper
series are system-level permutations, including both induced and choice homophily; lower series are department-
level permutations, excluding much of the induced homophily. Each box plot represents 100 permutations and
associated assortativity calculation, as described in section 2.4.2, and equation 2.4.
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Figure 7: Induced and Choice Homophily comparison looking gender ties in student supervisor relations 1973-2014. We
compare results of assortativity of two sub-samples: Top Universities vs. Ph.D. Sub-sample . The panel contains
4 series: aggregated (upper series) versus department level (lower series) crossed with Top Universities (white
background) versus Ph.D. (grey background). Upper series are system-level permutations, including both in-
duced and choice homophily; lower series are department-level permutations, excluding much of the induced
homophily. Each box plot represents 100 permutations and associated assortativity calculation, as described in
section 2.4.2, and equation 2.4.
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A.4.4 Choice Homophily of different groups
Figure 8: Gender Homophily of the different groups 1973-2014. The estimation is done minimising the average relative
entropy of tie-types between observed and predicted from equations 2.6. We use data at department level under
10000 samples with replacement of department observations. Black dashed are averages. Faculties with less
than 10 observations and without population variability are excluded.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A Section A.4
Table 2: Results of logistic regressions of yearly student-supervisor gender tie data. Dependent variable same-gender is
1 for same-gender ties and zero for cross-race ties. Models 3 and 4 are for the sub-sample of future scholars.
Faculties with fewer than 10 observations and without population variability are excluded. Where variables:
studrace (studgender) is a students’ dummy 1 for white (male); race (gender) is a professors’ dummy 1 for white
(male). Age is professor’s age; YearFirstRegistration is the students’ registration year. Sf and Tf are proportions
of female students and professors aggregated for each time period. Universities + Field are department dummies,
and Rating is professors’ NRF rating (7 rating categories).
Dependent variable:
same-gender ties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
studrace 0.058∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.114∗ 0.112∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.065) (0.065)
race 0.024 0.024 −0.141∗ −0.140∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.082) (0.082)
studgender 0.893∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.060) (0.060)
gender −0.605∗∗∗ −0.604∗∗∗ −0.960∗∗∗ −0.959∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.063) (0.063)
age −0.002 −0.002 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
YearFirstRegistration −0.011 −0.016∗ 0.006 −0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.019) (0.022)
Sf 1.440 −40.396 −0.712 −138.266
(6.722) (39.172) (15.845) (93.336)
Tf 0.636 −40.419 1.321 −131.649
(2.603) (37.963) (6.234) (89.135)
Sf:Tf 86.907 282.468
(80.169) (188.883)
Constant 20.846 51.648 −11.425 88.826
(15.588) (32.408) (39.345) (77.716)
Universities + Field yes yes yes yes
Rating yes yes yes yes
Observations 33,310 33,310 6,026 6,026
Log Likelihood -21,569.580 -21,568.990 -3,752.535 -3,751.416
Akaike Inf. Crit. 43,325.160 43,325.980 7,691.070 7,690.832
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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B.5 Variables
Independent variable:
• moreAdv is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the students has more then one su-
pervisor. One third of the students have more, the maximum number of advisor
per student is 3
• logprofcumavgprod is the log of 1+ the lagged cumulative average productivity
of advisor. The average cumulative number of paper is computed since the year
of the first record in the publication data to t-1 and divided by the number of
years.
• DummyStudPrevPub is a dummy equal to 1 if the student has published be-
fore. Overall the 28% of male students has already publish before starting the
Ph.D.; while for female student this percentage is 25%. This suggest that the
gap in publication could be originated before starting the Ph.D.
• timegrad time to graduation
B.6 Additional Statistics on the data
Figure 9: Average three years publications of students classified by gender(a) and race(b) of the student and gender(c) and
race(d) of advisor. The average for the groups is calculated every year starting from 8 years before the thesis


































































































































Appendix B Section B.6
Table 3: Student 3 year average number of publications including and excluding zeros for white male, white female, black
male, and black female. The logarithms are showed at the bottom of the table, excluding the zeros.
White Male White Female F/M Black Male Black Female F/M
Including zeros
Mean 1.58 1.21 0.77 1.37 0.75 0.55
Median 0.33 0 0 0
Std dev. 2.87 3.30 2.81 2.12
Obs. 1636 1673 1840 900
Excluding zeros
Mean 3.16 2.86 0.91 2.89 1.82 0.63
Median 2.00 1.33 0.67 1.67 1.00 0.60
Std dev. 3.38 4.58 3.50 3.00
Obs. 820 707 873 370
In logarithms Excluding zeros
Mean 1.17 1.04 -0.13 1.10 0.81 -0.29
Median 1.10 0.85 -0.25 0.98 0.69 -0.29
Std dev. 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.57
Obs. 820 707 873 370
Table 4: Advisor Logarithm of 1+ cumulative average productivity from first record to t-1. It refers to the variable called
Logprofcumavgprod
White Male White Female F-M Black Male Black Female F-M
Including zeros
Mean 1.29 1.14 -0.15 1.33 1.67 0.34
Median 1.36 1.17 -0.19 1.33 1.61 0.28
Std dev. 0.78 0.77 0.96 0.86
Obs. 3311 1413 1120 205
Excluding zeros
Mean 1.53 1.44 -0.09 1.67 1.77 0.1
Median 1.52 1.38 -0.14 1.58 1.65 0.07
Std dev. 0.59 0.57 0.76 0.77
Obs. 2775 1108 881 193
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Figure 10: Cumulative number of publications of advisor classified by gender(a) and race(b) and by couple of student and
advisor gender(c) and race(d). The average for the groups is calculated every year starting from 8 years before

































































































































































Appendix B Section B.6
Table 6: Distribution of Ph.D. students and advisors by the discipline of the thesis.
Student Black Stud. White Stud. Female Stud. Male Stud Advisor Black Adv. White Adv. Female Adv. Male Adv.
Agricultural sciences 90 46 44 44 46 63 15 48 45 18
Biological sciences 278 96 182 154 124 142 19 123 92 50
Chemical sciences 117 66 51 73 44 49 16 33 38 11
Earth and marine sciences 67 28 39 35 32 44 6 38 36 8
Engineering sciences 69 26 43 51 18 51 10 41 46 5
Health Sciences 81 33 48 34 47 59 18 41 33 26
Information and Computer science 31 5 26 16 15 21 3 18 17 4
Mathematical sciences 24 14 10 18 6 20 6 14 19 1
Medical sciences: Basic 43 25 18 17 26 28 11 17 20 8
Medical sciences: Clinical 14 7 7 6 8 12 2 10 6 6
Pharmaceutical Sciences 15 15 0 10 5 3 2 1 3 0
Physical sciences 55 37 18 49 6 36 9 27 31 5
Technologies and applied sciences 40 18 22 24 16 24 4 20 18 6
Table 7: Average productivity for different sub-sample of the data and student advisor couple. Productivity is computed
as log(1+ pubt ) where pubt is number of student publication between years t and t +2 inclusive.
Advisor
Male Female Average
Male 0.65 0.44 0.61
Female 0.44 0.46 0.44Student
Average 0.56 0.45 0.53
(a) Same-race pair, white student white advisor
Advisor
White Black Average
White 0.65 0.29 0.63
Black 0.46 0.6 0.52Student
Average 0.57 0.56 0.57
(b) Same-gender pair, male student male advisor
Advisor
Male Female Average
Male 0.6 0.54 0.59
Female 0.35 0.55 0.37Student
Average 0.51 0.54 0.52
(c) Same-race pair, black student black advisor
Advisor
White Black Average
White 0.44 0.09 0.42
Black 0.19 0.55 0.23Student
Average 0.38 0.26 0.37
(d) Same-gender pair, female student female advisor
Advisor
Male Female Average
Male 0.46 0.53 0.48
Female 0.37 0.19 0.31Student
Average 0.43 0.4 0.42
(e) Cross-race pair, black student white advisor
Advisor
White Black Average
White 0.44 0.57 0.45
Black 0.37 0.35 0.36Student
Average 0.43 0.39 0.42
(f) Cross-gender pair, female student male advisor
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Table 8: Gender and Racial Assortativity Coefficient (Ass.) by universities and field. The assortativity coefficient is
computed according to Newman (2003), while 95% confidence intervals are computed simulating 1000 times
type-blind tie formation given supervision and population composition.
Assortativity coefficient by Universities
Univerisity Ass. Gender sign 95% CI Null Model Ass. Race sign 95% CI Null Model
CapePeninsulaUniversityOfTechnology; -0.40 ( -0.75 ; 0.65 ) 0.00 ( -1.00 ; 1.00 )
DurbanInstituteOfTechnology; -0.39 ( -0.57 ; 0.48 ) 0.76 * ( -0.65 ; 0.53 )
NelsonMandelaMetropolitanUniversity; 0.30 ( -0.41 ; 0.38 ) 0.33 * ( -0.33 ; 0.33 )
NorthWestUniversity; 0.54 * ( -0.38 ; 0.36 ) 0.47 * ( -0.47 ; 0.47 )
RhodesUniversity; -0.11 ( -0.28 ; 0.26 ) 0.26 * ( -0.16 ; 0.17 )
TshwaneUniversityOfTechnology; -0.45 * ( -0.45 ; 0.42 ) 0.60 * ( -0.47 ; 0.47 )
UniversityOfCapeTown; 0.10 ( -0.14 ; 0.13 ) 0.19 * ( -0.13 ; 0.12 )
UniversityOfFortHare; 0.00 ( 0.00 ; 0.00 ) 0.66 * ( -0.89 ; 0.66 )
UniversityOfJohannesburg; 0.17 ( -0.39 ; 0.37 ) 0.47 * ( -0.33 ; 0.29 )
UniversityOfKwaZuluNatal; 0.18 ( -0.28 ; 0.28 ) 0.46 * ( -0.30 ; 0.33 )
UniversityOfLimpopo; 0.00 ( 0.00 ; 0.00 ) 1.00 NA
UniversityOfPretoria; 0.11 ( -0.14 ; 0.15 ) 0.20 * ( -0.15 ; 0.13 )
UniversityOfSouthAfrica; 1.00 ( -1.00 ; 1.00 ) 0.00 ( 0.00 ; 0.00 )
UniversityOfStellenbosch; 0.05 ( -0.14 ; 0.14 ) 0.20 * ( -0.13 ; 0.14 )
UniversityOfTheFreeState; 0.22 * ( -0.20 ; 0.22 ) 0.05 ( -0.11 ; 0.09 )
UniversityOfTheWesternCape; -0.07 ( -0.23 ; 0.25 ) 0.02 ( -0.24 ; 0.22 )
UniversityOfVenda; 0.33 ( -1.00 ; 1.00 ) 0.33 ( -1.00 ; 1.00 )
UniversityOfWitwatersrand; 0.16 ( -0.56 ; 0.40 ) 0.00 ( -0.31 ; 0.31 )
UniversityOfZululand; 1.00 NA 1.00 NA
VaalUniversityOfTechnology; 1.00 NA 1.00 NA
Assortativity coefficient by Field
Field Ass. Gender sign 95% CI Null Model Ass. Race sign 95% CI Null Model
Agricultural sciences 0.14 ( -0.17 ; 0.19 ) 0.52 * ( -0.19 ; 0.17 )
Biological sciences 0.06 ( -0.12 ; 0.12 ) 0.14 * ( -0.11 ; 0.11 )
Chemical sciences -0.07 ( -0.19 ; 0.17 ) 0.46 * ( -0.16 ; 0.17 )
Earth and marine sciences 0.05 ( -0.20 ; 0.17 ) 0.19 * ( -0.19 ; 0.19 )
Engineering sciences 0.11 ( -0.22 ; 0.20 ) 0.52 * ( -0.23 ; 0.22 )
Health Sciences 0.15 ( -0.21 ; 0.20 ) 0.28 * ( -0.20 ; 0.20 )
Information and Computer science 0.08 ( -0.32 ; 0.28 ) 0.63 * ( -0.50 ; 0.50 )
Mathematical sciences 0.24 * ( -0.36 ; 0.24 ) 0.14 ( -0.33 ; 0.38 )
Medical sciences: Basic 0.02 ( -0.24 ; 0.23 ) 0.55 * ( -0.30 ; 0.28 )
Medical sciences: Clinical 0.29 ( -0.57 ; 0.57 ) 0.29 ( -0.43 ; 0.43 )
Pharmaceutical Sciences 0.00 ( 0.00 ; 0.00 ) 0.40 ( -0.80 ; 0.60 )
Physical sciences 0.16 ( -0.42 ; 0.42 ) 0.26 * ( -0.18 ; 0.19 )
Technologies and applied sciences 0.06 ( -0.28 ; 0.28 ) 0.41 * ( -0.23 ; 0.25 )
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Figure 11: Three years number of publications of students classified by student gender/race (top) and couple student-
advisor gender/race of advisor (bottom). The average for the groups is calculated every year starting from 8

















































































































Appendix B Section B.6
Figure 12: Distribution of the dependent variable over the deciles of its distribution by student-advisor gender couple. The
bottom stack-plots represent the relative proportions of the gender couple in the population for each decile. (a)
Whole sample, (b) sub-sample of white students with white advisors, (c) sub-sample of black students with























































































































































































































Appendix B Section B.8
B.7 Regression with gender and race interaction on the
whole sample
Table 9: Pooled OLS Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error on the whole sample with interaction terms of
gender and race. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average productivity in terms of number of paper between
the period t and t+2. Models (1) for the Students comparison; Model (2) Advisor comparison; Model (3) Couples



























StudFemale_AdvFemale # StudBlack_AdvBlack -0.386
(0.213)
StudFemale_AdvFemale # StudBlack_AdvWhite -0.0425
(0.139)
StudFemale_AdvFemale # StudWhite_AdvBlack -0.229
(0.151)
StudFemale_AdvMale # StudBlack_AdvBlack -0.0572
(0.106)
StudFemale_AdvMale # StudBlack_AdvWhite 0.0234
(0.0968)
StudFemale_AdvMale # StudWhite_AdvBlack -0.0577
(0.263)
StudMale_AdvFemale # StudBlack_AdvBlack 0.0102
(0.189)
StudMale_AdvFemale # StudBlack_AdvWhite -0.0446
(0.120)
StudMale_AdvFemale # StudWhite_AdvBlack -0.185
(0.219)
Constant 0.516*** 0.393** 0.409***
(0.150) (0.140) (0.112)
N 6049 6049 6049
R2 0.285 0.281 0.287
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
B.8 Main OLS regressions
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Appendix B Section B.9
B.9 Poisson panel regressions Gender
B.9.1 Students
Table 11: Poisson Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is number of papers
between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample White Student White Professors; Column (2) On
the sub-sample Black Student Black Professors; Column (3) On the sub-sample Black Student White Professors.
Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
ALL (1) WW (2) BB (3) BW
StudFemale -0.408*** -0.485** -0.871** -0.547*
(0.124) (0.166) (0.324) (0.243)
moreAdv 0.0734 0.264 0.292 -0.317
(0.140) (0.218) (0.294) (0.290)
logprofcumavgprod 0.427*** 0.468*** 0.186 0.805**
(0.0965) (0.135) (0.201) (0.264)
DummyStudPrevPub 1.655*** 1.896*** 1.448*** 2.071***
(0.117) (0.165) (0.278) (0.291)
timegrad -0.148*** -0.0920 -0.201 0.0476
(0.0424) (0.0559) (0.124) (0.0881)
Constant 1.415*** 0.257 4.766*** 0.447
(0.398) (0.530) (0.798) (0.704)
/
lnalpha 1.471*** 1.375* 1.199 1.442
(0.400) (0.547) (0.902) (0.838)
N 6049 3083 1099 1641
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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B.9.2 Advisors
Table 12: Poisson Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is number of papers
between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample White Student White Professors; Column (2) On
the sub-sample Black Student Black Professors; Column (3) On the sub-sample Black Student White Professors.
Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
ALL (1) WW (2) BB (3) BW
AdvFemale -0.00650 -0.0205 -0.0947 -0.302
(0.155) (0.187) (0.382) (0.294)
moreAdv 0.0960 0.260 0.0887 -0.309
(0.142) (0.221) (0.291) (0.302)
logprofcumavgprod 0.428*** 0.468*** 0.187 0.802**
(0.0966) (0.135) (0.201) (0.266)
DummyStudPrevPub 1.664*** 1.932*** 1.410*** 2.116***
(0.117) (0.168) (0.277) (0.309)
timegrad -0.150*** -0.0870 -0.264* 0.0753
(0.0419) (0.0534) (0.129) (0.102)
Constant 0.919* -0.468 4.069*** 0.0270
(0.404) (0.519) (0.901) (0.717)
/
lnalpha 1.481*** 1.391* 1.230 1.451
(0.398) (0.548) (0.897) (0.833)
N 6049 3083 1099 1641
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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B.9.3 Student and Advisor couple
Table 13: Poisson Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is number of papers
between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample White Student White Professors; Column (2) On
the sub-sample Black Student Black Professors; Column (3) On the sub-sample Black Student White Professors.
Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
ALL (1) WW (2) BB (3) BW
StudFemale_AdvFemale -0.335 -0.420 -1.303** -0.992
(0.209) (0.216) (0.505) (0.683)
StudFemale_AdvMale -0.437** -0.504* -0.828* -0.581*
(0.143) (0.202) (0.345) (0.279)
StudMale_AdvFemale 0.0162 0.0635 -0.0460 -0.362
(0.200) (0.292) (0.414) (0.313)
moreAdv 0.0755 0.262 0.267 -0.309
(0.140) (0.218) (0.298) (0.291)
logprofcumavgprod 0.427*** 0.468*** 0.187 0.801**
(0.0965) (0.136) (0.201) (0.265)
DummyStudPrevPub 1.658*** 1.900*** 1.480*** 2.135***
(0.117) (0.167) (0.283) (0.305)
timegrad -0.146*** -0.0903 -0.207 0.0915
(0.0421) (0.0551) (0.127) (0.100)
Constant 0.997** -0.245 3.884*** -0.0736
(0.359) (0.480) (0.747) (0.652)
/
lnalpha 1.471*** 1.375* 1.198 1.437
(0.400) (0.548) (0.902) (0.839)
N 6049 3083 1099 1641
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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B.10 Quantile Regressions Gender
Table 14: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the complete sample. The dependent variable is log of 1+
average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Additional controls are field,
enrolment year, and year.
(1)25th (1)50th (1)70th (1)75th (1)80th (1)85th (1)90th (1)95th (1)99th
StudFemale_AdvFemale -2.44e-15 -3.18e-15 -0.129* -0.223** -0.295** -0.330*** -0.285* -0.224 -0.0191
(3.76e-15) (5.17e-15) (0.0605) (0.0766) (0.0905) (0.0969) (0.128) (0.129) (0.108)
StudFemale_AdvMale -2.79e-16 5.04e-15 -0.126* -0.194** -0.247** -0.269** -0.276** -0.255* -0.195**
(3.22e-15) (2.63e-15) (0.0578) (0.0723) (0.0801) (0.0832) (0.0887) (0.117) (0.0754)
StudMale_AdvFemale 3.64e-16 -5.11e-16 -0.0713 -0.127 -0.180 -0.180 -0.166 -0.0843 -0.110
(4.93e-15) (3.95e-15) (0.0596) (0.0803) (0.103) (0.112) (0.115) (0.139) (0.0950)
moreAdv -2.09e-15 1.60e-15 0.0767 0.0574 0.0726 0.0830 0.0669 0.105 0.00277
(3.54e-15) (2.96e-15) (0.0568) (0.0626) (0.0818) (0.0848) (0.100) (0.116) (0.0733)
logprofcumavgprod 6.71e-15 -2.11e-15 0.127*** 0.138*** 0.154*** 0.181*** 0.209*** 0.219*** 0.175**
(3.84e-15) (1.75e-15) (0.0383) (0.0352) (0.0398) (0.0476) (0.0512) (0.0528) (0.0549)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.511*** 0.981*** 1.069*** 1.031*** 0.968*** 0.946*** 0.927*** 0.913*** 0.752***
(1.91e-14) (2.16e-14) (0.0921) (0.0789) (0.0740) (0.0880) (0.0890) (0.123) (0.0669)
timegrad 3.38e-15 8.65e-16 -0.0117 -0.0311 -0.0527** -0.0790*** -0.104*** -0.145*** -0.179***
(2.13e-15) (1.11e-15) (0.0145) (0.0176) (0.0186) (0.0209) (0.0261) (0.0272) (0.0162)
N 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012
R2 0.246 0.230 0.306 0.312 0.312 0.303 0.294 0.272 0.196
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
Table 15: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the sub-sample of White Student and White Advisor. The
dependent variable is log of 1+ average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2.
Additional controls are field, enrolment year, and year.
(1)25th (1)50th (1)70th (1)75th (1)80th (1)85th (1)90th (1)95th (1)99th
StudFemale_AdvFemale -2.45e-15 6.67e-15 -0.0715 -0.160 -0.213 -0.238 -0.271* -0.361* -0.409***
(2.01e-15) (0.00646) (0.0921) (0.0998) (0.110) (0.147) (0.137) (0.175) (0.100)
StudFemale_AdvMale -1.61e-15 3.67e-15 -0.114 -0.174 -0.204* -0.245 -0.250 -0.334* -0.467***
(1.56e-15) (0.00471) (0.0801) (0.0895) (0.0949) (0.139) (0.163) (0.143) (0.0749)
StudMale_AdvFemale 1.24e-16 2.99e-15 0.00621 -0.0367 -0.0230 -0.0541 -0.173 -0.237 -0.386***
(2.41e-15) (0.00698) (0.109) (0.116) (0.159) (0.176) (0.142) (0.170) (0.0588)
moreAdv 4.20e-15 1.03e-14 0.0991 0.112 0.122 0.129 0.0814 0.00501 -0.0306
(2.54e-15) (0.00564) (0.0679) (0.0885) (0.0927) (0.117) (0.169) (0.133) (0.0710)
logprofcumavgprod -3.49e-16 -5.02e-16 0.108* 0.145** 0.162** 0.181* 0.236* 0.192** 0.184***
(8.33e-16) (0.00286) (0.0425) (0.0516) (0.0583) (0.0794) (0.0951) (0.0664) (0.0216)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.511*** 1.099*** 1.192*** 1.122*** 1.067*** 0.958*** 0.924*** 0.758*** 0.495***
(4.34e-15) (0.0328) (0.114) (0.123) (0.118) (0.116) (0.171) (0.125) (0.0711)
timegrad -2.31e-16 3.72e-17 -0.00440 -0.0214 -0.0396* -0.0625** -0.0920** -0.135*** -0.176***
(4.39e-16) (0.00169) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0191) (0.0211) (0.0337) (0.0361) (0.0118)
N 3058 3058 3058 3058 3058 3058 3058 3058 3058
R2 0.312 0.298 0.364 0.376 0.380 0.373 0.357 0.317 0.247
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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Table 16: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the subsample of Black Student and Black Advisor. The
dependent variable is log of 1+ average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2.
Additional controls are field, enrolment year, and year.
(2)25th (2)50th (2)70th (2)75th (2)80th (2)85th (2)90th (2)95th (2)99th
StudFemale_AdvFemale 1.09e-14 -0.0751 -0.396 -0.300 -0.438* -0.532* -0.659** -0.919*** -0.865***
(0.0840) (0.144) (0.272) (0.228) (0.218) (0.224) (0.218) (0.160) (0.0788)
StudFemale_AdvMale 1.99e-15 -0.0245 -0.254 -0.291* -0.351* -0.342 -0.376** -0.440* -0.310***
(0.0364) (0.0381) (0.189) (0.128) (0.144) (0.176) (0.133) (0.174) (0.0426)
StudMale_AdvFemale 3.74e-15 0.00603 -0.0638 -0.0319 -0.159 -0.182 -0.145 -0.0549 -0.355***
(0.0561) (0.0586) (0.200) (0.210) (0.187) (0.160) (0.150) (0.202) (0.0365)
moreAdv 6.48e-17 0.0172 0.104 0.134 0.0726 0.0446 0.0712 -0.0222 -0.0622**
(0.0474) (0.0443) (0.146) (0.134) (0.148) (0.170) (0.111) (0.108) (0.0234)
logprofcumavgprod -2.52e-15 0.0379 0.127 0.118 0.133 0.104 0.0796 0.103* 0.277***
(0.0191) (0.0370) (0.0797) (0.0742) (0.0836) (0.0696) (0.0617) (0.0450) (0.0176)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.490*** 0.801*** 0.692** 0.571*** 0.572** 0.654*** 0.697*** 0.655*** 0.629***
(0.0882) (0.126) (0.220) (0.155) (0.174) (0.198) (0.144) (0.103) (0.0353)
timegrad -8.63e-16 0.0158 -0.0179 -0.0596 -0.0897 -0.108* -0.121* -0.178*** -0.185***
(0.0116) (0.0236) (0.0858) (0.0644) (0.0522) (0.0546) (0.0503) (0.0456) (0.00787)
N 1091 1091 1091 1091 1091 1091 1091 1091 1091
R2 0.166 0.177 0.273 0.268 0.240 0.244 0.234 0.215 0.187
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
Table 17: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the subsample of Black Student and White Advisor. The
dependent variable is log of 1+ average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2.
Additional controls are field, enrolment year, and year.
(3)25th (3)50th (3)70th (3)75th (3)80th (3)85th (3)90th (3)95th (3)99th
StudFemale_AdvFemale 1.82e-15 3.80e-15 -0.167 -0.221 -0.349 -0.355 -0.445 -0.371* -0.433***
(1.36e-15) (3.97e-15) (0.155) (0.195) (0.205) (0.215) (0.228) (0.149) (0.0484)
StudFemale_AdvMale 3.03e-16 7.79e-16 -0.100 -0.176 -0.271 -0.338* -0.365* -0.299* -0.157***
(6.21e-16) (3.07e-15) (0.160) (0.198) (0.139) (0.155) (0.149) (0.119) (0.0329)
StudMale_AdvFemale -2.95e-16 -2.00e-17 -0.0283 -0.0869 -0.0843 -0.118 -0.130 -0.153 -0.0521
(1.09e-15) (4.79e-15) (0.161) (0.205) (0.141) (0.187) (0.151) (0.101) (0.0405)
moreAdv -3.22e-16 -1.25e-15 -0.0839 -0.135 -0.165 -0.190 -0.271* -0.179 -0.0589
(7.26e-16) (2.80e-15) (0.114) (0.121) (0.103) (0.0971) (0.124) (0.105) (0.0393)
logprofcumavgprod 5.65e-16 2.69e-16 0.139 0.186 0.191* 0.163* 0.111 0.0983 0.123***
(5.41e-16) (1.91e-15) (0.109) (0.103) (0.0813) (0.0806) (0.0936) (0.0544) (0.0147)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.288 0.847*** 0.924*** 0.931*** 0.927*** 0.984*** 1.038*** 1.030*** 0.900***
(.) (1.90e-13) (0.254) (0.273) (0.207) (0.255) (0.212) (0.115) (0.0446)
timegrad 2.01e-16 7.76e-16 0.0109 0.000221 -0.00841 -0.0159 -0.0600 -0.105** -0.129***
(1.81e-16) (1.38e-15) (0.0560) (0.0520) (0.0492) (0.0546) (0.0539) (0.0323) (0.00932)
N 1637 1637 1637 1637 1637 1637 1637 1637 1637
R2 0.152 0.186 0.281 0.287 0.275 0.274 0.243 0.178 0.147
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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B.11 Race Results
Table 18: Pooled OLS Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average
productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Models (1) for the Students comparison;
Model (2) Advisor comparison; Model (3) Couples Comparison. Where Columns (a) On the sub-sample Male
Student Male Professors; Columns (b) On the sub-sample Female Student Female Professors; Columns (c) On
the sub-sample Female Student Male Professors. Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
(1) (1)a (1)b (1)c (2) (2)a (2)b (2)c (3) (3)a (3)b (3)c
ALL MM FF FM ALL MM FF FM ALL MM FF FM
StudBlack 0.00637 0.0175 -0.0567 -0.0128
(0.0366) (0.0581) (0.102) (0.0623)
AdvBlack -0.00875 0.0439 -0.371* -0.0533
(0.0455) (0.0657) (0.156) (0.0766)
StudBlack_AdvBlack 0.00567 0.0467 -0.482 -0.0571
(0.0526) (0.0784) (0.259) (0.0772)
StudBlack_AdvWhite -0.00308 0.00510 -0.00275 0.0314
(0.0416) (0.0687) (0.111) (0.0731)
StudWhite_AdvBlack -0.0787 0.0433 -0.320* 0.0288
(0.0932) (0.124) (0.153) (0.246)
moreAdv 0.0515 0.129 -0.00657 0.0402 0.0515 0.133 -0.0442 0.0442 0.0518 0.133 -0.0462 0.0419
(0.0436) (0.0744) (0.0803) (0.0798) (0.0434) (0.0747) (0.0790) (0.0806) (0.0437) (0.0749) (0.0822) (0.0821)
logprofcumavgprod 0.122*** 0.182*** 0.0714 0.0649 0.122*** 0.183*** 0.0749 0.0637 0.122*** 0.183*** 0.0735 0.0638
(0.0287) (0.0502) (0.0455) (0.0530) (0.0287) (0.0503) (0.0453) (0.0529) (0.0288) (0.0503) (0.0456) (0.0532)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.798*** 0.853*** 0.835*** 0.743*** 0.797*** 0.853*** 0.863*** 0.741*** 0.796*** 0.854*** 0.876*** 0.741***
(0.0445) (0.0682) (0.114) (0.0890) (0.0444) (0.0671) (0.110) (0.0909) (0.0449) (0.0692) (0.115) (0.0889)
timegrad -0.0407*** -0.0640*** -0.0470 -0.00598 -0.0405*** -0.0637*** -0.0392 -0.00599 -0.0400*** -0.0637*** -0.0388 -0.00641
(0.0121) (0.0189) (0.0263) (0.0192) (0.0121) (0.0188) (0.0270) (0.0192) (0.0121) (0.0191) (0.0274) (0.0192)
Constant 0.348** 0.414* 0.315 0.250 0.367*** 0.379* 0.572** 0.298 0.351*** 0.422* 0.213 0.244
(0.111) (0.185) (0.220) (0.195) (0.109) (0.182) (0.207) (0.206) (0.104) (0.167) (0.197) (0.180)
N 6049 2683 825 1748 6049 2683 825 1748 6049 2683 825 1748
R2 0.279 0.317 0.417 0.298 0.279 0.317 0.433 0.297 0.279 0.317 0.435 0.299
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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Figure 13: Quantile Regression with clustered standard errors. Results for group comparison where the baseline group is
White Student with White Advisor. Quantile regressions are done for each 2.5 percentile. Full lines is zero,
dotted lines are panel OLS estimation of Models (3) in table 18. Additional controls are: discipline, enrolment
year, year, time to graduation, whether the student had published previously, whether the student have more
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Appendix B Section B.12
B.12 Poisson panel regressions race
B.12.1 Students
Table 20: Poisson Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is number of papers
between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample Male Student Male Professors; Column (2) On the
sub-sample Female Student Female Professors; Column (3) On the sub-sample Female Student Male Professors.
Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
ALL (1) MM (2) FF (3) FM
StudBlack 0.203 0.157 -0.689 0.522
(0.129) (0.183) (0.622) (0.268)
moreAdv 0.102 0.501* 0.268 0.112
(0.143) (0.221) (0.448) (0.287)
logprofcumavgprod 0.428*** 0.399** 0.701* 0.425**
(0.0965) (0.146) (0.301) (0.138)
DummyStudPrevPub 1.700*** 1.776*** 3.188*** 2.333***
(0.122) (0.175) (0.537) (0.272)
timegrad -0.155*** -0.156** 0.0229 0.0250
(0.0417) (0.0575) (0.135) (0.0816)
Constant 0.557 0.753 -2.456 -1.247
(0.409) (0.683) (1.796) (0.753)
/
lnalpha 1.479*** 1.364* 1.291 1.356
(0.397) (0.580) (1.137) (0.753)
N 6049 2683 825 1748
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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B.12.2 Advisors
Table 21: Poisson Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is number of papers
between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample Male Student Male Professors; Column (2) On the
sub-sample Female Student Female Professors; Column (3) On the sub-sample Female Student Male Professors.
Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
ALL (1) MM (2) FF (3) FM
AdvBlack 0.152 0.210 -3.972*** 0.122
(0.151) (0.199) (0.892) (0.311)
moreAdv 0.0969 0.498* 0.0101 0.0643
(0.141) (0.215) (0.444) (0.277)
logprofcumavgprod 0.428*** 0.399** 0.715* 0.426**
(0.0965) (0.146) (0.299) (0.137)
DummyStudPrevPub 1.675*** 1.774*** 3.746*** 2.221***
(0.118) (0.168) (0.675) (0.256)
timegrad -0.148*** -0.148* 0.0574 0.0354
(0.0420) (0.0605) (0.139) (0.0841)
Constant 0.673 0.700 0.765 -0.603
(0.390) (0.656) (1.543) (0.656)
/
lnalpha 1.480*** 1.364* 1.166 1.366
(0.397) (0.578) (1.164) (0.757)
N 6049 2683 825 1748
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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B.12.3 Student and Advisor couple
Table 22: Poisson Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error . The dependent variable is number of papers
between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample Male Student Male Professors; Column (2) On the
sub-sample Female Student Female Professors; Column (3) On the sub-sample Female Student Male Professors.
Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
ALL (1) MM (2) FF (3) FM
StudBlack_AdvBlack 0.320 0.343 -3.422** 0.400
(0.181) (0.244) (1.229) (0.391)
StudBlack_AdvWhite 0.0997 0.0437 -0.211 0.666*
(0.144) (0.198) (0.695) (0.311)
StudWhite_AdvBlack -0.400 -0.377 -4.190*** 0.262
(0.317) (0.489) (0.838) (0.568)
moreAdv 0.112 0.544* 0.0651 0.0913
(0.142) (0.224) (0.471) (0.296)
logprofcumavgprod 0.428*** 0.399** 0.712* 0.424**
(0.0965) (0.146) (0.300) (0.138)
DummyStudPrevPub 1.719*** 1.777*** 3.635*** 2.316***
(0.123) (0.180) (0.688) (0.276)
timegrad -0.148*** -0.150* 0.0603 0.0201
(0.0416) (0.0596) (0.138) (0.0866)
Constant 0.686 0.775 -3.266* -0.713
(0.351) (0.590) (1.497) (0.649)
/
lnalpha 1.476*** 1.361* 1.163 1.353
(0.397) (0.579) (1.174) (0.754)
N 6049 2683 825 1748
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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B.13 Quantile Regressions Race
Table 23: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the whole sample. The dependent variable is log of 1+
average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Additional controls are field,
enrolment year, and year.
(1)25th (1)50th (1)70th (1)75th (1)80th (1)85th (1)90th (1)95th (1)99th
StudBlack_AdvBlack -9.38e-16 -4.55e-18 -0.0105 0.00431 0.0443 0.0723 0.139 0.170 0.206
(4.27e-15) (2.78e-15) (0.0636) (0.106) (0.105) (0.145) (0.115) (0.127) (0.120)
StudBlack_AdvWhite 6.27e-16 1.77e-15 0.00828 0.0277 0.0357 0.0382 0.0167 -0.0148 0.00657
(3.19e-15) (2.30e-15) (0.0505) (0.0679) (0.0769) (0.0922) (0.0713) (0.0914) (0.170)
StudWhite_AdvBlack 9.22e-16 8.26e-15* -0.114 -0.124 -0.112 -0.103 -0.112 -0.0827 -0.0101
(8.10e-15) (3.99e-15) (0.0612) (0.0951) (0.137) (0.142) (0.159) (0.315) (0.187)
moreAdv -2.13e-15 1.37e-15 0.0583 0.0529 0.0642 0.0754 0.0580 0.0384 0.0146
(3.86e-15) (2.59e-15) (0.0598) (0.0864) (0.0993) (0.115) (0.0749) (0.115) (0.101)
logprofcumavgprod 6.99e-15 -7.50e-16 0.119*** 0.152*** 0.168*** 0.197*** 0.224*** 0.234*** 0.204*
(3.72e-15) (1.28e-15) (0.0336) (0.0422) (0.0475) (0.0533) (0.0452) (0.0582) (0.0815)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.511*** 0.981*** 1.069*** 1.037*** 0.989*** 0.944*** 0.962*** 0.906*** 0.798***
(2.25e-14) (1.63e-14) (0.0816) (0.0959) (0.0908) (0.108) (0.0978) (0.118) (0.0674)
timegrad 3.47e-15 1.13e-15 -0.00852 -0.0300 -0.0553* -0.0861*** -0.115*** -0.149*** -0.190***
(2.18e-15) (8.56e-16) (0.0134) (0.0215) (0.0269) (0.0222) (0.0180) (0.0197) (0.0179)
N 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012 6012
R2 0.246 0.230 0.299 0.306 0.308 0.299 0.287 0.260 0.202
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
Table 24: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the sub-sample of Male Student and Male Advisor. The
dependent variable is log of 1+ average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2.
Additional controls are field, enrolment year, and year.
(1)25th (1)50th (1)70th (1)75th (1)80th (1)85th (1)90th (1)95th (1)99th
StudBlack_AdvBlack -5.30e-15 2.65e-15 0.0711 0.0513 0.0789 0.0764 0.0771 0.0936 0.267**
(0.0183) (0.0126) (0.152) (0.139) (0.160) (0.176) (0.178) (0.127) (0.0962)
StudBlack_AdvWhite -4.30e-15 6.80e-15 0.0594 0.0399 0.0452 0.0423 -0.00101 -0.0307 -0.0989
(0.0155) (0.0105) (0.112) (0.127) (0.125) (0.137) (0.110) (0.102) (0.0531)
StudWhite_AdvBlack -8.47e-15 -6.90e-15 0.0776 -0.0471 -0.0774 -0.104 -0.179 -0.327 -0.581***
(0.0308) (0.0189) (0.248) (0.260) (0.177) (0.166) (0.169) (0.168) (0.126)
moreAdv -1.47e-15 3.29e-15 0.139 0.0790 0.0955 0.130 0.179 0.191 0.293***
(0.0175) (0.0124) (0.138) (0.137) (0.141) (0.196) (0.174) (0.122) (0.0704)
logprofcumavgprod 6.32e-15 -1.70e-17 0.277*** 0.299*** 0.327*** 0.316*** 0.306*** 0.265*** 0.237***
(0.00848) (0.00595) (0.0555) (0.0610) (0.0586) (0.0694) (0.0532) (0.0586) (0.0307)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.511*** 1.099*** 1.048*** 0.943*** 0.909*** 0.926*** 0.949*** 0.924*** 0.920***
(0.0427) (0.0600) (0.127) (0.131) (0.147) (0.183) (0.156) (0.137) (0.0871)
timegrad 3.13e-15 4.75e-16 -0.0555 -0.0852** -0.115*** -0.131*** -0.166*** -0.194*** -0.204***
(0.00507) (0.00401) (0.0295) (0.0314) (0.0300) (0.0279) (0.0301) (0.0231) (0.0382)
N 2668 2668 2668 2668 2668 2668 2668 2668 2668
R2 0.254 0.240 0.338 0.337 0.326 0.319 0.312 0.294 0.241
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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Table 25: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the sub-sample of Female Student and Female Advisor.
The dependent variable is log of 1+ average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and
t+2. Additional controls are field, enrolment year, and year.
(2)25th (2)50th (2)70th (2)75th (2)80th (2)85th (2)90th (2)95th (2)99th
StudBlack_AdvBlack -0.0323 -0.421 -0.684 -0.584 -0.508 -0.721 -0.855** -0.845* -1.262***
(.) (.) (1.487) (1.309) (0.468) (0.459) (0.312) (0.426) (0.0638)
StudBlack_AdvWhite -3.07e-16 2.74e-15 -0.0352 -0.0573 -0.0451 2.74e-16 -0.00283 -0.0874 -0.136***
(1.48e-15) (3.69e-15) (0.0481) (0.0531) (0.0848) (0.0869) (0.0815) (0.107) (0.0158)
StudWhite_AdvBlack 1.42e-15 2.03e-16 -0.324** -0.373** -0.410** -0.511 -0.709** -0.828*** -1.050***
(2.17e-15) (1.59e-15) (0.109) (0.131) (0.155) (0.306) (0.249) (0.248) (0.0666)
moreAdv 1.00e-16 -3.68e-16 -0.0270 -0.0256 -0.0120 1.61e-15 0.00822 0.0747 0.131***
(1.68e-15) (2.04e-15) (0.0699) (0.0602) (0.0887) (0.0752) (0.0905) (0.0833) (0.0151)
logprofcumavgprod -1.02e-15 -2.02e-16 0.0349 0.0417 7.42e-16 8.25e-16 -0.0134 -0.00524 0.0495*
(1.74e-15) (1.23e-15) (0.0450) (0.0444) (0.0624) (0.0596) (0.0670) (0.129) (0.0228)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.288*** 0.981*** 1.314*** 1.263*** 1.299*** 1.345*** 1.337*** 1.264*** 1.347***
(1.97e-14) (4.86e-14) (0.246) (0.369) (0.232) (0.218) (0.143) (0.209) (0.0555)
timegrad -6.85e-16 6.01e-18 0.0110 0.00337 -8.64e-16 -1.25e-15 -0.00539 0.00153 0.00537
(7.53e-16) (5.08e-16) (0.0156) (0.0291) (0.0307) (0.0293) (0.0246) (0.0377) (0.00750)
N 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811 811
R2 0.280 0.303 0.384 0.386 0.368 0.368 0.286 0.275 0.262
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
Table 26: Quantile regression with clustered standard errors on the sub-sample of Female Student and Male Advisor. The
dependent variable is log of 1+ average productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2.
Additional controls are field, enrolment year, and year.
(3)25th (3)50th (3)70th (3)75th (3)80th (3)85th (3)90th (3)95th (3)99th
StudBlack_AdvBlack -1.41e-16 2.35e-16 -0.0382 -0.0672 -0.0604 -0.0188 0.0648 0.209 0.383***
(2.80e-15) (0.0245) (0.103) (0.125) (0.109) (0.137) (0.124) (0.121) (0.0376)
StudBlack_AdvWhite 7.19e-16 1.98e-16 0.0811 0.0522 0.0302 0.0438 0.0890 0.0155 0.0649**
(1.97e-15) (0.0212) (0.0928) (0.103) (0.0949) (0.119) (0.122) (0.0856) (0.0232)
StudWhite_AdvBlack 1.12e-15 2.58e-15 -0.0449 -0.0868 -0.152 -0.0958 0.990 0.844 0.689***
(4.16e-15) (0.0543) (0.117) (0.206) (0.245) (0.497) (0.941) (0.555) (0.121)
moreAdv 3.86e-16 -2.26e-16 0.0492 0.107 0.203 0.215 0.138 0.133 0.0132
(2.02e-15) (0.0230) (0.103) (0.180) (0.166) (0.237) (0.170) (0.143) (0.0280)
logprofcumavgprod -2.79e-15 -2.48e-16 0.0682 0.0676 0.0779 0.106 0.168 0.0919 0.126***
(1.92e-15) (0.0139) (0.0634) (0.0710) (0.0603) (0.0746) (0.0859) (0.0728) (0.0182)
DummyStudPrevPub 0.288*** 0.693*** 0.959*** 1.034*** 1.080*** 1.051*** 1.021*** 1.118*** 1.019***
(6.06e-15) (0.0688) (0.160) (0.185) (0.128) (0.145) (0.122) (0.103) (0.0300)
timegrad -8.47e-16 -6.17e-16 0.0156 0.0150 0.00432 -0.0211 -0.0343 -0.0188 -0.0122
(6.98e-16) (0.00645) (0.0209) (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0309) (0.00984)
N 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746 1746
R2 0.225 0.242 0.311 0.316 0.307 0.299 0.271 0.249 0.224
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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Table 28: Pooled Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average
productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample White
Student White Professors; Column (2) On the sub-sample Black Student Black Professors; Column (3) On the
sub-sample Black Student White Professors. Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
(1) (2) (3)
AdvFemale -0.119 0.137 -0.0473
(0.0714) (0.146) (0.0834)
Constant 0.431** 1.198** 0.571**
(0.159) (0.402) (0.206)
N 3083 1099 1641
R2 0.0830 0.119 0.0764
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
B.14 Without controls
Table 27: Pooled Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average
productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample White
Student White Professors; Column (2) On the sub-sample Black Student Black Professors; Column (3) On the
sub-sample Black Student White Professors. Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
(1) (2) (3)
StudFemale -0.195** -0.236** -0.169*
(0.0613) (0.0845) (0.0813)
Constant 0.559*** 1.659*** 0.743***
(0.143) (0.393) (0.189)
N 3083 1099 1641
R2 0.0949 0.138 0.0893
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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Table 29: Pooled Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average
productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample White
Student White Professors; Column (2) On the sub-sample Black Student Black Professors; Column (3) On the
sub-sample Black Student White Professors. Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
(1) (2) (3)
StudFemale_AdvFemale -0.252** -0.0632 -0.291*
(0.0941) (0.230) (0.137)
StudFemale_AdvMale -0.238*** -0.240** -0.101
(0.0716) (0.0923) (0.0957)
StudMale_AdvFemale -0.198 0.0319 0.0327
(0.107) (0.173) (0.0989)
Constant 0.426*** 1.411*** 0.585***
(0.125) (0.368) (0.167)
N 3083 1099 1641
R2 0.0997 0.139 0.0941
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
Table 30: Pooled Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average
productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample Male
Student Male Professors; Column (2) On the sub-sample Female Student Female Professors; Column (3) On the
sub-sample Female Student Male Professors. Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
(1) (2) (3)
StudBlack -0.137 -0.146 -0.0791
(0.0702) (0.111) (0.0770)
Constant 0.859*** 0.337 0.599**
(0.198) (0.225) (0.192)
N 2683 825 1748
R2 0.0544 0.183 0.0884
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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Table 31: Pooled Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average
productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample Male
Student Male Professors; Column (2) On the sub-sample Female Student Female Professors; Column (3) On the
sub-sample Female Student Male Professors. Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
(1) (2) (3)
AdvBlack -0.0603 -0.252 -0.109
(0.0792) (0.163) (0.0943)
Constant 0.732*** 0.383 0.622**
(0.188) (0.207) (0.203)
N 2683 825 1748
R2 0.0491 0.184 0.0861
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
Table 32: Pooled Panel Regression with robust clustered standard error. The dependent variable is log of 1+ average
productivity in terms of number of paper between the period t and t+2. Column (1) On the sub-sample Male
Student Male Professors; Column (2) On the sub-sample Female Student Female Professors; Column (3) On the
sub-sample Female Student Male Professors. Additional controls are field, and enrolment year.
(1) (2) (3)
StudBlack_AdvBlack -0.107 -0.0329 -0.141
(0.0933) (0.262) (0.0949)
StudBlack_AdvWhite -0.197* -0.202 -0.0204
(0.0812) (0.120) (0.0878)
StudWhite_AdvBlack -0.361* -0.393* 0.0174
(0.155) (0.161) (0.320)
Constant 0.710*** 0.175 0.526**
(0.171) (0.166) (0.164)
N 2683 825 1748
R2 0.0634 0.200 0.0890
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001"
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C.15 University reform in 2004
The South African university system saw a major reform in 2004. The reform
merged and split university departments in the spirit of a geographical rationalization
and racial integration. In the analysis I use post-merger names mostly because the data
are more complete. More precisely, it is possible to make an accurate translation from
pre- to post-merger names, but not from post- to pre-merger names, so by using pre-
merger names I would lose a significant number of observations. Moreover, the use
of post-merger names represents a value added of the work. It is a way to produce the
prestige ranking of the South African universities that can be compared to the actual
system. From the point of view of the analysis I note the following. The University of
Johannesburg came into existence as the result of a merger between Rand Afrikaans
University, Technikon Witwatersrand, and Vista University, where the latter two have
almost no PhDs (3 in total) in the period. So using University of Johannesburg in-
stead of its disaggregation pre-merger would not make much difference. Similarly,
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University was created by the merger of Port Elizabeth
Technikon, University of Port Elizabeth, and Vista University where the sample is
dominated by PhDs from Port Elizabeth. NorthWest University is a merger of Uni-
versity of the North West and Potchefstroom University, and the latter dominates PhD
production, particularly if I restrict attention to SET where 32 PhDs are from Potchef-
stroom versus 6 from the University of the North West. The only possible problem
could arise for the case of University of KwaZulu Natal which is the merger of Univer-
sity of Durban West Ville and University of Natal. Though, restricting to SET, Natal
dominates with 32 PhDs versus 6 in Durban West Ville.
As a robustness check I redo the prestige ranking in SET with those observations
for which I have full data using pre-merger names. Table 33 shows the results which
are quite consistent to those of the full sample. I must also be cognizant of the fact that
in the period there was to some extent a language divide which appears mitigated using
post-merger names. Indeed, looking separately at English and Afrikaans language
universities in Table 33 I can observe a more informative pattern. English universities
have the same rankings here as in the main analysis. The exception being KZN:
University of Natal is ranked 4th in the analysis using old names whereas KZN was
ranked second among English universities in the main analysis. Afrikaans universities
have almost the same ranking here as they do in the main analysis; and if UNW (NWO
and Potchefstroom) are excluded.
I have also repeated the matched pairs analysis with pre-merger names, and notwith-
standing the reduced sample size, results are in line with the main findings.
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Prestige Ranking with pre-merger names

















Table 33: Prestige Ranking for SET 1970-2004 using pre-merger names. The prestige ranking is in ascending order from
the highest prestige which correspond to one. The number is the average of the orders with the maximum scores
of the 10,000 repetitions. The algorithm is run on the adjacency matrix of pre-merger university names of the
hiring network. Universities with fewer than 5 PhDs are excluded.
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C.16 Faculty hiring network
Indegree and Outdegree
SET SSH
Indegree Outdegree Indegree Outdegree
UniversityOfCapeTown 8 14 4 11
NelsonMandelaMetropolitanUniversity 8 9 6 2
UniversityOfWitwatersrand 9 11 4 6
UniversityOfPretoria 10 14 5 8
UniversityOfJohannesburg 8 10 5 4
UniversityOfTheFreeState 7 7 3 2
UniversityOfSouthAfrica 8 8 8 9
UniversityOfStellenbosch 10 15 5 14
UniversityOfKwaZuluNatal 7 13 8 8
UniversityOfTheNorthWest 8 10 4 6
UniversityOfLimpopo 11 3 7 0
RhodesUniversity 5 9 5 5
UniversityOfTheWesternCape 7 5 2 5
UniversityOfFortHare 7 1 2 0
WalterSisuluUniversity 3 0 5 1
UniversityOfVenda 3 1 2 0
CentralUniversityOfTechnology 1 1 1 1
TshwaneUniversityOfTechnology 6 0 4 1
VaalUniversityOfTechnology 2 1 2 0
MonashSAUniversity 0 1 0 0
DurbanInstituteOfTechnology 2 0 1 0
CapePeninsulaUniversityOfTechnology 3 0 0 0
Table 34: Indegree and Outdegree SET hiring network for the years 1970-2004. Network statistics are compute without
considering self-loops
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Figure 14: Prestige Ranking 1970-2004 without distinction of fields. The frequency scores are in ordered left to right
from the highest prestige which corresponds to one. The Black dots represent the average placement of each
university in the maintained orderings, red dots and green dots are respectively one and two standard deviation
from the average. The algorithm runs on the adjacency matrix of the hiring network. Universities with fewer
than 5 PhDs are excluded.
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C.18 Cohort effects
In this appendix I present the results of the matched pair analysis but restrict the
sample to those who received a PhD prior to 1992. This way I reduce significantly
any possible cohort effects.
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(a) First Job, 5 years after PhD
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(c) First Job, 10 years after PhD
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(g) First Job, 20 years after PhD
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Figure 15: Up versus stay comparison, with the sample restricted to those who received their PhD degrees prior to 1992.
The black curves are cumulative distribution functions of the proportion of observations in which Rup > Rstay
was the case for p% of the matched pairs. Grey curves are the CDFs for the Rstay > Rup proportions. From top
to bottom 5,10,15, and 20 years after PhD. Pairs matched using gender, race, PhD obtained years and first job
university (left column) or PhD institution (right column).
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(a) First Job, 5 years after PhD
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(c) First Job, 10 years after PhD
























































(d) PhD, 10 years after PhD
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Figure 16: Down versus stay comparison, with the sample restricted to those who received their PhD degrees prior to 1992.
The black curves are cumulative distribution functions of the proportion of observations in which Rdown > Rstay
was the case for p% of the matched pairs. Grey curves are the CDFs for the Rstay > Rdown proportions. From
top to bottom 5,10,15, and 20 years after PhD. Pairs matched using gender, race, PhD obtained years and first
job university (left column) or PhD institution (right column).
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(a) First Job, 5 years after PhD
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(g) First Job, 20 years after PhD
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Figure 17: Up versus down comparison, with the sample restricted to those who received their PhD degrees prior to 1992.
The black curves are cumulative distribution functions of the proportion of observations in which Rup > Rdown
was the case for p% of the matched pairs. Grey curves are the CDFs for the Rdown > Rup proportions. From
top to bottom 5,10,15, and 20 years after PhD. Pairs matched using gender, race, PhD obtained years and first
job university (left column) or PhD institution (right column).
178
Appendix C Section C.19
C.19 SSH results






















































































































































































CapeTown 30 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 5 1 1 3 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
NelsonMandelaMetropolitan 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Witwatersrand 3 0 27 3 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pretoria 0 1 3 48 5 1 10 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
Johannesburg 0 0 0 1 16 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TheFreeState 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
SouthAfrica 1 4 0 11 1 2 69 0 3 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Stellenbosch 4 2 1 3 1 4 2 42 1 0 1 1 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
KwaZuluNatal 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 36 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
TheNorthWest 0 0 0 0 3 0 5 1 0 36 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
Limpopo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rhodes 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TheWesternCape 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
FortHare 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WalterSisulu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Venda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CentralUnivOfTechnology 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
TshwaneUnivOfTechnology 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
VaalUnivOfTechnology 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MonashSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DurbanInstituteOfTechnology 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CapePeninsulaUnivOfTechnology 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 35: Adjacency matrix of the hiring network for the years 1970-2004 in SSH, rows are PhD institutions and columns
are first job institutions. Each entry represents the number for people with a PhD in university i hired as first job
in university j.
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Figure 18: Hiring network 1970-2004 SSH. The vertex are the South African Universities, plotted according to their
geographical coordinates (for the institutions located in the same area I separated manually). Vertex size in-
degree, vertex colour out-degree. Where the correlation between in-degree and out-degree 0.53.
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Table 36 contains summary statistics of the SSH hiring network.
Summary Statistics SSH hiring network
All Male Female White Black
Number of Nodes 22 22 22 22 22
Number of Components 3 3 5 3 7
Number of isolated Nodes 2 2 4 2 6
Statistics on the Giant Component
Number of Nodes 20 20 18 20 16
Number of Edges 83 63 43 74 26
Edge Density 0.218 0.166 0.141 0.195 0.108
Average Path Length 1.959 1.976 2.386 2.02 2.037
Diameter 8 11 7 9 5
Global Clustering Coefficient 0.525 0.429 0.35 0.51 0.308
Table 36: Summary Statistics SSH hiring network for the years 1970-2004. Network statistics are compute without con-
sidering self-loops.
SSH PhDs hired from the top 5 universities
Rank PhD University Placed in SA academia Hired by Top 5 Proportion placed in Top 5
1 Stellenbosch 70 55 0.786
2 Witwatersrand 39 33 0.846
3 Cape Town 52 36 0.692
4 Pretoria 79 51 0.646
5 WesternCape 20 16 0.8
All in Top 5 260 191 0.735
Total PhD hires 542 0.480
Table 37: PhDs hired from the top 5 prestigious universities in SSH, according to the prestige ranking. The total of SSH
PhDs Hired in the period is 542.
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Figure 19: Prestige Ranking for SSH 1970-2004. The frequency scores are in ascending order from the highest prestige
which correspond to one. The black dots is the average of the orders with the maximum scores under 10000
repetition, red dots and green dots are respectively one and two standard deviation from the average. The
algorithm runs on the adjacency matrix of the hiring network. Universities with fewer than 5 PhDs are excluded.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C Section C.21
C.21 Robustness check of KS test
To address the well known problem of excess of sensitivity of KS test with large
samples, we perform a robustness check, following a bootstrap technique. For each
comparison of the distributions of proportions obtained with our matched pairs tech-
nique, we sample with replacement 100 samples of size 100 and each time we compute
the KS test3, then we store the obtained p-values and we count how many times the
p-values are lower than 0.05. Under the null hypothesis, p-values are distributed as
a uniform, so if the fraction of p-values under 0.05 is larger that 0.05, then we can
conclude in a more consistent way that the two distributions are different. Table 40
shows the results of this procedure for figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Observing the table
the results of KS tests are confirmed.
3According to Sekhon (2011) to account for possible presence of ties we use the ks.boot command under
the R library Matching.
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Matched pairs robustness analysis KS test
Up-stay Down-stay Up-Down
First Job PhD First Job PhD First Job PhD
5 years after PhD
two tailed 1 1 1 0.54 0.28 1
less 1 1 0 0.65 0 1
greater 0 0 1 0 0.42 0
10 years after PhD
two tailed 0.03 0.26 0.99 1 0.94 1
less 0 0.38 0 0 0 1
greater 0.06 0 0.99 1 0.96 0
15 years after PhD
two tailed 0.89 1 1 1 1 1
less 0 0 0 0 0 1
greater 0.94 1 1 1 1 0
20 years after PhD
two tailed 1 1 1 1 1 1
less 0 0 1 0 0 1
greater 1 1 0 1 1 0
Table 40: Proportion of p-values lower than 0.05 of Bootstrap KS test repeated 100 times on repeated re-samples of
size=100 for p%
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Matched pairs robustness analysis KS test; Cohort effects
Up-stay Down-stay Up-Down
First Job PhD First Job PhD First Job PhD
5 years after PhD
two tailed 0.94 1 1 0.99 1 0.05
less 0.96 1 0 0 0 0.03
greater 0 0 1 0.99 1 0.07
10 years after PhD
two tailed 0.96 0.14 1 1 1 0.98
less 0 0 0 0 0 0.98
greater 0.99 0.21 1 1 1 0
15 years after PhD
two tailed 1 1 1 1 1 1
less 0 0 0 0 0 1
greater 1 1 1 1 1 0
20 years after PhD
two tailed 1 1 1 1 1 1
less 0 0 1 0 0 1
greater 1 1 0 1 1 0
Table 41: Proportion of p-values lower than 0.05 of Bootstrap KS test repeated 100 times on repeated re-samples of
size=100 for p%. Sample restricted to those who received their PhD degrees prior than 1992
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D.22 Faculty Hiring Matrix Names
ABBREVIATION NAMES
1 CINVESTAV(ZACATENCO) CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DE ESTUDIOS AVANZADOS DEL I.P.N. - UNIDAD ZACATENCO
2 CICESE CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION CIENTIFICA Y DE EDUCACION SUPERIOR DE ENSENADA
3 UNAM UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTONOMA DE MEXICO
4 CINVESTAV(OTHERS) CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DE ESTUDIOS AVANZADOS DEL INSTITUTO POLITECNICO NACIONAL
5 IMP INSTITUTO MEXICANO DEL PETROLEO
6 ECOSUR EL COLEGIO DE LA FRONTERA SUR
7 IPICYT INSTITUTO POTOSINO DE INVESTIGACION CIENTIFICA Y TECNOLOGICA AC
8 CIBINOR CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES BIOLOGICAS DEL NOROESTE SC
9 INAOE INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ASTROFISICA OPTICA Y ELECTRONICA
10 UAM UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA METROPOLITANA
11 UAEM UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DEL ESTADO DE MORELOS
12 INECOL INSTITUTO DE ECOLOGIA, A.C
13 IBERO UNIVERSIDAD IBEROAMERICANA AC
14 CICY CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION CIENTIFICA DE YUCATAN AC
15 CIO CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES EN OPTICA AC
16 COLPOS COLEGIO DE POSTGRADUADOS
17 CIQA CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION EN QUIMICA APLICADA, A.C
18 CIAD CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION EN ALIMENTACION Y DESARROLLO AC
19 BUAP BENEMERITA UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE PUEBLA
20 UASLP UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE SAN LUIS POTOSI
21 CIMAV CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION EN MATERIALES AVANZADOS SC
22 IPN INSTITUTO POLITECNICO NACIONAL
23 UV UNIVERSIDAD VERACRUZANA
24 UADY UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE YUCATAN
25 UAEM UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DEL ESTADO DE MEXICO
26 UCOL UNIVERSIDAD DE COLIMA
27 UAQ UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE QUERETARO
28 TEC INSTITUTO TECNOLOGICO Y DE ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES DE MONTERREY
29 UDG UNIVERSIDAD DE GUADALAJARA
30 UGTO UNIVERSIDAD DE GUANAJUATO
31 IMSS INSTITUTO MEXICANO DEL SEGURO SOCIAL
32 UNISON UNIVERSIDAD DE SONORA
33 UMICH UNIVERSIDAD MICHOACANA DE SAN NICOLAS DE HIDALGO
34 UAEH UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DEL ESTADO DE HIDALGO
35 UANL UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE NUEVO LEON
36 TECNM TECNOLOGICO NACIONAL DE MEXICO
189
Appendix D Section D.23
D.23 Prestige Ranking Algorithm
/* Input: A:= weighted directed Adjacency Matrix with zero
entries in the main diagonal. */
sk:= A top-score defined with an arbitrary small initial value;
S:= An empty vector of max scores;
O:= An empty matrix of orders with u columns;
for i = 0 to n do
o0:= Generate a random n-tuple of length u;
M:= Sort the matrix A by o0;
s0:= Compute current score by adding the upper triangular elements of M
by row;
/* Local Search */
for i = 0 to n do
o1:= Swap randomly two elements of o0;
M:= Sort the matrix M by o1;
s1:= Compute swap score by adding the upper triangular elements of
M by row;
if s1 > s0 then
M:= Sort the matrix A by o1;
sk:= Update the top-score by s1;
end if
end for
dif:= Compute difference between s1 and sk;
if dif > 0 then
sk:= Update the top-score by s1;
S:= Add the current score sk as an element of S ;
O:= Add a row of orders given by s1 ;
end if
end for
/* Output1: S:= A set of highest scores */
/* Output2: O:= A matrix of orders for each element in S
*/
Algorithm 1: Prestige Ranking Algorithm by Cowan and Rossello (2018).
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D.24 NSR: Disciplines, Evaluation and Commissions
Disciplines
Area I Physics-Mathematics and Earth Sciences
Area II Biology, Chemistry, Life Sciences
Area III Medicine and Health Sciences
Area IV Humanities and Behavioural Sciences
Area V Social Sciences
Area VI Biotechnology and Agricultural Sciences
Area VII Engineering
Commissions
The members of the “Evaluation Commission" are designated by the “Council of Ap-
proval", the highest authority in the “National System of Researchers" (NSR). Once
the Evaluation Commission is designated and formalised it will run for a period of 3
years. The Evaluation Commission has the obligation to review applications of new
and incumbent members of the NSR.
Evaluation
The “Evaluation Commission" reviews each application assessing both the quality
and the quantity of the research output. Each application is evaluated by at least
two members of the commission. The evaluation takes into consideration primarily
the research output, but also human capital formation (number of supervisions) and
linkages with industry and the public sector, updates in study plans and publication of
dissemination articles. The research output include: Articles, Books, Book Chapters,
Patents, Technological Developments, Innovations and Transfers of Technology.
Levels of Rewards:
- SNI Candidates4: Granted for 3 years, with the possibility of 2 years of extension.
- Level I: Granted for 3 years the first time, and every 4 years in the following periods.
- Level II: Granted for 4 years the first time, and every 5 years in the following peri-
ods.
- Level III: Granted for 5 years the first and second time, and every 10 years in the
following periods.
- Emeritus Professors: Candidates must have 65 years of more, and have accumulated
at least three periods of level III distinction (15 years) without interruption.
4Applicants can only receive this distinction one time.
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D.25 Results Static Rank




























































Figure 20: Stochastic Analysis of Up vs Stay. The solid curves are CEDFs of the proportion of pairs in which RStay >RU p.
Dotted curves are CEDFs for RU p > RStay. Pairs matched by gender, age, discipline, graduation years, and
same PhD university (left), or same first-job university (right). From top to bottom: short-run (Up to 2 years),
medium-run (3-5 years), and long-run (6-25 years) after PhD graduation.
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Figure 21: Stochastic Analysis of Stay vs Down. The solid curves are CEDFs of the proportion of pairs in which RDown >
RStay. Dotted curves are CEDFs for RStay > RDown. Pairs matched by gender, age, discipline, graduation years,
and same PhD university (left), or same first-job university (right). From top to bottom: short-run (Up to 2
years), medium-run (3-5 years), and long-run (6-25 years) after PhD graduation.
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Figure 22: Stochastic Analysis of Stay vs Down. The solid curves are CEDFs of the proportion of pairs in which RDown >
RStay. Dotted curves are CEDFs for RStay > RDown. Pairs matched by gender, age, discipline, graduation years,
and same PhD university (left), or same first-job university (right). From top to bottom: short-run (Up to 2
years), medium-run (3-5 years), and long-run (6-25 years) after PhD graduation.
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D.26 KS-Test Results
Table 42: KS-Test Results for Phd and First-job Matches.
PhD Matches
Null : H0 Short-run Med-run Long-run
F(pU p) = F(pStay) D=0.9874; pvalue=0 D=0.9097; pvalue=0 D=0.8165; pvalue=0
F(pU p)≤ F(pStay) D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1
F(pU p)≥ F(pStay) D=0.9874; pvalue=0 D=0.9097; pvalue=0 D=0.8165; pvalue=0
F(pDown) = F(pStay) D=0.812; pvalue=0 D=0.8487; pvalue=0 D=0.8564; pvalue=0
F(pDown)≤ F(pStay) D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1
F(pDown)≥ F(pStay) D=0.812; pvalue=0 D=0.8487; pvalue=0 D=0.8564; pvalue=0
F(pU p) = F(pDown) D=0.7353; pvalue=0 D=0.6077; pvalue=0 D=0.5924; pvalue=0
F(pU p)≤ F(pDown) D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1
F(pU p)≥ F(pDown) D=0.7353; pvalue=0 D=0.6077; pvalue=0 D=0.5924; pvalue=0
First-Job Matches
Null : H0 Short-run Med-run Long-run
F(pU p) = F(pStay) D=0.9227; pvalue=0 D=0.888; pvalue=0 D=0.9227; pvalue=0
F(pU p)≤ F(pStay) D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1
F(pU p)≥ F(pStay) D=0.9227; pvalue=0 D=0.888; pvalue=0 D=0.9227; pvalue=0
F(pDown) = F(pStay) D=0.8434; pvalue=0 D=0.8319; pvalue=0 D=0.8434; pvalue=0
F(pDown)≤ F(pStay) D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1
F(pDown)≥ F(pStay) D=0.8434; pvalue=0 D=0.8319; pvalue=0 D=0.8434; pvalue=0
F(pU p) = F(pDown) D=0.6273; pvalue=0 D=0.6835; pvalue=0 D=0.6273; pvalue=0
F(pU p)≤ F(pDown) D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1 D=0; pvalue=1
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In line with Article 23 of the regulation governing the attainment of the doctoral
degree at Maastricht University, in this section, I highlight the valorisation opportuni-
ties of this doctoral dissertation. The aim of this section is to show how the knowledge
developed in my research project can be valuable for society, policy makers, and other
scholars.
The general inspiration of this dissertation was to examine why specific demo-
graphic groups remain under-represented in knowledge-intensive occupations. I ex-
amined this with the empirical focus of higher education. The standard economic
theory predicts that rational agents will recruit workers based on individual merit,
skills, and intelligence and not based on physical appearance or group belonging. The
Economic theory considers demographic imbalances as sub-optimal and destined to
disappear. However, the Nobel laureate Gary Becker highlighted that this might not
be the case when agents have a taste for discrimination. Recent contributions in so-
ciology and psychology examined how this consideration might be more nuanced,
showing that this “taste for discrimination” might be unconscious. Moreover, in ed-
ucational settings, merit and skills of students are endogenous to the opportunities
and the quality of supervision is provided them. Since humans tend to display an ho-
mophilistic tendency, under-represented groups are disadvantaged because they have
fewer opportunities to meet similar ones. This observation is the heart of my work and
implies that individual and systemic mechanisms together play a role in perpetuating
these demographic imbalances.
In addition to the scientific relevance discussed in the previous chapters, this dis-
sertation contains research results related to this issue that are of socio-economic rel-
evance for our society. Most of them were highlighted in the previous chapters, I
summarise them in this valorisation addendum.
Beyond the general framework, each chapter examined systemic and individual
mechanisms of the entry process in the workplace. The chapters of this thesis provided
interesting results and new empirical methods.
In Chapter 2, I found that the formation of student-supervisor relation can operate
as a first bottleneck preventing social transformations.
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I developed a new methodology to separate choice homophily from that induced
by the system which solves causal issues creating a null model of type-blind tie for-
mation that incorporates network structures and individual characteristics (i.e. super-
vision capacity, popularity, department norms). Using those results, I examined how
population groups relate to one other. I developed a model with interacting populations
and estimated homophilous preferences in the demographic groups using aggregate
department level data of student, supervisor, and tie composition. The methodology
can be used for monitoring social transformations within organisations and it is suit-
able in the presence of sparse register data. I applied the described methods to register
data of student-advisor relations at South African universities between 1973 and 2014.
My results underline that in the university system both race-based and gender-
based homophily influence tie formation. The observed racial (gender) homophily
in the system arises from institutional constraints, network structures, and choices
made by individuals. In particular, half of the observed homophily is induced by the
system through institutional constraints and network structures and half is driven by
choices. The latter originates primarily in new members of the former dominant group
(white/male students). However, when the sample of students is restricted to promis-
ing students who enter academia, white professors also display choice homophily.
Further, I found that during a transition phase of social transformations homophily
can mechanically increase even if there are no behavioural changes among individ-
uals, under certain circumstances. In terms of policy recommendations, Chapter 2
underlines that to achieve sustainable social transformations a demographic change
is not enough and that structural constraints and behavioural aspects should be tack-
led together. In particular, white (male) students and their advisors is a critical target
group for intervention.
In Chapter 3, I focussed on the individual mechanisms related to training, testing
the link between homophilous/heterophilous (same-/cross- type) ties and productiv-
ity. In particular, I studied whether student-advisor gender and racial couple affects
student’s doctoral productivity. I used an econometric technique, employing a panel
data analysis with a quantile regression approach. This approach studies the link be-
tween homophilous/heterophilous ties and productivity looking at different student
productivity-profiles. I found that on average female students publish less than males.
This difference exists for female students working with a male advisor (heterophilous
ties) and not those working with a female supervisor (homophilous ties). But look-
ing at this link for different student productivity-profiles I found the following. In the
whole sample, female students with a high (or low) productivity-profile studying with
female advisors are as productive as male students with a high (or low) productivity-
profile studying with male advisors. Decomposing the joint effect of gender and race
I found different results looking at same- and cross-racial supervision. For same-race
supervision, the gap in average performance between female students and male stu-
dents is mainly driven by a gap in the right hand tails of the productivity distribution
(students with high productivity profiles). In contrast, cross-racial supervisions dis-
play a smaller gender gap that is u-shaped over student productivity.
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Chapter 3 underlines the role that female advisors have for female students. Fur-
ther, it shows the crucial role that cross-racial ties have in reducing gender productivity
differences. Moreover, the chapter points out that same-(cross-) racial ties have a het-
erogeneous effect on student productivity depending on her/his productivity-profile.
In terms of policy advice, the evidence from the chapter shows that promoting cross-
racial ties and female supervision have potential in decreasing the gender gap.
Most of us agree that achieving a balanced representation of the population in de-
sirable occupations is politically and socially important. Fulfilling a better balance
can enhance economic growth and social development because it increases the pool of
talents to select from, and empowers those previously excluded. However, Chapters 2
and 3 highlighted how the inclusion of previously discriminated groups could be more
difficult than expected and hard to implement with a single policy target. More impor-
tantly, the main results of Chapters 2 and 3 challenge the current policy approach to
integration and inclusion that considers the under-represented population as the main
target group. On the one hand, Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that young agents of the for-
mer majority groups (white males) are should be the target of policies. On the other
hand, Chapter 3 highlights that the main target should be the group of highly pro-
ductive students where most of the student gender productivity gap is generated. The
shift in integration and inclusion policy design, suggested by my findings in Chap-
ters 2 and 3, has a direct implication to strategies aimed at achieving the following
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG): UN-SDG number 4 Quality Education;
UN-SDG number 5 Gender Equality; and UN-SDG number 10 Reduced Inequalities.
Policies devoted to promoting such goals should have a holistic and long-run perspec-
tive beyond labour markets outcomes, and crucially they must focus on the group of
people that hardly conceives possible gains from such policies.
The second part of the dissertation, in Chapters 4 and 5, I examined university
rankings and their implication in the Ph.D. job market and future performance. These
Chapters connect with the increasing importance that universities play in our society,
and the growing interest in the evaluation and ranking of universities. In particular,
university rankings are often used in the job market to screen job candidates. However,
most of university rankings have measuring issues, and they mainly lack information
about how peers and competitor academics evaluate each other. To solve this issue,
Chapters 4 and 5 develop a new ranking algorithm of universities bases on hiring net-
works. This contributes to the policy debate since an improved measure of university
prestige permits a better evaluation of universities for those considering career. In
particular, I studied the link between hiring, university prestige, and research quality.
I developed a technique to rank university prestige and used it to test whether pres-
tige movements affect scholar research quality. To achieve this, I developed a new
quasi-experimental method, based on matching. I compared the quality performance
of matched pairs of individuals with the same training (or same job) but different
movements in the prestige hierarchy.
I found that the university system has a hierarchical prestige ordering with specific
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hiring flows. In this stratified hierarchy, blacks and females are disadvantaged — they
tend to experience more mobility and to move down in the prestige hierarchy when
hired in their first job in academia. Overall, inertia has a positive role in the system:
those who make large movements in terms of prestige have lower research ratings than
those who are hired by the same university granting the Ph.D.. This inertia also affects
the long run (20 years after Ph.D. graduation). The results in the Chapters suggest
that the hierarchical stratification of the university system is a constraint to social
transformation because it systematically disadvantages upward prestige mobility of
black and female Ph.D.s, in particular, with effects also in the long-run. In terms of
policy, any intervention aimed at counteracting this hierarchical stratification allowing
a fruitful exchange between institutions will promote social transformations. Further,
developing incentives to allow black and female students to stay after Ph.D. and built
their research capacity before changing institution could also be beneficial.
Chapters 4 and 5 are of particular interests for policy makers interested in the
diffusion of knowledge and talents. My findings challenge the common notion that
mobility positively affects the performance of a researcher. The association between
mobility and performance is non-linear and context-specific. Indeed, most of the re-
sults that link mobility and performance are from North America where there are no
language differences, and where mobility is at the base of cultural norms (see for ex-
ample the “American Dream”). Moreover, North America and the US, in particular,
are attractors of talents meaning that also the process of including a new researcher
member joining the team is common. A similar organisational and routine activity
might differ in a context where mobility is rare.
The research results of my dissertation are therefore of vital interest for policy
makers and university rectors that want to achieve effective inclusion policies, to in-
crease productivity, and to create a better research environment.
In my thesis, I developed new methods. Chapter 2 develops a new methodol-
ogy which separates choice homophily from that induced by the system. The method
solves causal issues creating a null model of random and unbiased tie formation that
controls for network structures, supervision capacity, and small sample bias. Fur-
ther, I design a model with interacting populations and use it to estimate homophilous
preferences using aggregate department-level data of student, supervisor, and tie com-
position. The methodology is promising for monitoring aggregate and group level
homophily in the entry process. Further, the method can also be used with sparse
register data.
Chapter 3 uses an econometric technique. In particular, I employ a panel data anal-
ysis with a quantile regression approach. This to investigate the link between student-
advisor same- and cross-gender (and race) couples and productivity. In this chapter, I
investigate the relation between homophily and productivity in the different student
productivity-profiles. This accounts for the possibility that homophily/heterophily
(same-/cross-gender -race ties) works differently for (hub) scholars with extraordinary
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levels of productivity who experience Matthew effects.
Chapter 4 develops a new technique to study prestige stratification of institutions.
Based on hiring networks, the algorithm ranks universities according to their repu-
tation among academics. Further, I develop a new quasi-experiment method to test
the effect of movements in the prestige hierarchy on research quality. The method is
based on exact matching and compares the performance of matched pairs of scholars
with the same training (or job) but different prestige transitions.
Chapter 5 modifies the ranking algorithm to rank university prestige. The modified
version of the algorithm takes into account that universities may recruit in a cyclical
manner. In this way, the university ranking is dynamic over time and accounts for
changes in investment flows, modes, news. Then, I apply the matching methodology
used in Chapter 4.
The new methodologies developed in my thesis can be of interest for concrete
product developments. For example, they can be implemented into statistical packages
like R or STATA and used for policy evaluation. This future development is beyond
the scope of my research but is a possible commercial activity. Indeed most of my
methods are suited for application in different organisations (public agencies, large
firms, ...).
The innovation content of this dissertation stands in two main points. First, it is in
its methodology. The various techniques I developed are tailored to the characteristics
of the data I analysed and are particularly suited for sparse register data. Second,
some of my results are counter-intuitive or in the literature similar results have been
supported by little empirical evidence, mostly based on anecdotes.
Regarding the plans for further dissemination and valorisation of my results, I will
present my work to the academic community through conferences and workshops.
Hopefully, the chapters of my dissertation will be published in international peer-
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